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Abstract:  
Despite the increasingly common situation of statelessness in the contemporary Middle East, a 
majority of the theoretical tools used to study nationalism are contingent upon the existence of a 
sovereign state.  As such, they are unable to fully explain the mechanisms of national identity, 
political participation, and integration in non-institutional contexts, where other social identities 
continue to play a significant political role.  In these contexts, the position of demographic 
minorities in society is significant, as actors with the most popular support – majorities -- tend to 
have the strongest impact on the shape of the political field.  This thesis demonstrates what we can 
learn from studying the mechanisms of nationalism and political participation for one such minority 
group, the Palestinian Christians, particularly with regards to how national identity fails or succeeds 
in instilling attachment to the state and society. 
 
This is accomplished by applying the theoretical framework of social identity theory to empirical 
field research conducted in the West Bank in 2014, combined with an analysis of election and survey 
data.  It is argued that the level of attachment individuals feel towards the “state” or confessional 
communities is dependent on the psychological or material utility gained from group membership.  
If individuals feel alienated from the national identity, they are more likely to identify with their 
confessional community.  If they are alienated from both, then they are far likelier to emigrate.  
Additionally, I suggest that the way in which national identity is negotiated in a stateless context is 
important to future state building efforts, as previous attempts to integrate national minorities into 
the political system through, e.g., devolved parliaments and quotas, have failed to instil a universal 
sense of the nation.   
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Chapter One -- Introduction:  It seems to me that nationalism is collapsing in the Middle East and the Middle East is going through a crisis of  identity.  People are not sure who they are and how can they define themselves.  And identity is a complex issue because there are a lot of  social elements that shape a person's identity.  I can say I am from the West Bank, I am from Bethlehem, I am a Christian – all of  them could be true depending on the social context -- each one of  us has multiple identities.  Sometimes these identities could be in tension with each other and there are dominant identities depending on the reality of  the situation.1  -- Palestinian academic, mid-40s, Bethlehem  
The objective of  this study is to examine the role that social identity plays in political participation 
and integration for the Palestinian Christian communities.  This will be accomplished by exploring 
how the two largest confessional communities, the Rum Orthodoks and Latin (Catholic), negotiate 
between loyalty and adherence to the cultural identity and political norms of  their confessional 
communities, and that of  the proto-Palestinian state, where they represent a small, but vital part of  
the population. 
 
As the above quotation illustrates, social identity is a complex and fluid concept.  It shapes the ways 
in which we view ourselves and the other and consequently affects our interaction with the social 
and political landscape.  This is because our membership in social groups not only dictates 
acceptable behaviour in response to social roles (e.g. As a Palestinian Christian I cannot vote for Hamas)2, 
but also because in-group biases can affect the ways in which we experience integration within our 
other constituent social identities.  This is particularly relevant to our experience of  national identity 
in that nationalisms that are insufficiently broad and inclusive may alienate rather than include 
groups in the demographic, economic or cultural minority.  In the contemporary Middle East, the 
collapse of  authoritarian regimes, which had previously subdued sub-national ethnic, religious, and 
communal identities, has fractured the notions of  the nation and state.  As a result, actors from 
varying ideological perspectives are once again contesting what constitutes “the nation”.  This has 
had a dramatic effect on ethnic, demographic, and religious minorities across the region who find 
themselves increasingly alienated by evolving notions of  national identity in which communalism 
and religion have become a central focus.  Although Palestine has been largely unaffected by the 
                                                 1. Palestinian Academic, interview by Quinn Coffey2014, Bethlehem. 
2 This opinion was expressed repeatedly during interviews and informal discussions during fieldwork.  Following Sen (2009), this study argues that belonging to a social identity limits what are considered acceptable choices in either the social or political sphere; hence publically supporting Hamas, as an Islamist party, is irreconcilable with being a Christian.     
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violence and upheaval of  the Arab Uprisings,3 the ongoing Israeli Occupation, Islamic 
fundamentalism, an ineffective Palestinian Authority, and perpetual statelessness have created an 
environment in which notions of  the nation are increasingly splintered along political, communal, 
and religious lines.  As a result, the Palestinian Christian community has struggled to define its role 
as a small, but integral part of  the Palestinian national and cultural landscape.  This study uses an 
analytical framework inspired by social identity theory to address how identity affects levels of  
integration (national belonging/state attachment) and modes of  political participation in the 
Palestinian Christian communities.   
 
Social identity and state formation: 
As states form, they are shaped by the various socio-linguistic, religious, and ethnic groups from 
which they are constituted, which are consolidated or repurposed in the creation of  a singular 
notion of  the nation.  In some cases, this national identity reflects the plurality of  these various sub-
national groups, becoming broad and inclusive.  In other cases, the national identity is reflective of  
the group in the demographic, economic or cultural “majority”.  This inevitably isolates other sub-
national groups who then face the challenge of  negotiating between the preservation of  their 
cultural integrity, and loyalty and conformity to the state as “minorities”.  Within the context of  a 
stable nation-state, notions of  national identity remain consistent over time, as does the relative 
position of  various sub-national groups.  However, within unstable states experiencing ongoing 
conflict, economic underdevelopment or the dissolution of  borders, notions of  the nation can 
become fractured along sub-national and supra-national lines.  In these contexts, identity becomes a 
central consideration in the political field as these groups struggle to transform the ideological and 
structural nature of  the state -- often based on the interests of  the sub-national group they 
represent, rather than the nation as a whole.   
 
Despite the relevance of  social identity in the contemporary political culture of  the Middle East, its 
effects on the social and political fields are poorly understood.  This is partly due to the fact identity 
itself  is difficult to define.  As Fearon notes, ‘Even though everyone knows how to use the word 
properly in everyday discourse, it proves quite difficult to give a short and adequate summary 
                                                 
3 The Arab Uprisings (“Arab Spring”; “Arab Awakening”) were a series of countrywide protests against authoritarianism and corruption beginning in Tunisia in 2010.  These protests spread throughout 2011 and 2012 to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria where leadership was either ousted or significantly challenged; and Bahrain, Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia where the government either quickly quelled protests with minor changes or the threat of violence.   
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statement that captures the range of  its present meanings’.4  This is because of  the nature of  identity 
as a fluid concept with multiple meanings -- it is not easy to define it in absolute, static or singular 
terms.  Rather, it is an ongoing process or dialogue between the social context and our sense of  self.  
As such, it is impossible to define ourselves in relation to one coherent and temporally static identity.  
It is more accurate, therefore, to speak of  moments of  identification5 in which our many constituent 
“selves” layer in response to the social context.  Although we may have a strong sense of  who we 
are as individuals in these moments of  identification, we almost always define ourselves in relation 
to larger social groups.  That is, when answering the question, who are you?, the answer is almost 
always a social identity -- I am British; I am a Christian; I am a teacher. Naturally, we all identify with a 
number of  social identities simultaneously, but certain of  these identities become more salient in 
response to factors like the material or psychological utility of  an identity or perceived threat against 
the group.6  But the layering of  these social identities also affects our behaviour, as it shapes our 
priorities, needs, and loyalties, as well as the possible choices available to a member of  that social 
group.  This is because when we become members of  social groups we often take on social roles -- 
as a Christian, a mother  -- and implicit in these roles are certain behavioural expectations from the 
group and society as a whole.7 
 
Using social identity as an analytical tool, this study proposes that if  Palestinian Christians feel 
alienated from the broader Palestinian national identity (i.e. they do not see themselves reflected in 
it), there can be a decline in the level attachment they feel towards the state and an increase in the 
level of  communalism8.  Further, if  Palestinian Christians do not feel that their leadership (priests, 
community leaders, etc.) can sufficiently address acute social and political issues, then they are less 
likely to be willing to endure the daily hardship of  the Israeli Occupation and will be likelier to 
emigrate.  As this study will show, this is evidenced by the fact that there is a decline in both 
religiosity and politicisation in the Palestinian Christian community.  This is the result of  a dual 
struggle: within the church to define its identity and vocation; and within the state to define its 
national identity whilst presenting a unifying narrative of  the nation.  This is because the level of  
                                                 4. James Fearon, "What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word)?,"  (1999)., 2. 
5 “Moments of identification” is a term conceived in the process of writing this thesis.  It was inspired by the cited works on social identity theory.   
6 The material utility of identity refers to the tangible material benefits of associating identifying with a group; e.g. members of the Latin Church have greater access to the social welfare provided by the Vatican in the Middle East.   
7 Amartya Sen, "The Fog of Identity," Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8, no. 3 (2009). 
8 Communalism herein is defined as a strong connection, prioritisation, and allegiance to the religious community.   
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psychological and material utility that individuals derive from group identities, whether they are 
communal or political, is extremely consequential to their willingness to take part in these identities 
and to endure hardship.  In other words, if  these identities do not meet certain basic criteria, then 
there is little reason for individuals to take part in them. 
 
Approaches to the study of  identity and politics in the Middle East: 
The evolving position of  minorities in the Middle East and the ways in which they participate 
politically is an understudied area of  academic research.  Within the relatively stable context of  
authoritarianism, Middle Eastern Christians typically had close relationships with authoritarian 
regimes9, both in order to preserve their often fragile position in society and because the alternatives 
to authoritarianism, such as political Islam, could potentially endanger their relatively stable position 
in society.10  In the Palestinian context, as discussed above, the lack of  a state over the course of  
modern history, and the general trend of  quasi-secular politics in Palestine has meant that Palestinian 
Christians have been able to play a significant role in Palestinian politics despite their relatively small 
number. However, apart from studies that give a cursory overview of  political trends as part of  
broader studies on the history of  these communities, there has been minimal academic focus on the 
issues at the core of  these trends in the Palestinian Christian communities.  Rather, studies on 
Palestinian Christians have generally given a historical or theological perspective on their history in 
the region.  These types of  published works can be grouped into two areas: those which are part of  
larger edited works on Middle Eastern Christianity, and those which address the history of  a 
particular confessional community in the Holy Land.   
 
Belonging to the first group, the edited work by Emma Loosley and Anthony O’Mahony, Eastern 
Christianity in the Modern Middle East (2010), offers a valuable interdisciplinary perspective on the 
contemporary state of  Middle Eastern Christian communities, broken down by confessional 
                                                 
9 Fiona McCallum, "Religious Institutions and Authoritarian States: Church–State Relations in the Middle East," Third World Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2012). 
10 The complex and evolving relationship between Middle Eastern Christian communities and authoritarian regimes has been characterised by pragmatism rather than ideological support, although amongst older Palestinian Christians there remains a certain level of allegiance to older Ba’ath party and pan-Arabist ideological perspectives.  The issue of the Assad regime has become divisive amongst Palestinians more generally, but popular Palestinian Christian leaders like Atallah Hanna, Bishop of Sebastia, have come out in support of the Assad regime.  Naela  Khalil, "Syria War Polarizes West Bank Palestinians," al-Monitor 2013. 
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community.11  Similarly, the edited work, Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East: The 
Challenge of  the Future (1998), offers varying interdisciplinary perspectives relating the 
contemporary struggles of  Middle Eastern Christians to their historical origins.12  Both of  these 
books were invaluable in terms of  locating the general historical context of  the Palestinian Christian 
communities in the early stages of  this research.   
 
More specific to the immediate regional context under examination in this thesis, Una McGahern’s 
2011 book Palestinian Christians in Israel: State Attitudes Towards Non-Muslims in a Jewish State, 
was particularly useful in exploring how the experiences of  the Palestinian Christian communities in 
Israel contrasted those of  the Palestinian Christian communities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.13  
This work offered insights as to how the relationship between the state and the Christian 
communities shapes their attitudes towards feelings of  integration and political participation.  
Similarly, Paolo Maggiolini’s 2015 paper, Christian Churches and Arab Christians in the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan: Citizenship, Ecclesiastical Identity and Roles in the Jordanian Political Field, 
offers a contrasting experience of how neighbouring Muslim-majority states relate to their Christian 
minority communities.14  It was particularly useful in terms of the examination of ecclesiastical 
identity in the context of participation in the political and national processes.   
 
Books on the history of  the various Palestinian Christian communities themselves were useful in 
further stages of  the research.  The specific historical context of  the Palestinian Christian 
community was examined via a number of  different perspectives.  Firstly, studies that examined the 
historical context of  the Palestinian Christian community broadly.  In this respect, O’Mahony’s 2003 
edited book, The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land: Studies in History, 
Religion and Politics, was valuable in discussing both the origins and contemporary context of  the 
various Palestinian Christian confessional communities.15  Similarly, Marsh’s 2005 paper, Palestinian 
Christianity – A Study in Religion and Politics, gives a useful overview of the post-1948 political and 
                                                 
11 Sotiris Roussos, "Eastern Orthodox Christianity in the Middle East," in Eastern Christianity in the Modern Middle East, ed. Anthony O'Mahony and Emma Loosley (London: Routledge, 2010). 
12 Andrea Pacini, Christian Communities in the Arab Middle East: The Challenge of the Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
13 Una McGahern, Palestinian Christians in Israel: State Attitudes Towards Non-Muslims in a Jewish State (Routledge, 2011). 
14 Paolo  Maggiolini, "Christian Churches and Arab Christians in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Citizenship, Identity and Roles Ecclesiastical in the Jordanian Political Field," Archive of Social Science of Religions 5, no. 171 (2015). 
15 The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land: Studies in History, Religion and Politics, ed. Anthony O'Mahony (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003). 
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social context, as well as the theological responses to the political and social context by Palestinian 
religious leaders.16  The history of the relationship between Palestinian Christians to the Arab and 
Palestinian nationalist movements was explored in Noah Haiduc-Dale’s 2013 book, Arab Christians 
in British Mandate Palestine: Communalism and Nationalism 1917-1948.17  Similarly, Robson’s 2011 
book, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine, gave useful overview of Christian-specific 
responses to colonialism and the Zionist movement.18   
 
Studies specific to the historical context of  the two case study communities were also explored.  
O’Mahony has published numerous works on the Palestinian Latin community and the role of  the 
Vatican in Palestinian/Israeli relations.  In regards to both the history and internal political dynamics 
of  these communities, The Christian Communities of  Jerusalem and the Holy Land: Studies in 
History, Religion and Politics (2003) was valuable in discussing both the origins and contemporary 
context of  the Palestinian Latin community, but also other Palestinian Christian communities.19  
Similarly, O’Mahony’s 2007 work, The Vatican, Jerusalem, the State of  Israel, and Christianity in the 
Holy Land gave insights into both the internal and external political dynamics of  the Palestinian 
Latin community.20  The contemporary role of  the Patriarchal leadership, particularly that of  former 
Patriarch Sabbah, was explored in O’Mahony’s 2005 paper, Rome and Jerusalem: The Vatican and 
Christianity in the Holy Land.21   
 
The considerably longer history of  the Palestinian Orthodox community was explored both in 
connection to the history of  Orthodoxy more generally and its origins in the Holy Land.  In this 
regard, Tsimhoni’s two papers The Status of  the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in 
Palestine (1982) and The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of  Jerusalem During the Formative Years of  
the British Mandate in Palestine (1978) give a useful overview of  the history of  this community in 
                                                 
16 Leonard Marsh, "Palestinian Christianity – a Study in Religion and Politics," International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 57, no. 7 (2005). 
17 Noah Haiduc-Dale, Arab Christians in British Mandate Palestine: Communalism and Nationalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013). 
18 Laura Robson, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011). 
19 Anthony O'Mahony, "The Latins of the East: The Vatican, Jerusalem and the Palestinian Christians," in The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land: Studies in History, Religion and Politics, ed. Anthony O'Mahony (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003). 
20 "The Vatican, Jerusalem, the State of Israel, and Christianity in the Holy Land," International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 5, no. 2 (2007). 
21 Anthony O’Mahony "Rome and Jerusalem: The Vatican and Christianity in the Holy Land," Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies 7, no. 2 (2005). 
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Palestine.22  Several other papers focused specifically on the contested identity of  the Palestinian 
Orthodox community, whilst also giving detailed histories. Marsh’s 2011 paper, The Orthodox 
Church and its Palestinian-Christian Identity, connects the contemporary struggle over the identity 
of  the Palestinian Orthodox community to the issue of  the Patriarchate of  Jerusalem’s vocation over 
its long history.23  Similarly, Vatikiotis’ 1994 paper, The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem 
between Hellenism and Arabism, discusses the impact of the development of competing Greek and 
Arab nationalisms on the identity of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem.24  
 
Roussos has published numerous studies on issues of identity and politics in the Orthodox 
community.  The 2003 paper, The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and Community of Jerusalem: 
Church, State and Identity, gives a very useful background to the history of the Palestinian 
Orthodox community from the Ottoman period into the early 1990s. 25  This paper also usefully 
examines the role of colonial powers in these struggles over the identity and vocation of the 
Jerusalem Patriarchate throughout the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries.  Similarly, Roussos’ 1999 
paper, The Greek Orthodox Community of Jerusalem in International Politics: International 
Solutions for Jerusalem and the Greek Orthodox Community in the 19th and 20th Centuries, 
discusses the important role of international actors in the local politics of the Palestinian and ethnic 
Greek Orthodox communities in the Holy Land.26  Roussos’ 1995 paper, How Greek, how 
Palestinian? The Patriarchate of Jerusalem in the Mid-War Years, continues the discussion over the 
contested identity of the Patriarchate, detailing specifically the transition from Ottoman to British 
authority.27  The relationship between the early Arab nationalist movements and Orthodoxy was 
explored in a 2007 paper, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism and Greek Orthodox Church 
Networks in the Near East: 1899-1947, which formed a useful basis for the discussion of these 
                                                 
22 Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Status of the Arab Christians under the British Mandate in Palestine," Middle Eastern Studies 20, no. 4 (1984).; "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem During the Formative Years of the British Mandate in Palestine," Asian and African Studies (Journal of the Israel Oriental Society, University of Haifa) 12, no. 1 (1978). 
23 Leonard Marsh, "The Orthodox Church and Its Palestinian-Christian Identity," Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 63, no. 1-2 (2011). 
24 P.J. Vatikiotis, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem between Hellenism and Arabism," Middle Eastern Studies 30, no. 4 (1994). 
25 Sotiris Roussos, “The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and Community of Jerusalem: Church, State and Identity”, in The Christian Communitieis of Jerusalem and the Holy Land: Studies in History, Religion and Politics, ed. Anthony O'Mahony (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003). 
26 Sotiris Roussos, “The Greek Orthodox Community of Jerusalem in International Politics. International Solutions for Jerusalem and the Greek Orthodox Community in the 19th and 20th centuries”, in Jerusalem, Its Sanctity and Centrality to Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Continuum Press, ed. Lee Levine (Continuum, 1999). 
27 Sotiris Roussos, "How Greek, How Palestinian? The Patriarchate of Jerusalem in the Mid-War Years," Sobornost incorporating Eastern Churches Review 17, no. 1 (1995). 
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trends in chapter four.  Finally, the contemporary manifestations of identity and politics in the 
Palestinian Orthodox community was explored in a 2005 paper by Katz and Kark titled, The Greek 
Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem and its Congregation: Dissent Over Real Estate, in which they 
detail the relationship of the Greek higher clergy to the State of Israel, centring on the sale of 
Patriarchal land to the Israeli investors.   
 
In addition to the above texts, studies related more specifically to social, theological, and political 
issues within the Palestinian Christian communities were examined. In general, these studies can 
generally be grouped into two areas of  focus: studies on identity and surveys.  Lybarger has 
published two insightful studies on negotiating religion and politics in Palestine.  The first, a 2007 
book entitled Identity and Religion in Palestine, addresses the evolving role of  religion in the 
Palestinian political landscape.28  This has been particularly useful in understanding how religion has 
come to shape the political landscape in Palestine.  Lybarger addressed Palestinian Christian identity 
more specifically in a 2007 paper, For church or nation? : Islamism, secular-nationalism, and the 
transformation of  Christian identities in Palestine, in which he relies on ethnographic research to 
discuss three particular modes of  political belonging within these communities.29  Similarly, 
Kårtveit's 2014 book, Dilemmas of  Attachment: Identity and Belonging Among Palestinian 
Christians, provides a nuanced and insightful look into the complexities of  national belonging for 
the Palestinian Christian communities, as well as highlighting the realities of  Christian-Muslim 
relations in Palestine.30 These complex dynamics of  Christian-Muslim relations in Palestinian were 
also usefully explored in Haiduc-Dale’s 2015 paper, Rejecting Sectarianism: Palestinian Christians' Role in 
Muslim–Christian Relations.  This paper offers a historical perspective on Christian-Muslim relations, 
particularly in relation to modes of Christian political participation in the Arab and Palestinian nationalist 
movements over time.  Bowman also addresses the complex modes of  national belonging amongst 
Palestinians in general, with some special emphasis on the particularity of  national belonging for the 
Christian community in the 2007 edited book Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Peace and Conflict 
Research. 31 Relating specifically to the intersection of  religion and politics in the Palestinian 
Christian communities, Marsh’s 2004 paper, Palestinian Christians: Theology and Politics in the Holy 
                                                 28. Loren D. Lybarger, Identity and Religion in Palestine, Princeton University Press (Princeton2007). 29. "For Church or Nation? : Islamism, Secular-Nationalism, and the Transformation of Christian Identities in Palestine," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, no. 4 (2007). 30. B.H. Kårtveit, Dilemmas of Attachment: Identity and Belonging among Palestinian Christians (London: Brill, 2014). 31. Glenn Bowman, "Constitutive Violence and Rhetorics of Identity," in Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Peace and Conflict Research, ed. Francisco Ferrandiz and Antonius Robben (Bilbao: University of Deusto, 2007). 
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Land, discusses specific theological responses, like Palestinian Liberation Theology, to the social and 
political context of the communities.32  
 
The second group of  studies, which informed much of  the framework for this analysis, were a 
group of  demographic and other surveys carried out largely by Palestinian NGOs and CROs.  These 
studies provided a useful basis from which to carry out further study.  These included the 2006 
Sabeel Survey on Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and Israel33, which addresses demographic 
issues in particular; a 1996 study by Sabella and Hanf  entitled A Date with Democracy: Palestinians 
on Society and Politics, an Empirical Survey,34 which gives an overview of  Palestinian political 
opinions; a 2008 study by the Diyar Consortium Palestinian Christians in the West Bank: Facts, 
Figures and Trends,35 which is an excellent resource for understanding the material contribution of  
Palestinian Christians in the field of  social welfare; and two studies by Sabella in 2001, Comparing 
Palestinian Christians on Society and Politics: Context and Religion in Israel and Palestine 36and 2005 
Christian Arab Presence in Palestine,37 which discuss trends in the political opinions of  the 
community.  Additionally, the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research, which has carried 
out dozens of  large-scale surveys on topics ranging from political support to views on violence, has 
generously made the raw survey data from 38 surveys conducted between 2000-2010 available for 
this study.  Christian-specific data was then tracked and analysed in SPSS.  This data has given 
considerable insights into political support over time, views on the Palestinian Authority, levels of  
religiosity, opinions on the peace process, and numerous other social and political issues. 
 
Within the larger field of  identity politics, studies have typically relied on survey data in order to 
track the ways in which gender, ethnicity, and religion affect political participation.  However because 
of  the reliance on quantitative data and surveys, these studies have tended to oversimplify or 
misinterpret the relationships between various levels of  identity and politics.  One clear example of  
                                                 
32 Leonard Marsh, "Palestinian Christians: Theology and Politics in the Holy Land," One in Christ: A Catholic Ecumenical Review 39, no. 3 (2004). 33. Sabeel, "The Sabeel Survey on Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and Israel," Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center  (2006). 34. Theodor Hanf and Bernard Sabella, A Date with Democracy: Palesitnians on Society and Politics, an Empirical Survey (Freiburg: Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut, 1996). 35. Mitri Raheb, Palestinian Christians in the West Bank: Facts, Figures and Trends, ed. Rifat Odeh Kassis; and Rania Al Qass Collings (Bethlehem: Diyar Consortium, 2008). 36. Bernard Sabella, "Comparing Palestinian Christians on Society and Politics: Context and Religion in Israel and Palestine," in Middle East Studies Association (Al Bushra, 2001). 37. Sabella, "Christian Arab Presence in Palestine," al-Liqa' 24 (2005). 
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this in the Palestinian Christian context is the disconnect between the perceived dominance of  
certain political parties within the communities, and the election results themselves.  Survey data is 
unable to explain why, for example, a Palestinian Christian may support Hamas as a resistance group, 
attend a PFLP rally, and then vote for Fatah.  As such, it is valuable to explore the complexities of  
political choice, identity and social behaviour because this may give us insights into other issues like 
emigration, sectarianism, and alternative state building models.  These issues over the methodology 
and terminology in studies on identity politics are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.   
 
Studies on nationalism and state development were also used in this study.  However, an underlying 
and potentially problematic assumption of  these studies is that they assume that nations necessarily 
develop into states.  Relatively few studies have addressed nationalism within the context of  
statelessness.  Wedeen's 2008 book, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen, 
which discusses how Yemenis form national attachments in the absence of  a strong and coherent 
state apparatus, was particularly instructive on issues of  statelessness, as well as offering a compelling 
critique of  traditional models of  nation and state theory.  Chapter Three of  this study continues this 
discussion and engages with traditional notions of  nationalism and state building.  
 
Although these publications on identity and surveys of  political and social trends have provided 
useful insights into broad trends within the community, there have not been any studies which have 
provided a clear link between identity issues and political behaviour within the Palestinian Christian 
community.  There have also been few studies that have detailed voting trends and political party 
support over time.  This study hopes to address these gaps.   
 
As the future of  nations and states in the Middle East continues to evolve, it is important to address 
how groups will enforce, reinvent, and transmit ideas of  the nation.  Further, studies that address 
the negotiation between religious and political identity are particularly relevant to the contemporary 
Middle East, as they can contribute to our understanding of  how areas of  significant religious 
diversity envision the future of  the nation and state.  It is hoped that this study will make a 
contribution to our understanding of  how non-Muslim minorities in particular negotiate between 
preserving the cultural integrity of  their religious identities, whilst participating in a political context 
that is increasingly divided along religious lines.  This is particularly relevant to state-building efforts 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and potentially post-conflict Syria as federalism, proportional electoral systems, 
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and devolved parliamentary powers have thus far failed to successfully integrate minority 
communities in the national political field.  As discussed in Chapter Five, this is because minority 
communities often have a complicated relationship with affirmative action efforts, which may isolate 
their communities or exacerbate the perceived differences between sub-national groups and the 
nation as a whole.  This study can therefore offer insights into the ways in which these communities 
view their place in society, and the effects of  these types of  political arrangements.  Finally, it is 
hoped that this study will contribute to the study of  Palestinian politics more generally, as a 
supplement to the broader field of  Palestinian studies.   
 
Key Definitions: 
Before elaborating on the methodology used in this study, it is necessary to define a few key terms.  
Firstly, this study uses the term “minority”, but does so cautiously and critically.  Although the 
ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq have drawn considerable academic and media attention to the 
vulnerable minorities of the Middle East, there has been little critical examination of how the term is 
used.   Middle Eastern minority groups have been broadly defined as non-Muslim (Christian, Yazidi, 
Jewish, among many others), but also include Shi’a Muslims, moderate Muslims38, atheists, women, 
children, LGBT communities and any other groups who do not fit into the rigid religio-cultural 
paradigm of Daesh (Islamic State).  However, despite the diversity of these groups, they are discussed 
within a similar intellectual framework structured by our preconceived notions of what being a 
minority entails.  Our understanding of minority status in the Middle East therefore become 
amorphous, raising questions as to its usefulness and accuracy.   
 
Within the context of the modern Middle East, minority is used primarily to characterize groups that 
are in some way subordinate or vulnerable within their specific cultural or political context.  It is this 
understanding of minority that has led to the development of international protections of these 
groups and the enshrining of minority rights within the legislative frameworks of developing states: 
e.g. devolved parliamentary powers and reserved parliamentary seats.  A fundamental flaw in this 
                                                 
38 The term “moderate Muslim” is used cautiously and infrequently in this study.  As the British journalist Sarfraz Manzoor rightly points out, the term incorrectly implies a distinction between “good” secular and westerised Muslims and “bad” observant Muslims.  Within the context of this study, the term is used only to distinguish between Muslims who support political Islam and those who support other political ideologies.  Sarfraz  Manzoor, "Can We Drop the Term ‘Moderate Muslim’? It’s Meaningless,"  The Guardian (2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/16/moderate-muslim-devout-liberal-religion.   
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understanding is that it does not provide the necessarily background to understand how a minority 
community has interacted with society over time.  Thus, we consider both the tragically besieged 
Iraqi Yazidis and the far more stable Egyptian Copts to be minorities, independent of their vastly 
different social and political realities.  This suggests that the language we use to understand these 
communities suffers from a lack of precision resulting from our failure to consider the perspectives 
of the communities themselves, who may reject their characterization as unequal, subordinate or 
vulnerable.  At best this mislabelling may result in a bruising of egos, at worst it may undermine or 
discredit the enormous contributions that these communities have made to their national cultures, 
by assuming that they are irreconcilably different from their countrymen.  This has wide ranging 
implications for the ways in which these groups are perceived within their evolving national 
contexts, but also the ways in which the international community engages with development, state 
building, and aid.  Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the term is used only in reference to the 
demography  of the Palestinian Christians, not to imply that they are in any way subordinate within 
their societies.  This choice was made primarily because, as Chapter Seven will discuss in more detail, 
the community itself rejects the term, reflecting the complex relationship that Middle Eastern 
Christians have with their status as “vulnerable minorities”.   
 
It is also important to briefly discuss what is meant by the term “community” within the context of  
this study.  As Mayo discusses, ‘definitions of community’ have tended to focus upon two aspects – 
community in terms of place or shared geography, and community in terms of shared interests, 
whether these are based upon ‘race’, ethnicity, religion or some other interest which the community 
in question shares in common.’39  This study uses community in three contexts: the broad 
Palestinian Christian community, which encompasses a number of smaller confessional 
communities; the confessional communities themselves (i.e. Orthodox, Latin, Baptist, etc.); and the 
national community – Palestinian.  The first two comprise “communities of interest”, in which 
members of the community share in common, but also often imagined sets of interests and values.  
In that sense, communities of interest are intimately linked with the concepts of social identity and 
the in/out-group, which are discussed further in Chapter Two.  The national community also shares 
in an imagined set of interests, but has a stronger emphasis on geography, in that the nation or 
national homeland is an important aspect of how the national community is conceptualised.  This 
                                                 
39 Marjorie Mayo, Cultures, Communitieis, Identities: Cultural Strategies for Participation and Empowerment (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000)., 39 
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study is primarily interested in how individuals negotiate between these varying levels of identity and 
community, as well as the points at which the interests of these varying identities intersect.   
 
These processes of negotiating identity, community, and interest are apparent in the discussion of 
how the confessional communities define and refer to themselves, as the names of  the confessional 
communities often reflect internal debates as to the identity and vocation of  the churches 
themselves.  The two case study communities in this study are the Greek Orthodox and Latin40 
communities, who constitute the two largest confessional communities in Palestine.  Although this 
study also deals with the Palestinian Christian community more broadly, issues of  religious identity 
are explored in more detail within the context of  these two confessional communities.   
 
Issues of  social/communal identity were particular strong in the Orthodox community. Although 
the term “Greek Orthodox” is appropriate shorthand to refer to the specific rituals and liturgy of  
this confession, the identity of  the Orthodox Patriarchate of  Jerusalem has been the source of  
conflict between the Arab laity and ethnic Greek higher clergy since at least the advent of  Greek and 
Arab nationalism in the 19th century.  In the contemporary context, the indigenous Palestinian 
Orthodox community refers to itself  using the Ottoman designation “Rum Orthodoks” – although in 
the Ottoman period this term referred to Orthodox of  all ethnicities.  Rum Orthodoks is the primary 
term used in this study, however Greek Orthodox is used when referring to the institution of  the 
Patriarchate itself.  The term “Arab Orthodox” is used in some instances to distinguish between the 
Arabic-speaking indigenous Orthodox Christians of  the Middle East and their ethnic Greek 
counterparts, although the community rarely refers to themselves with this label.  Within the 
considerably younger Latin community, there is not a longstanding struggle over the name of  the 
church and community.  But given the presence of  approximately 10 other Christian denominations 
across the Middle East, including sizeable Catholic communities of  other rites: Maronite, Chaldean, 
Melkite, this study refers to the community as “Latin” despite the fact that many respondents 
referred to themselves simply as Katholik (Catholic). 
 
Methodology and Plan of  Study: This study consists of  two major sections: communal identity and political identity.  Both sections 
rely on qualitative data obtained during fieldwork in the West Bank in 2014.  A majority of  the 
                                                 40. Catholics of the Roman rite. 
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interviews took place in and around the Bethlehem area including: Bethlehem city, Beit Sahour, Beit 
Jala, East Jerusalem and further afield in Taybeh and Ramallah.  20 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted lasting from one to two hours, in addition to four focus groups with 5-10 participants 
each, and hours of  observation in youth groups, churches, political rallies, and community events.   
 
Through these interviews with community members, church leadership, NGO and CRO workers, 
and politicians, this study was able to gain a nuanced view of  identity within these communities.  
Although this study also deals with trends across the Palestinian Christian community as a whole, 
two case study communities were examined in greater detail: the Rum Orthodox and Latin 
communities.  As detailed above, these communities were chosen not only because they are the two 
largest confessional communities in Palestine, but also because their contrasting histories and origins 
can offer insights into the differences and similarities in the experience of  identity therein.  The case 
study approach, of  course, limits the ability to make generalisations about the community as a 
whole, but can also show the considerable complexity and depth of  the experience of  identity and 
its varying effects on political participation in the community. 
 
A qualitative method was chosen because of  its ability to track the dynamics of  ‘attitudes, values and 
behaviour patterns of  ordinary citizens’, which other studies on Middle Eastern identity politics are 
often lacking due to their reliance on survey data.41   This has allowed for a more thorough 
examination of  the ways in which identity shapes interest and action in the social space, as well as 
helping to explain inconsistencies within the data – such as Christian support for Hamas or 
disconnects between perceived dominance of  certain political parties and electoral data.  Interview 
and focus group participants were selected using the chain sampling technique, in which initial 
research contacts referred additional participants from within their own social or professional 
networks.  This technique was chosen because of  its proven efficacy in conflict environments in 
which it may be difficult to gain access to certain groups.42   I was also acutely aware of  the 
limitations of  chain or referral sampling, both in relation to the possible selection bias of  
community "gatekeepers" and potentially becoming isolated within their social networks.  In order 
to avoid these pitfalls, my initial research contacts were chosen from a variety of  sources with 
diverse backgrounds, professions, confessional communities and age groups.  In this way,                                                  41. Nissim Cohen and Tamar Arieli, "Field Research in Conflict Environments: Methodological Challenges and Snowball Sampling," Peace Research 48, no. 4 (2011)., 425 42. Ibid. 
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participants were not limited from within a single social or professional network.  Within the context 
of  the fieldwork, several key themes were addressed with interview and focus group participants in 
order to best identify factors affecting identity and state attachment.  
 
Communal Identity: 
1. What factors determine whether or not an individual identifies with their confessional 
community or their broader communal identity? 
2. What role does the material utility of  the community play in identity choice? 
3. Is there a relationship between contextualisation of  the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict in the 
faith and levels of  attachment to the communal or confessional identities? 
4. How have evolving social norms (such as interfaith marriage) affected views of  the 
confessional communities? 
5. What role does church leadership play in influencing political choice? 
Political Identity: 
1. What factors determine whether or not an individual identifies with their national identity? 
2. What role does the material utility (the material benefit gained by the individual or group) of  
the state play in identity choice? 
3. How is the Palestinian nation conceptualised within the Christian community?   
4. How do Palestinian Christians conceptualise their role in Palestinian society?  
a. In terms of  Citizenship 
b. In terms of  Equal Rights 
5. How does political participation function? 
a. Voting trends 
b. Party support 
c. What factors contribute to whether or not individuals participate in politics? 
6. How has political participation changed over time? 
7. What are views on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? 
8. What are the major concerns for the future of  the Palestinian Christian community? 
 
  
  25
In addition to addressing the above themes, each interview was concluded with an identity card 
exercise. 43 Respondents were given index cards with possible social identifications listed on them 
and then asked to chose the cards relevant to them and arrange them according to personal 
importance.  The respondent was then asked to discuss why they had chosen the particular cards 
and excluded others, as well as their prioritisation of  identities.  This exercise gave insights into how 
individuals identified, what factors influenced their identity, and lead to other discussions about the 
ways in which respondent’s social identity had changed over time.  Although this was an enlightening 
exercise, it was undoubtedly influenced by the context of  the interview and interviewer.  As is 
discussed in the introduction, it is expected that the results would vary slightly depending on the 
context.    
 
The interviews were conducted on the condition of  anonymity and names were omitted from the 
saved data, but information on age, religious background, political background, and location of  the 
interview were recorded.  This interview material was transcribed and then entered into the NVivo 
software for analysis and coding.  Major coding themes were as follows: 
 
1. Church life 2. Political support and trends 3. Identity and history 4. Demography 5. Social and public life  Survey data was created based upon opinion surveys conducted by the Palestinian Centre for Policy 
and Survey Research (PCPSR).  I was given access to the raw SPSS data files from 38 large-scale 
opinion polls conducted from 2000-2010.44  Christian-specific data was then analysed in SPSS.  
Sample size varied from survey to survey, but averaged around 50 Christian respondents from an 
even distribution of  male and female respondents to each of  the 38 surveys.  This sample size 
reflected the total percentage of  Christians to the total population (roughly 1%).45    
                                                 
43 The idea of the identity card exercise came from a discussion with members of the Defining and Identifying Middle Eastern Christian Communities in Europe (DIMECCE) research team, who used a similar exercise in their 2014/2015 study. https://arts.st-andrews.ac.uk/dimecce/ 44. The methodology for the PCPSR surveys can be accessed here: http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/153 
45 Geographic distribution was as follows: ‘Palestine is divided into several strata with each representing the towns, cities, villages, and refugee camps in the 16 governorates (muhafazat). Palestine is also divided into "counting areas," or clusters, with each containing a number of  families (ranging from 80 to 160 families in each cluster). The number of  families in each cluster designates the size of  that cluster. The 1997 census provides detailed data on the families as well as detailed maps showing every house in each cluster. The total number of  clusters in Palestine is 3200.’  From the 
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This qualitative data was supplemented and informed by numerous primary and secondary source 
materials.  Primary source material consisted primarily of  electoral and demographic data obtained 
from the Palestinian Central Bureau of  Statistics, Palestinian Elections Commission, Palestinian 
Centre for Policy and Survey Research, Birzeit University, and Bethlehem University.  The electoral 
data used in this study was not easily obtained.  Data from the Palestinian Central Elections 
Commission and the Palestinian Central Bureau of  Statistics was often incomplete.  Therefore, data 
from all available PA sources was collated into a new list (see appendix) of  election results for the 
electoral districts covered in this study.  Student electoral data from Birzeit and Bethlehem 
Universities was obtained from the Deans of  Student Affairs from both universities – this data was 
perhaps the most complete overall.  Information regarding the numerous political parties at the local 
level was obtained from a combination of  qualitative interviews, the PA, and the PLC.  Interestingly, 
the municipalities visited during fieldwork were unable to relate any details about local political 
parties or offer electoral data.   
 
Additionally, because of  the rapidly evolving political and social situation in Palestine, numerous 
Palestinian news sources were consulted on a regular basis throughout the duration of  this study.  In 
order to track Christian-specific issues, the websites of  the Latin and Greek Patriarchates of  
Jerusalem were also consulted on a regular basis, along with newsletters published by these 
organisations.  Press releases and reports from Palestinian NGOs and CROs were also instrumental 
in this thesis.  Social media groups focusing on Palestinian Christian issues were also followed 
regularly and were essential to understanding how ongoing issues were framed within the 
communities themselves.   
 
Positionality: 
Throughout the fieldwork, I was acutely aware of  the limitations that my own subject position, both 
as an outsider, and in dealing with a minority community in a conflict zone, had on the outcome of  
interviews and the access I was granted to interview subjects.  My own interpretation of  the data 
was most certainly affected by my gender, nationality, political opinions, economic background, 
education, etc.  However, following similar theoretical perspectives that inform the discussion of                                                                                                                                                               PCPSR methodology: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys," (http://www.pcpsr.org/2000-2010).  
  
  27
identity in this study, I take the position that both researcher and research subject maintain a number 
of  subject positions that are expressed differently through the process of  social interaction.  
Therefore, I do not consider the researcher or research subject to be 'representatives of  a class, 
stratum or generation', but rather a layering of  various subject positions.46  In this sense, neither 
researcher nor research subject has a fixed positionality. 
 
At the same time, there were situations in which certain subject positions became extremely 
consequential to the access that was granted. My position as an outsider made it necessary for me to 
gain the trust of  respondents before being given access to sensitive or critical information.  
However, because the research subjects were guaranteed anonymity, they would often share views on 
subjects that they may have not shared with their fellow community members, particularly critical 
views of  the political or church leadership.  In other cases, community gatekeepers questioned my 
nationality as an American and political perspectives – particularly my views on the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict -- as part of  a vetting process to allow further access.47 Whilst this was avoided 
as much as possible, it did occur in a number of  instances and may have impacted upon the types of  
information offered by respondents.   
 Plan of  study: The second chapter of  this thesis lays out the theoretical framework of  this study.  Focus is given to 
the use of  identity as an analytical concept, as well as the ways in which identity shapes social and 
political action.  Chapter Three details the development of  nations, states, and nationalism in the 
Middle East, with a particular emphasis on the theories of  Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith.  
It then examines the particularity of  Palestinian statelessness and how this has come to affect the 
development of  nationalism in that context. This analysis also covers the evolving role of  religion in 
the Palestinian national discourse and how this has affected state attachment for the Palestinian 
Christian communities.  Chapter Four discusses the historical development of  the two largest 
Palestinian Christian denominations – the Greek Orthodox and Latin – from the perspective of  
identity and vocation of  the Orthodox and Latin Patriarchates of  Jerusalem.  Chapter Five examines 
the interaction of  religious, communal, and national identities in order to determine their effect on 
                                                 46. Jukka Torronen, "The Concept of Subject Position in Empirical Social Research," Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 31, no. 313-329 (2001)., 1-2 
47 Nationality becomes an even more important factor in times of conflict – particularly as the involvement of the American government in Israeli/Palestinian affairs continues to be disproportionately greater than any other international player.   
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social and political action.  This chapter details the role of  communal identity in political decision 
making, Palestinian Christian perspectives on the role of  their church in their political life, and how 
the history of  these denominations affects political action and national belonging in the 
contemporary context.  The chapter goes on to explore notions of  political identity, focusing on 
Arabism, political affiliation, and notions of  national belonging.  Chapter Six focuses on political 
trends within the Palestinian Christian communities, with a particular emphasis on local and student 
politics.  It details major political trends, party support, and the factors contributing to these trends 
where discernible.  Chapter Seven discusses the implications of  identity issues on the Palestinian 
Christian communities, presenting an analysis of  contemporary demographic decline and 
emigration.   
 
 
  
  29
Chapter Two -- Identity Choice and Social and Political Action: 
 
As detailed in the introductory chapter, identity can have a significant influence on social and 
political behaviour primarily because of  its ability to shape the frameworks within which we make 
choices.  However, despite the important role that identity plays in human behaviour, it remains a 
rather elusive concept, with a variety of  meanings and uses.  Indeed, identification, as Hall argues, 
‘turns out to be one of  the least well-understood concepts [...] it is drawing meanings from both the 
discursive and the psychoanalytic repertoire, without being limited to either.’48  Identification is 
heavily dependent on the individual or group’s association with a shared origin, often based in a 
mythically constructed and distant past.49  These origins may be “constructed”, in the sense that they 
often have imagined or ambiguous attributes, and “real” in the sense that they are often based on 
tangibles like ethnicity and language or a common religious background and culture.  On another 
level, identification can be based on association with particular social categories and social roles like 
profession, social clubs or even style of  dress.  However, the notion of  identity as multiple and fluid 
concept necessarily means that individuals possess many possible identities to which they may or 
may not associate with depending upon the context.  When our many possible identities layer in 
response to the social context, our internalised understanding of  socially acceptable norms and 
choices are also affected, thus shaping our behaviour.  
 
This chapter address the factors that influence identity choice, and how these choices affect social 
and political action in the Palestinian Christian communities.  The first section narrows the scope of  
identity, distinguishing between broadly defined personal and social identities.  This is followed by an 
examination of  the various processes of  identity choice, and the consequences of  these choices for 
social and political action with a particular focus on notions of  state attachment and integration.  
 
Locating Identity: 
Following Penn, this study begins with the empirical observation that individuals simultaneously 
belong to ‘a large collection of  groups’, which they choose (either consciously or subconsciously) to 
                                                 48. Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay, Questions of Cultural Identity (London: Sage, 1996)., 2. 49. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006).; Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
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associate with or emphasise depending on the social context.50  In this way it is observed that there 
are contexts in which certain identities may come to the fore in order to produce a desired action in 
the social space.  In the context of  this study, Palestinian Christian participants have dozens of  
“potential identities” that they may consider to be the most important to them personally in a given 
context – Palestinian, Christian, Greek Orthodox, Latin, Arab – to name just a few.  Although it is 
often the case that one or two of  these identities will take priority over less important identities, 
identity is fluid to the extent that the individual’s interaction with others causes him/her to 
constantly renegotiate or redefine themselves in relation to the social context.  In other words, 
because the social context is not static, identity cannot be static or singular.  This view is compatible 
with the concept of  situational selection, in which certain aspects of  social identity can be more 
rigid than others – e.g. race, gender, religion, nationality – but are nevertheless partly dependent on 
‘situational forces’ like social context and the influence of  external actors.51  
 
Naturally, the definition and uses of  identity within this context are quite broad.  But, as Fearon 
argues, identity is primarily used ‘in two linked senses’: personal and social. 52  Personal identity can be 
understood firstly as self-categorisation through differentiation from the other, i.e. ‘what individuates 
us, defines and distinguishes us from others, and makes us this person rather than some other’.53  
Secondly, following Turner and Tajfel, personal identity can be understood as some distinguishing 
characteristic(s) ‘that a person takes a special pride in or views as socially consequential but more-or-
less unchangeable.’54 Although personal identity is very much linked to, and dependent upon social 
identity, social identity is distinct in that it understood primarily through our membership within social 
groups: ‘as a social category and a socially distinguishing feature’; as a process of  self-categorisation 
within a social structure;55 or of  social connectedness and “groupness”.56  
 
Although these prevailing definitions are somewhat ambiguous, they do provide a useful basis to 
discuss how identity is used as an analytical category.  As Brubaker and Cooper note, it is largely due 
                                                 50. Elizabeth Maggie Penn, "Citizenship Versus Ethnicity: The Role of Institutions in Shaping Identity Choice," The Journal of Politics 70, no. 4 (2008)., 956 51. Ibid., 957 52. Fearon, "What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word)?.", 2 53. Sen, "The Fog of Identity.", 286 54. Fearon, "What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word)?.", 2; Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 55. John Turner, Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 56. Fernando Aguiar; Andres de Francisco, "Rational Choice, Social Identity, and Beliefs About Oneself," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39, no. 4 (2009)., 552 
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to the ambiguous nature of  identity theory that the uses of  identity are so widespread and varied, 
whilst also being dependent upon the theoretical tradition in which the theorist is situated.57   Indeed 
a major criticism of  using identity as an analytical category is the fact that it is made to do ‘a great 
deal of  work’ with often flimsy or ‘weak’ definitions of  what it actually means.58   This is complicated 
by the fact that identity is used across the social sciences to explain a variety of  phenomenon, from 
equally varied analytical and theoretical perspectives.  As Aguilar and de Francisco neatly summarise,  
The concept of  identity has been employed to analyze non-instrumental, expressive modes of  action that assumedly aid us in understanding participation in social movements (Melucci 1994). It has been used in turn to explain the fragmented nature of  the contemporary self  (Giddens 1991) and to reject that the contemporary self  is fragmented (Rinken 2000). Identity has been interpreted as a fuzzy set of  roles (Montgomery 2000), as a source of  individual security and stability (Woodward 2003), and as a process of  self-categorization that creates meaningful group boundaries that, depending on the context, may exacerbate the contrast with other groups through stereotyping and prejudice (Turner et al. 1987).59  
A major concern in this study was therefore to use identity in such a way that the empirical data 
collected during fieldwork is suitably and thoroughly examined, without discounting data that does 
not fit into an overly rigid paradigm. When used in a theoretical vacuum or when applied merely to 
quantitative data like elections, identity loses much of  its ability to describe the nuance and 
complexity of  human behaviours.  
 
Although there is a great deal of  variety in the particular uses of  identity, identity choice is 
understood from two main perspectives.  The instrumentalist approach considers interest or utility 
to be the primary motivator in identity choice and subsequent action in the social and political 
spheres.  In this paradigm, individuals make choices that are most materially or socially beneficial to 
them in a given context in order to ‘maximize their benefits’.60  In contrast, the constructivist 
approach considers the interaction of  identity and a particularistic social context to be the primary 
motivating factor in social and political action.61   As mentioned above, empirical data collected 
during fieldwork suggests that the social constructivist view is more suitable in the context of  this 
study.  Identity is recognised as multiple and fluid, and situations were observed in which interest or 
utility were subdued in exchange for altruism. At the same time however, it is recognised that there 
are often contexts in which individual or group interest is the primary motivator.  Therefore, 
                                                 57. Roger Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity"," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000)., 6 58. Ibid. 59. Francisco, "Rational Choice, Social Identity, and Beliefs About Oneself.", 551 60. Ibid., 548 61. Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond Identity”, 7 
  
  32
although interest takes a lesser role in this examination of  identity, situations were recognised in 
which the fluidity of  identity is made to ‘harden, congeal and crystalise’ often at the behest of  
external actors.62   However, rather than placing emphasis on ‘traditional issues of  labour and 
production’ – as instrumentalists have historically done – this study moves identity to a more central 
role, stressing the ‘expressive goals of  self-realization’ and taking into account ‘previously devalued 
differences’ like race, religion, and gender.63  
 
Therefore, following Jenkins, this study attempts to forge a middle path, in which interest and 
identity are not viewed as two mutually exclusive or opposing forces.64   Rather, it is argued that the 
ways in which individuals identify shapes their interests, and vice versa.65 Thus, ‘individuals may 
sometimes pursue interests that appear to run counter to their public identification(s), ethnic or 
otherwise.’66  As an example, a majority of  Palestinian Christian respondents indicated that they 
would never vote for Hamas because they viewed the Islamisation of  Palestine as a major barrier to 
their citizenship status in a future state.  Yet other respondents indicated that they knew Palestinian 
Christians who had voted for Hamas in local elections because of  their perceived ability to resist 
Israel – demonstrating clearly that choice is far more nuanced that a wholly constructivist or 
instrumentalist paradigm can describe.  In this way, it is hoped that this study will contribute to an 
ongoing debate within constructivist circles as to the usefulness and rigor of  the constructivist 
approach, which has been criticised as being overly “soft” and broad.67   Therefore, in order to make 
a useful contribution to this debate, this study does not take the constructed nature of  identity for 
granted, but rather continues to explore how identity is constructed and why this matters. 68   
 
 
 
                                                  62. Ibid., 29 63. Margaret Sommers, "The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach," Theory and Society 25, no. 5 (1994)., 608 64. Richard Jenkins, Being Danish: Paradoxes of Identity in Everyday Life - Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012)., 9 65. Ibid., 9 
66 Ibid., 8 67. For further critiques of the constructivist approach see for example: Roger Brubaker et al., Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).; Brubaker and Cooper, "Beyond "Identity"."; James Fearon and David Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," International Organization 54, no. 4 (2000).; Fearon, "What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word)?." 
68 Ibid.Roger Brubaker et al., 7. 
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Personal and Social Identity: 
As suggested in the previous section, identity is understood as having both personal and social 
elements.  Whilst enlightenment thought69 viewed personal identity as being contingent on a “core 
self ” – soul, essence – a post-modern perspective70 argues that personal identity is defined through a 
relationship with the social context and is essentially subject to change.  This view was further 
elaborated by Giddens and Hall who distinguish between three different conceptions of  identity 
subject: the enlightenment subject, the sociological subject, and the post-modern subject.71  In each 
case the relationship between subject (the individual or group) and structure (the broader cultural 
context) is dependent on both the individual’s conception of  the self  and the realities of  the social 
structure, with the distinction being whether or not the individual is viewed as having an 
autonomous core self.  The enlightenment conception of  the subject views the individual as having 
an inner unchanging or unalterable core self  which moves throughout time and space as a distinct 
identity, independent of  the structure that surrounds it.  In contrast, the sociological subject forms 
his or her identity based on the relationship with ‘significant others, who mediate to the subject the 
values, meanings and symbols – the culture – of  the worlds he/she inhabited’.72  In other words, an 
individual’s identity is formed ‘in the interaction between the self  and society’ or the personal and 
the public.73   We simultaneously ‘project ourselves into these [public] cultural identities’, and 
internalise 'their meanings and values', which helps to align our subjective feelings and identities with 
the objective places in our social and cultural worlds.74   
 
This conception of  identity also provides personal identity with a certain amount of  fixity, particularly 
within "traditional" or pre-state cultures, where social and cultural structures were less prone to the 
rapid and constant change of  the modern and globalised world.  This is because the sociological 
conception of  identity maintains that subject's identity is dependent on its interaction with certain 
objective points in the structure of  the cultural world.  It is therefore somewhat fixed in nature, in 
that cultural reproduction maintains a measure of  consistency over time through 'recurrent social 
                                                 
69 Enlightenment thought degraded the role of faith in scientific study, focusing rather on reason and rationality.   
70 Post-modernism disrupted the enlightenment view that there is an essential truth that can be derived through the pursuit of reason and rationality.  Rather, it articulated that reality was incomplete and in a state of perpetual change.    71. Stuart Hall, ed. Modernity--an Introduction to Modern Societies (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995)., 597 72. Ibid., 597. 73. Ibid., 597. 74. Ibid., 598.; John Turner; Henri Tajfel, "Social Comparison and Group Interest in Ingroup Favouritism," European Journal of Social Psychology 9, no. 2 (1979). 
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practices' like ceremony, tradition, and religious practice.75   By placing these social actions within a 
continuous narrative of  past, present and future, Giddens argues, traditional societies can make use 
of  symbols and histories that represent the collective experience of  previous generations.76  
 
However with the emergence of  modern societies, which are characterised by the continual 
expansion and fluidity of  cultural and material production, the post-modern subject has emerged.  
Klar argues that the post-modern subject is detached from 'traditional, overarching social structures' 
and is therefore free to identify with 'new and multiple social and political groups'.77   Consequently, 
the post-modern subject has no "core identity" because, unlike the sociological subject, the lack of  
recurrent social practices and ever-changing modes of  cultural production within modern societies 
have resulted in fewer "fixed points" within the social structure with which the subject can connect.  
Rather, as Giddens suggests, modernity is 'a highly reflexive form of  life in which social processes 
are constantly examined and reformed in the light of  incoming information about those very 
practices, thus constitutively altering their character.'78 In other words, it is no longer thought that a 
person's identity is derived from a "core self" but rather through his or her interaction with society 
and the internalisation of  group values.   
 
As such, personal identity is understood in the context of  this study as 'that part of  the individuals' 
self-concept which derives from their knowledge of  their membership of  a social group (or groups) 
together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.'79 It is, in other 
words, defined primarily through our interactions with the other, so that when we answer the 
question who am I?, the answer is almost always a social identity or social category rather than something 
essential to only ourselves: I am a student; I am a teacher; I am a Palestinian; I am a Christian.80   
 
Social identity is therefore understood through our membership within social groups.  Social identities 
help us to make sense of  who we are and also what is expected of  us by the society at large when we 
enter into the social roles dictated by group membership.  There are, therefore, both internal and 
                                                 75. Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity / Anthony Giddens (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1990., 1990), Cited in Hall (1995), 599 76. Hall, Modernity--an Introduction to Modern Societies., 599. 77. Samara Klar, "The Influence of Competing Identity Primes on Political Preferences," The Journal of Politics 75, no. 4 (2013)., 1 78. Hall, Modernity--an Introduction to Modern Societies., 599 79. Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)., 1109 80. Fearon, "What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word)?." 
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external expectations when we enter into a social identity.  If  an individual identifies as a Christian, he 
or she adopts a certain moral and cultural worldview, whilst simultaneously taking on the social role 
of  a Christian – including all of  the expectations that society has of  Christians as a group.  These 
social roles have a number of  effects on social and political action as they not only shape individual 
interest, but can also limit an individual's available social and political choices to the extent that only 
certain choices are socially acceptable given the social role.  This is supported by Senn and Parekh 
who argue that one root of  communalism is an individual lack of  reasoning about identity choice – 
an individual's resistance to making reasoned or rational identity choices due to the 'unreasoned 
conviction that one's personal identity is dependent on one's social identity’.81  This has important 
consequences for social and political action, in that individuals' identification with a specific group – 
Christian or Greek Orthodox as an example – consequently places limits on acceptable behaviour 
and acceptable choices in the social and political landscape: As a Christian, I could not vote for Hamas.   
 
This is related to the ways in which group membership functions.  If  there are mismatches between 
group/societal expectations and the behaviour of  an individual, this may endanger membership in 
the group.  As an example, national identity is a form of  social identity that is defined primarily by the 
state. Both the state and the society have a set of  expectations and values that are meant to be 
upheld by members of  the national group – patriotism, often a specific religious belief, national 
language, etc. Under stable conditions these expectations and values remain somewhat consistent 
over time, as do power relations between sub-national groups.  Under unstable conditions such as a 
failed state or state in transition, the expectations and values of  the national group are subject to 
rapid and unpredictable change.  As internal power dynamics shift, it may be the case that a new 
sub-national group becomes more dominant thus having a greater effect on the discourse of  the 
nation.  Consequently those sub-national groups who may have enjoyed positions of  prominence or 
stability in the former state/national structure (minorities in particular) may no longer fulfil the 
expectations and values of  the changing social identity of  the nation.  Their membership in the group 
may then be endangered.  Therefore, as the values and roles of  the national identity change, so too 
do the conditions for membership.    
 
                                                 81. Sen, "The Fog of Identity.", 287 
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This study takes the position that individuals maintain a number of  social identities that change in 
response to the social context.  This choice may be affected by in-group bias,82 perceived threat 
against the group,83 religious or political conviction, pragmatism84, and a host of  other 
circumstances.  Social and political preference and action are shaped by an individual or group's 
'position in social space'; i.e. the relation of  'particularistic categorical attributes' like religious 
denomination, tribalism, gender, generation, political affiliations, etc., to the social context.85  Social 
and political choices are therefore seen as being dependent on the complex interaction of  group 
identities and the social space.   
 
Identity choice: 
Choosing the ways in which one identifies is a natural process that we use in order to relate to and 
make sense of  society, and also for society to relate to and understand us.  Through empirical field 
research, this study sought to answer two questions; what motivates identity choice? And how does identity 
choice affect political and social action?86   Three major internal processes of  identity choice were 
identified, as well as two major external factors influencing these choices.  Internal processes of  
identity choice are the ways in which we negotiate possible social identities in relation to our personal 
identity.  These choices are characterised in three ways: group pride, utility and defensiveness87.  
 
Group pride:  
As Turner and Tajfel argue, identification with a group, 'implies that the individual cares about the 
well-being of  the group, and thus exhibits a bias toward the group.'88    This conceptual framework 
for in-group bias comes largely from the field of  social identity theory, which suggests that self-
esteem gained from association with a group is a 'central motivation of  behaviour', which is 
'determined and maintained by individual's social settings and the categories or roles they fill in that 
                                                 82. In-group bias, as defined by Turner and Tajfel is ‘a descriptive concept referring to any tendancy to favour the ingroup over the outgroup, in behaviour, attitudes, preferences or perception’.  Tajfel, "Social Comparison and Group Interest in Ingroup Favouritism.", 187. 83. Klar, "The Influence of Competing Identity Primes on Political Preferences." 84. Francisco, "Rational Choice, Social Identity, and Beliefs About Oneself." 85. Brubaker and Cooper, "Beyond "Identity".", 6-7 86. Following Penn: Penn, "Citizenship Versus Ethnicity: The Role of Institutions in Shaping Identity Choice." 
87 These terms are borrowed from social identity theory literature – in particular the work of Turner, Tajfel, Klar, and Penn. 88. Penn, "Citizenship Versus Ethnicity: The Role of Institutions in Shaping Identity Choice.", 957 
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environment.'89   When an individual chooses to identify with a group it is often because of  a sense 
of  group pride that they gain from membership in the group or a special sense of  belonging and self-
esteem that individuals derive from identification with something larger than themselves.   
 
In the view of  social identity theory, identification with a group is a three-step process in which an 
individual firstly categorises his/her surroundings and labels others based upon established groups. 
Individuals then enter the process of  social identification in which they take on the roles of  their 
particular group identity, as well as classifying "the other" according to specific roles.  Finally they 
compare their group with other groups in order to gain some sense of  self-esteem in relation to the 
other.  This results in in-group and out-group biases as we categorise ourselves and our society into 
different social groups.  Competition and conflict between groups arise not merely as a result of  any 
potential material inequities, but also a sense of  emotional inequity.  Thus, if  a rival group is better 
off  than my group, it lowers the self-esteem that I derive from my membership in the group.90  The 
well being of  my group is therefore tied to my own sense of  well being.   
 
When interviewing a young Rum Orthodoks student in Bethlehem, during the identity card exercise 
she described her identity as being first and foremost defined by her pride in being from Bethlehem:  
 
 QC: Why do you identify as Bethlehemi above other possible identifications?  I: I love Bethlehem very much because it's my home. I am proud to come from here.91   
In this instance, there is neither a sense of  material utility gained from this association, nor is there a 
sense that this choice was in any way defensive.  Rather, this young woman felt a special connection to 
the local culture and landscape of  Bethlehem – from which she derived a sense of  self  and pride.  In 
the same interview, when asked why the respondent identified secondly as Christian rather than with 
her Orthodox faith she responded as follows:  
 
I love all Christians – I don't separate between Orthodox and Catholic.  Lately I've been more into Catholicism because Orthodoxy likes to separate from other Christians.  The priests keep teaching the little children that Catholics aren't like us.  But we are the same; we don't have very large differences.92 
                                                 89. Eric Dickson; Kenneth Scheve, "Social Identity, Political Speech, and Electoral Competition," Journal of Theoretical Politics 18, no. 1 (2006)., 5 90. Tajfel, "Social Comparison and Group Interest in Ingroup Favouritism." 91. Focus Group Bethlehem University Students, interview by Quinn Coffey2014. 
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It is observed here that the respondent identifies with the broader Christian community as a whole 
rather than her confessional community, specifically because of  her negative experience of  in-group 
bias within the Orthodox tradition.  This is suggestive of  several things.  Firstly, because she 
identified primarily as Bethlehemi, her sense of  the in-group extended to all those from Bethlehem 
– Christians, Muslims, secular groups. In this sense, the sphere of  her in-group subdued the barriers 
between these other potential groups.  Although her faith was her second strongest identification – 
she felt that the relative in-group biases of  Orthodoxy and exclusion of  others was not 
representative of  either her life as a Bethlehemi or as a Christian.  Although a member of  the Rum 
Orthodoks community, she no longer derived a sense of  self-esteem from membership in this group 
and expressed interest in the Latin Church, which she felt was more open to ecumenical relations – 
and thus more in-tune with her primary identification as a Bethlehemi.   
 
This has important implications for feelings of  national solidarity and state attachment amongst the 
Christian minority.  If  the national identity is increasingly defined along religious lines, it may be that 
non-Muslim experience of  Palestinian nationalism is exclusionary.  These trends will be discussed in 
more depth in Chapters Five and Six but it is clear from the above example that the effect of  in-
group bias and group pride can be a particularly strong motivation to either join or leave a group.   
 
Utility:  
The second factor affecting identity choice is the perceived or real effect of  the identity choice on 
individual utility.  Two levels of  utility were observed.  The first is the material utility of  choice.  
Following rational choice theory, it is observed that social action can be explained by the assumption 
that individuals will make choices that maximise benefits.93  In other words, individuals are faced 
with a variety of  possible choices and they will choose the option that leads to the best or most 
useful outcome for them personally.94 In an international political context, we can think of  an 
example in which international aid is contingent upon a community supporting certain international 
norms or at least those held by the main donors.  As is discussed in greater deal in Chapter Six, the 
Bethlehem municipality received very little international aid from 2005-2012 because of  the election 
                                                                                                                                                             92. Ibid. 93. Mark P. Petracca, "The Rational Choice Approach to Politics: A Challenge to Democratic Theory," The Review of Politics 53, no. 2 (1991). 94. Francisco, "Rational Choice, Social Identity, and Beliefs About Oneself." 
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of  a PFLP mayor.95   The PFLP was considered by the American government to be a terrorist 
organisation and aid organisations (particularly those affiliated with the US government) were 
therefore unable to carry out aid missions in the Bethlehem municipality during this period.  This 
hindered development of  major municipal projects in the city and surroundings, which are heavily 
dependent on aid.  Despite the historically strong support of  the political left in Christian areas of  
Palestine, the victory of  Fatah in the 2012 elections was explained by respondents as being the result 
of  years of  underdevelopment under PFLP leadership: 
 
The mayor has been Fatah since 2005 because the foreign donors approve of  Fatah, so they give the municipality funds to do projects.  Whereas the previous election of  Hamas and PFLP candidates – the donors did not approve.96  
Voters shifted their private political identity in order to maximise the material utility of  their political 
choice – even if  they continued to publicly support the PFLP.    
 
Penn describes a less obvious form of  utility in which individuals view the common fate of  the 
group, or its overall welfare, as having psychological utility to them personally.  In other words, the 
relative success of  the group may encourage or discourage identification.  If  an individual sees that 
the group is faring poorly, they will associate this with their own personal sense of  well being.  This 
phenomenon was observed in regards to the notion of  samud or steadfastness in which groups who 
can most successfully oppose Israel gain popular support regardless of  their ideological stance.  But 
there is another more existential level to the utility of  this form of  in-group bias. Schuessle describes 
the utility of  voting choices in situations where the electoral outcome is not affected by the 
individual vote; i.e. there is no chance for the voter's party to win the election, but he/she votes for 
the party regardless out of  a sense of  either civil duty or in order to identify with a political social 
group: 'It is only the voter herself  that can point to her electoral deed and legitimately draw her 
political identification from it: to be Democrat, she has to vote Democrat.'97  In essence, the voter in 
this example derives internal existential utility from group membership in the American Democratic 
Party as a function of  self-esteem or pride, despite there being little external utility or material 
payoff  to this choice; it is useful emotionally.   
                                                 95. Batarseh was boycotted by the US: Daoud Kuttab, "Why Do U.S. Officials Boycott Bethlehem's Mayor?," Huffington Post, 02/09/2011 2011. 
96 Municipality Employee, interview by Quinn Coffey2014. 97. A. Schuessler, "Expressive Voting," Rationality and Society 12 (2000)., 556 
  
  40
 
Defensiveness: 
A final internal factor, which, in reality, is a function of  both utility and group pride, is a perceived 
threat towards the group.  In these situations, individuals will identify with a group in order to either 
protect their sense of  self-esteem derived from group membership or the utility of  their 
membership in the group.  Choices based upon threat are far more dependent on the external 
factors of  social context and identity priming, as they occur primarily in relation to other groups or 
individuals.  In this study, certain defensive situations were identified in which identification with 
communal identity, either as broadly Christian or with a specific denomination, was provoked by 
demographic decline, conflict, and perceived social status. 
 
Demographic decline: 
The ongoing issue of  emigration, combined with the changing social norms within the Christian 
community98 produced a number of  situations in which the community reacted defensively to the 
changing demography of  traditionally Christian villages and cities – leading to an increased sense of  
communalism: 
Now there is a small minority of  Christians who emphasise the fact that we are Christians before being Palestinians – this is a small minority and I try to understand it in the context of  demography.  I'll give the example of  Bethlehem city where Christians used to be the big majority of  the city, but with emigration during the last century, they've found themselves as a small minority in their own town.  As families leave and sell their houses, Muslim families come to Bethlehem.  Now there are neighbourhoods in Bethlehem where there are no Christians at all.  They feel that their Christian presence is threatened so they want to emphasise that we are Christians.  For example, 10 years ago you would see big crosses on houses illuminated in the night – we are Christian – what do they mean by this?  What are we trying to prove?99   
Conflict: 
Defensive responses to conflict can occur in a number of  situations: when the community faces an 
existential threat during times of  war; in the interaction between Palestinian citizens and Israeli 
soldiers; between Palestinians themselves.  These confrontations can enhance or degrade solidarity 
with possible social identities as the individual seeks to support the identity that is under threat.    
 
                                                 
98 As discussed in Chapter Seven, the changing demography of the Palestinian Christian community is affected not only by emigration, but also an increase in marriage age, decrease in the amount of offspring produced by each couple, raising standards of living, and an aging population. 99. Latin Priest 1, interview by Quinn Coffey2014, Beit Jala. 
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QC: How do you negotiate between the Arab, Palestinian, and Christian parts of  your identity – which comes first, if  any at all?  Son: I think I identify as Arab Palestinian – or maybe Palestinian Arab Christian  QC: So the Palestinian part is more important for you?  Son: Currently yes -- in light of  the Occupation.  Father: Yes, no but I think maybe now what he is talking about is that the main problem today is Occupation so that is emphasised.   Son: I'll become Arab Palestinian after we are liberated... [laughs]100  
Perceived social status: 
Similar to the threat of  conflict, the perception that one’s community is subordinate or is not a full 
member of  society increases the feeling of  communalism and thereby decreases the level of  national 
solidarity.   
I am not less an Arab than any other person --  I was an Arab before Islam.  600 years before Islam I was here.  I welcomed Islam.  So I'm not a minority.  Maybe in number I am few, but I belong to the land.  And before I was Christian, I was from the Canaanite people -- I have deep roots in this country and I don't want to have any political religious state.  As much as I am against Christian Zionism, I don't trust any political religious state in Islam nowadays, I also don't believe, of  course, in a Jewish state.101  
Here we see just a few of  the contexts in which defensive identity choices become salient.  It was 
observed and reported by respondents that these defensive types of  choices have become increasingly 
frequent with the ongoing impact of  demographic decline, the Israeli Occupation, and perceived 
Islamification of  the social and political spheres.  It was also reported that communal identity was 
becoming increasingly common amongst the youth in particular.  As one respondent indicated: 
 
Many of  our people – young people now are starting to think individually about life about everything. Sometimes they feel connected for a national or social cause or public issues, but other times they feel that they are only themselves, they are individuals -- they have this ego centric value and this makes many of  them as a result of  not finding the solution for their difficulties, finding their own way – sometimes religion is the inspiring issue for them so they go for only the church – also sometimes they get disconnected from the community.102   
                                                 100. NGO Employee, interview by Quinn Coffey2014, Bethlehem. 101. Ibid. 102. CRO Employee 2, interview by Quinn Coffey2014, Bethlehem. 
  
  42
There was a definite sense that identifying defensively decreased the perceived level of  national 
solidarity or interest in nationalist causes.  This was a factor mentioned repeatedly by those who had 
been especially active during First Intifada and amongst the older generations when the public role 
of  religion was less pronounced.   
 
External factors: 
These choices, however, do not exist in a vacuum.  There are a number of  factors affecting whether 
or not a person chooses to associate with communal or political identity.  The first is the social context 
– or 'the environment in which all individuals live and interact within.'103  A number of  factors104 
within the social context that shape identity choice were identified, both through observation and 
qualitative interviews. Empirical work suggests that certain social context factors are far more salient 
than others in determining identity choice.  Firstly, the level of  religiosity is a very significant factor 
in identity choice.  Survey data indicates that, of  those who self-identify as either very religious or 
moderately religious, only 20% indicated that politics was important to them.105 This was also 
reflected when individuals described their constituent identities, but was also dependent on a 
generational element.  Respondents under the age of  50 who identified as either very or moderately 
religious listed either Christian or their denomination as their primary identity in 60% of  the 
interviews.  Whereas, those above the age of  50, regardless of  levels of  religiosity, identified either 
Arab, Palestinian or a combination of  Arab Christian or Palestinian Christian as their primary 
identities in 100% of  the interviews.  This is indicative of  several things.  Firstly, with the younger 
generation, following what Lybarger identified as a trend of  'apolitical piety', there is a strong 
negative correlation between level of  religiosity and identification with national, supranational or 
party-based identities.106  This generational difference suggests that there is an increased level of  
identification with communal identities, either globally or regionally, within the younger generation 
and less identification with national or supranational identities.  
 
                                                 103. Penn, "Citizenship Versus Ethnicity: The Role of Institutions in Shaping Identity Choice.", 958 
104 There are numerous external factors that were considered relevant to the research including but not limited to: generational difference; level political participation; level of religiosity; family history of political activism; economic status; who do they consider the “other”; identity priming from religious or political actors; accidental priming from the researcher: 'By simply mentioning an identity group, researchers effectively prime an identity and increase the salience of  that identity.' Samara Klar, "The Influence of  Competing Identity Primes on Political Preferences," ibid.75 (2013)., 2. 
105 Adapted Data from the PCPSR Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research", 2000-2010. 106. Lybarger, "For Church or Nation? : Islamism, Secular-Nationalism, and the Transformation of Christian Identities in Palestine." 
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The second factor, identity priming, is the overall effect of  political or communal organisations in 
inducing or subduing specific identities to fulfil a specific social or political agenda.107  Following 
Klar, this study focused on three forms of  identity priming: basic prime, efficacy prime and defensive prime.  
The first, and least effective type of  priming, basic identity priming, involves merely mentioning the 
desired identity choice in a political or religious context in order to 'increase its salience'.108  As an 
example, frequent mentions in PLO speeches of  'Our Arab Palestinian people', without directly 
relating the relevance of  Arabism to the audience, situates the speech within the general ideological 
context of  the PLO, without specifically mentioning any potential policy implications. The second, 
far more effect type of  priming, efficacy priming, involves an actor mentioning the direct relevance of  
a particular piece of  policy, legislation or event to a social group.  As an example, a Palestinian 
politician may mention aid given to the country by the United Nations in a speech about whether or 
not the Palestinian state should apply for UN membership.  This is done in order to directly relate 
the utility of  a policy to the audience.  The final type of  identity priming observed is defensive 
priming.109  In this instance, a specific identity may be mentioned as being under threat in order to 
encourage individuals to associate with and support it.  Identity priming also happens at the state 
level as the state attempts, through various methods discussed in the next chapter, to induce a 
national identity.  Political and religious actors may also utilise a specific discourse of  the nation in 
order to gain support.   
 
Conclusion: 
As this chapter has illustrated, identity choice, in this case between communal and political identities, 
has a significant impact on social and political action because these choices not only shape interest, 
but also limit possible action given the values and social restrictions of  group identities.  This 
chapter set out to address two questions: What motivates identity choice? and How does identity choice affect 
social and political action?  In addressing the first question, it was argued that identity choices in the 
Palestinian Christian communities were made both in response to the personal identity of  the 
individual and the social context.  That meant that within particular moments of  identification, 
individuals assess the material and psychological utility of  a particular identity in response to external 
factors like threat, group pride, in-group bias, and internal factors like morality, personality, and self-
                                                 107. Following Klar; Penn; Kendra McLeish; Robert Oxoby, "Social Interactions and the Salience of Social Identity," Journal of Economic Psychology 32, no. 1 (2011). 108. Klar, "The Influence of Competing Identity Primes on Political Preferences.", 3 109. Methodology borrowed from Klar. 
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esteem.  Individuals were less likely to identify with the nation if  they felt that communal interests 
were not fulfilled by this national identity.  In other words, when faced with a national identity that is 
insufficiently broad and inclusive, Palestinian Christians will retreat to their communal identities, 
which decreases levels of  integration and, as the next chapter explores, attachment to the state.  
Similarly, individuals who prioritised broader identifications like "Palestinian", "Christian", 
"Bethlehemi", over their confessional communities, were less likely to identify as such if  their 
confessional communities were not open to these broader groups.  Therefore, identity choices 
responded both to material and psychological factors.  This has important implications for the study 
of  identity politics, particularly for Middle Eastern minority groups who are increasingly faced with 
having to negotiate between preservation of  their threatened communal identities, whilst striving to 
take part in the struggle for national self-determination through participation in the national identity 
and culture of  the state. 
 
As the next chapter will discuss, decades of  statelessness, instability, and military rule have 
exacerbated divisions within the Palestinian national consciousness, potentially alienating the 
Palestinian Christians.  This leads to declining political participation and increased emigration.  
Discussed within the broader context of  state development in the Middle East, the next chapter 
explores the development of  national identity in the Palestinian context in relation to the Palestinian 
Christian communities.   
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Chapter Three -- Nation, State, and Statelessness in the Middle East: 
 
In the history of  Christian-Muslim relations you will find Christians were defined at one time as dhimmi people.  During the Ottoman period they were defined as millet.  And as a dhimmi – the main definition of  relating to a person in the community is religion. So religion becomes the main defining factor to define the relationship. As a millet, community becomes the main defining factor – ethno-religious community. So the Armenians will be a community, the Greek Orthodox will be another millet – not Christians in general. So the ethno-religious identity becomes how you identify the other. Then comes the Palestinian Authority for example – nationalism if  you wish and then citizenship becomes the defining factor. But millet and dhimmi did not disappear, but it depends on the group and their convictions. And now you have citizenship, but citizenship is not citizenship as defined in the US or in England – it is citizenship for a state that is based on Islamic law and developed into a political system whose roots are dependent on Islamic shari'a.110    -- Palestinian Christian academic, mid-40s, Bethlehem 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, identity plays a significant role in the level of attachment 
individuals feel towards their nation, state and society as a whole.  People are made to feel a part of 
the state primarily through identification with a national identity – I am British, I am a citizen of the 
United Kingdom – and only then if they feel that the national identity reflects or is inclusive of their 
other constitutive identities -- the Scottish Referendum on membership in the UK in 2014 was 
illustrative of this point.111 This is because belonging to a social identity entails in and out-group biases 
which come to characterise not only what the social identity is (we are X and therefore we are not Y), 
but also who qualifies for membership/citizenship (e.g. X's have parents that were born here, they 
speak a certain language and belong to a certain religion).  National identity, as a contingent 
construct,112 allows us to imagine ourselves as part of a wider community of individuals.113  It 
compels us to go to war in order to protect and serve this community, and it provides some measure 
of social cohesion in times of peace.  Although, as Connelly has put it, to confess a particular 
identity is to belong to difference, national identity also allows us to forgo internal differences in 
order to unite us in otherwise potentially problematic configurations.114 Within the context of  a 
majority of  sovereign nation-states, the primary vehicle for the transmission and reinforcement of  
                                                 110. Palestinian Academic, "Personal Interview." 
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national identity is the state itself.  The introduction of universal education, military conscription, 
official ceremonies, and speeches, all work to indoctrinate citizens into a very specific and codified 
sense of national loyalty and belonging.  National identity in this context is somewhat rigid because 
it is secured in a distant and mythologised past, and also because it has been monopolised by the 
state, whose own legitimacy depends on it.   
 
In the Palestinian context there is a very strong sense of the nation – nationalism, patriotism, and 
loyalty are also prevalent – and yet there has never been a state through which to transmit these 
ideas to the public.  National identity, although constituted from and partly reinforced by the people, 
is largely a top-down phenomenon in a sovereign nation-state in that it is ultimately the state that 
monopolises and transmits the national narrative to the citizen.  However, as Khalidi notes, the 
‘absence of sovereignty’ throughout Palestinian history has ‘denied the Palestinians full control over 
the state mechanisms – education, museums, archaeology, postage stamps and coins, and the media, 
especially radio and television – which myriad recent examples show is essential for disseminating 
and imposing a uniform “national” criteria of identity’.115  National identity is therefore constructed 
through a combination of everyday actions, and the influence of majority political, social and 
religious actors.116  The actors with the most popular legitimacy or support are then able to articulate 
specific ideological programmes, which allows them to embed their own socio-cultural worldview 
into the national identity of the developing state.117   
 
In the context of the contemporary Middle East, the experience of statelessness and a fluid national 
identity is increasingly the norm.  However, the theoretical perspectives used to analyse these 
national experiences rely heavily on theories that have developed, as Owen argues, ‘on the basis of 
an evaluation of a purely European experience.’118  Two of the most widely cited theorists in this 
regard have been Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith, who represent the modernist and 
ethnonationalist perspectives respectively.  Although their analysis of nation, state, and nationalism 
provide considerable insights into some of the more universal mechanisms of national identity, they 
fall short in explaining two primary areas of concern for this study: the role of religion in national 
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politics and statelessness.  This chapter aims to bridge the gap between Anderson and Smith’s 
perspectives, and the realties of state development in the Middle Eastern context.  This is 
accomplished firstly through an exploration of the historical context of nationalism and national 
identity, followed by a critical discussion of Anderson and Smith’s theories of nationalism, national 
identity and state development.  The particularity of state development in the Middle East is then 
discussed, followed by an exploration of how statelessness comes to affect the transmission of 
nationalism across societies.  This chapter concludes by discussing the evolving role of religion in 
the Palestinian national discourse, and how this has affected perceptions of national identity, 
citizenship, and equal rights amongst the Palestinian Christian communities. 
 
Nationalism: 
As the previous section discussed, national identity is a type of  social identity constructed largely 
through the apparatus of  the state.  It is through this relationship that we are able to imagine 
ourselves as being part of  a larger community of  the nation, often by subduing other potentially 
divisive social identities like race, religion, and gender.119Although these interrelated concepts of  
nationalism, national identity, and the nation seem perfectly natural and inevitable forms of  social 
identification in the contemporary context, their present form is a consequence of  the creation of  
the modern state system beginning in 17th century Europe.   
 
The subsequent growth, in the 17th century, of  popular sovereignty and the declining power of  the 
church meant that the individual now belonged to something larger than themselves and their 
community.  Indeed, the reorganisation into a state system necessitated a new way for powers to 
legitimise their authority in the eyes of  a newly empowered public, who had transitioned from 
subject to citizen.  Previously, in the western context, the great monarchies of  Europe had bound 
their authority together with that of  the Church, granting the ruler a religiously sanctioned authority.  
But the emergence of  the state system and the decline in the Church's power meant that the state 
had to institutionalise its legitimacy in some other way.  Most early European states were composed 
of  multiple nations (e.g. England, Wales, Scotland, and, beginning in the 20th century, Northern 
Ireland), each with its own socio-political, and often ethno-linguistic origins.  Importantly, however, 
in the era of  pre-Westphalian sovereignty, borders between these disparate nations were often 
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'flexible and porous'.120 Borders began to solidify as the notion of  sovereignty developed in the wake 
of  the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), as states agreed in the Treaty of  Westphalia in 1648 to end 
involvement in the domestic affairs of  other states – respecting, namely, the territorial integrity of  
other states.   
 
The territorial nature of  the new state system meant that nationalisms, which often pre-existed 
defined international borders, would also be territorially bounded.  Accordingly, the construction of  
a state-specific national identity eventually transformed these sub-national groups into a unified 
nation-state.  This is not to suggest that this process entailed a rapid or universal paradigm shift.  
Indeed, the Western European context offers a number of  examples of  ongoing sub-national 
conflict up to the contemporary context – the Basques of  Spain being an obvious example.  
However, the evolution of  notions of  sovereignty, followed by the growth of  vernacular print 
culture and universal education helped to create and reinforce a previously vague sense of  a unified 
and territorially bounded nation-state.  This "national idea" would grant the state ultimate authority 
over its citizens (overshadowing other affiliations) and allow the state to project its power at an 
international level against other newly defined nation-states.   
 
However, a parallel process of  state development did not occur in the Middle East.  From the outset 
the newly formed Middle Eastern states, emerging gradually in the postcolonial era, faced three 
major problems.  The first was that the artificial imposition of  a Westphalian state system onto the 
Middle East did not necessarily reflect the realities of  pre-existing ethno-linguistic, cultural or 
national boundaries.  Rather, these new borders were based primarily on the whims of  British and 
French colonial officers during the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916, in which Britain and France 
agreed upon their future spheres of  influence in the Ottoman lands in the event of  an Ottoman 
defeat in the First World War. Although these borders were partly based upon Ottoman provincial 
and administrative boundaries, the sudden imposition of  territorial nationalism onto populations 
that had been under Ottoman rule for close to 500 years did not put an end to the broader super-
national identities and loyalties that most individuals possessed.121 As a result of  this incongruity 
between nation and state, Middle Eastern states were forced to compete with supra-national loyalties 
                                                 120. Ibid., 19 
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to the broader Arab World and the Islamic Umma,122 as well as a host of  other affiliations to tribe, 
ethnicity, communal identity, and region,123 which ultimately undermined the authority of  the state.  
In addition, sub-national identifications were often exacerbated by colonial powers who co-opted 
traditional power networks in exchange for loyalty and economic incentives – reinforcing the 
distinctions between these groups, rather than fostering national belonging early on.124   
 Second, the nature of  the Middle Eastern political culture of  the period did not necessarily support 
the transplant of  what would become a largely secular model of  the nation-state onto a more 
communally oriented public, both because of  the mismatch between state borders and national 
groups, and also because of  the differing relationship between religion and politics in the Middle 
East. Consequently, as newly independent Middle Eastern states began to determine the shape of  
their own legal systems, and more importantly for this analysis, the shape of  their national identities, 
they were faced with significant challenges from within their societies to reconcile the apparent 
disconnect between what was viewed a primarily western mode of  thought (secularism) and the 
Islamic tradition.   This was exacerbated by the fact that secularism in the Middle East was 'generally 
imposed from above as a political programme by rulers wishing to modernize', rather than evolving 
organically from decades long conflicts and debates as in the western context.125  Therefore, in the 
post-colonial context, secularism became associated with despotic and authoritarian regimes, whilst 
religion, and eventually pious nationalism or religious nationalism, e.g. Islamism, ‘became a source of  
refuge and a marker of  identity for many Arabs and Muslims.’126   As the salience and legitimacy of  
pan-Arabism127 and state-based nationalism (both largely secular phenomena) has declined in recent 
decades as a result of  economic and social underdevelopment, the legitimacy of  religion 'as an 
alternative paradigm' has increased.128  This decline has been evidenced by the growing strength of  
Islamist parties in a number of  Arab countries, and, of  course, the steady growth in popularity of  
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Hamas in the Palestinian context at the expense of  left wing socialist parties like the PFLP, DFLP, 
and PPP.   This notion of  political piety129 or religious nationalism130 integrates expressions of  both 
supra-national and more localised communal and tribal group identities into ideas of  the nation.  
Hence, groups like Hamas have integrated the broader discursive language and symbols of  the 
global Islamic community into their nationalist rhetoric on Palestinian resistance.  In this way, their 
worldview is grounded in an Islamic religio-cultural milieu, whist being centred on the Palestinian 
context.  As will be discussed later in this chapter, this more religion-centric view of  the nation has 
potentially divisive consequences for minority groups – particularly in contexts in which the state has 
a weak or ineffective role in national cultural production.    
 
Finally, the theoretical literature on the development of  nations and states assumes that nations 
necessarily develop into states or that, in the contemporary context, nations are unsustainable without 
reinforcement from a state apparatus.  Despite the fact that there is a strong sense of  the Palestinian 
nation, the lack of  an effective state apparatus has meant that ideas of  the nation are often fluid and 
highly contingent upon changing popular sentiment.  In this sense, the Palestinian context, and 
stateless nations more generally, present a clear challenge to the assumptions of  nationalist theorists 
like Anderson and Smith, whose paradigms rely on the state as the primary vehicle for the 
transmission of  nationalism.  Statelessness can provide a context in which national cultural 
production is essentially non-instrumental.   
 
The nationalism of  stateless groups has been explored in some detail by Wedeen who argues that, in 
the absence of  effective state institutions, 'national solidarities – to the extent that they do exist – 
tend not to be generated through state institutions usually credited with inculcating national values, 
but through the ordinary activities undertaken by men and women in pursuit of  their daily lives.'131  
In this context, ideas of  the nation and the construction of  national identity are fluid in the sense 
that a variety of  actors (not just the state) are able to influence and shape the national imagining 
based upon their own ideological stance.  The relative influence of  these actors is determined then, 
not by their monopoly on the use of  force, in the Weberian sense, but rather on their ability to 
reflect popular sentiments and gain critical masses of  support.132  Further, new and developing states 
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like Palestine will often construct a national identity which seeks to merge or reconstitute a variety 
of  "traditional" identities (communal, tribal, ethnic, religious) in order to both consolidate power 
(through identification with the cultural majority), and to unify otherwise heterogeneous populations 
as the state seeks to secure its position as the primary authority.133  
 
As this section has demonstrated, the particularly of  state development in the Middle Eastern 
context, as well as the impact of  statelessness on ideas of  the nation, necessitate a more precise 
understanding of  how nation and state are used as analytical concepts when applied to the Middle 
East.  The development of  Arab nationalism has received significant attention in scholarly works on 
the Middle East.  Amongst these numerous studies, historians like Rashid Khalidi, Albert Hourani, 
and others have brilliantly detailed the development of  specific regional and localised national 
identities, which have made invaluable contributions as political histories.  However, aside from 
Tibi,134 few of  these works have critically addressed theories of  nationalism and the interplay of  
state and nation in the Middle East.  Rather, the majority have typically used the term nation-state 'as 
if  the concepts were synonymous', without concern for either the context in which these theories of  
nationalism were developed or the historical context of  state development in the Middle East.135 As 
a result, theories that were originally intended to serve as models of  nationalism in the Western 
European context have been applied to regions whose historical trajectories are vastly different.  The 
next section critically engages with two prevailing nationalism theories of  Benedict Anderson and 
Anthony Smith.  
 
Imagined Communities -- Benedict Anderson: 
In his Imagined Communities (1982), Anderson argues that nationalism emerged as a consequence of  
the growth of  print capitalism, which effectively ended the virtual monopoly that sacral languages 
and the church had on the printed word.  This is because of  the combined effects of  universal 
education and print in vernacular languages.  For the first time, people were able to imagine 
themselves as being a part of  something larger than their immediate communities and feel 
connected to other citizens whom they may have never met or had anything in common with – the 
“imagined community”.  This coincided with a changing relationship between church and state as 
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the state began to fill roles traditionally occupied by the church – providing, for example, education 
and healthcare – whilst also becoming the primary legal authority.  The following sections address 
Anderson’s notion of  the nation and state and the role of  language. 
 
Nation and State: 
Perhaps most striking about Anderson's Imagined Communities is that he makes no real attempt to 
distinguish between his tirelessly elaborated "imagined community" of  the nation, and the state.  
Rather, the modern notion of  nation-state is discussed as if  it were a given, a simple side effect of  
the collision between history, technology and capitalism, which Anderson suggests is 'a recent and 
often uneasy mating'.136  In fact, a closer examination of  Anderson's definition of  the nation: 'an 
imagined political community – imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign',137 tells us that, in his 
view, there is no real distinction between the modern nation and state, rather, one seeps into the 
other.  It is not surprising then that Anderson assigns traits to the nation, which in the Middle 
Eastern context, are typically associated with the state, namely territorial limitation and sovereignty.  
When we compare this with the widely used definition of  the state elaborated by Max Weber, 'a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of  the legitimate use of  force within a 
given territory [emphasis added]', we see that by contrast, Weber associates the notion of  sovereignty 
(independent authority over territory) and territorial limitation as being characteristics of  the state 
rather than nation.138    Anderson addressed his conflation of  nation and state in his book, Language 
and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia, arguing that in the modern political spectrum, 'the 
legitimacy and self-determination' of  nations have become 'accepted norms', which nations secure 
through the institution of  the state, whilst the state, in turn, relies on the nation to legitimise its 
existence (both to its citizens and to the international community).139  In other words, the state exists 
in a sort of  symbiosis with the nation.  This is due, in part, to the development of  nations and states 
in the European context, where the modern nation-state emerged out of  several decades-long 
conflicts between nations, arriving finally in its modern form as the victors of  these conflicts 
formed into distinctive states – and as sub-national groups were either integrated or accepted some 
form of  power-sharing with the state.  In this context, the marriage of  nation and state, however 
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bloody its origins, was a somewhat natural and gradual process.140  As mentioned in the previous 
section, states in the Middle East did not develop out of  conflict between Middle Eastern nations, 
but were rather the result of  an external imposition of  the Sykes-Picot Agreement.  Therefore, the 
term nation-state must be used cautiously in the Middle Eastern context, particularly because it 
implies that nations are entirely bound or limited by a state’s borders, when numerous examples to 
the contrary are available: the Kurds, Assyrian Christians, and Palestinians. 
 
The term nation-state is particularly misleading when used to explain the phenomenon of  multiple 
identities, which, as the previous chapter discussed, characterises nationalism in the Middle East.  
The external imposition of  Westphalian or European style nation-states in the region created 
arbitrary borders, not based on any single national culture or shared cultural experience, meaning 
that nationalism in the region is bound neither to specific territories, nor is it consolidated, rather it 
is at once religious, ethnic, linguistic and territorial.  Therefore, in the case of  the Middle East, the 
nation cannot fit neatly into the state and vice versa.  Further, without the legitimacy granted from a 
unified and coextensive nation141, Middle Eastern states have strategically co-opted, crushed or 
attempted to assimilate multiple identities through coercion at the state level.  Although 
authoritarianism was able to successfully suppress competing nationalisms for decades, the Arab 
Uprisings have released a great pressure valve, allowing substate and suprastate identities to spill 
back out as each national group vies for self-determination.  The result is a post-authoritarian 
identity crisis with substate and suprastate/transstate groups seeking to revive their identities, whilst 
the mass migration of  refugees has created and reawakened pre-state cultural networks across the 
region.  
 
The Role of  Language: 
In Anderson's view, the only difference between the older "imagining" of  the state and the 
contemporary is the operation of  sovereignty, which in the former was based around centres, where 
borders were often 'porous and indistinct' and the latter where sovereignty is applied in equal 
measure over the entirety of  the 'legally demarcated territory'.142  This implies that in the older 
imagining, nationalism could indeed exist across the boundaries of  proto-states, but that these 
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transstate identities ended with the advent of  the nation-state beginning in the 17th century.  In other 
words, suprastate identities were made to fall in line with the national identity of  the state, within 
legally demarcated territories, and substate identities were either marginalised (Britons in France) or 
absorbed (Gaelic tribes of  Great Britain) – an argument very much in line with that of  White, who 
argues that states in formation would generally assume the cultural identity of  the majority.143    This 
is significant because it highlights the fact that the advent of  the nation-state exacerbated differences 
between majority and minority communities, with the latter struggling to retain their unique cultural 
characteristics in an increasingly majority-centric nation-state. 
 
Anderson argues that these more fluid and multiple identities were consolidated through a process 
of  linguistic opportunism on the part of  print-capitalism, which had the dual effect of  undermining 
the authority of  the Church, whilst giving the nation a degree of  simultaneity by which citizens 
could better imagine and associate with other members of  their national community.  This imagining 
of  the national community was only made possible when sacred texts were printed in vernacular 
languages, shedding the limited access that Latin, Greek, and Hebrew placed on ontological truth, 
and when members of  an increasingly literate public were able to associate themselves with the rest 
of  the imagined community of  the nation through newsprint and literature.144  Simultaneously, the 
rapid imperial expansion of  the British and French Empires put Europeans in contact with ancient 
central/south Asian, Egyptian, Chinese, and other cultures with histories and languages that often 
pre-dated Latin, Greek and Hebrew, 'undermining the idea that Hebrew [and other languages were] 
either uniquely ancient or of  divine provenance';145  all languages were now equally worthy of  study 
and standardisation.  Latin, Greek, and Hebrew no longer had a monopoly on "ancientness"; print-
capitalism and the newfound equity of  languages helped to reinforce the idea that nations extended 
into the pre-religious past, which, in turn, undermined the authority of  the Church as the ancient 
institution to which all authority was owed.   
 
This was also affected, to a large extent, by the adoption of  vernaculars as state languages beginning 
as early as the 16th century.  Not only did this, in effect, determine exactly which linguistic and 
cultural groups were included/excluded as part of  the nation-state, but it also allowed the various 
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dialect groups, who ordinarily may not have had a mutual intelligible spoken vernacular, to 
understand one another through a standardised national print language.146  In the European context 
this meant that, through the advent of  universal education, many dialects quickly disappeared in 
favour of  the state vernacular, but this also had the added effect of  allowing nation-states to 
explicitly define which culture they belonged to, whilst undermining the power of  any alternative 
associations that may have weakened their authority.147  In this way, these early nation-states were 
able to take ownership over their official languages and, more importantly, distinguish between older 
religious and ethnic identities and the newer national identity of  the state.  This was the case with 
the Latinisation of  the Turkish alphabet as part of  the process of  Turkish nationalism and the 
reforms of  Kemal Atatürk in the early 20th century, which sought to distinguish itself  from Arab 
nationalism, whilst attempting to limit the power of  the traditional religious elite through the 
secularisation of  the country.148  However, in contrast to the European and Turkish examples, where 
the adoption of  official languages and the increase in print and literature in vernacular languages 
helped states/nationalisms distinguish themselves from other states/nationalisms, the rise in Arabic 
language print in some ways undermined the newly established states' nationalising projects, in that 
ideas and dialogues were able to more easily move throughout the vast Arabic speaking landscape – 
crossing state borders and increasingly the salience of  suprastate ideas like pan-Arabism and Islamic 
revivalism. 
 
Print capitalism 'created languages of  power' that challenged the traditional authority of  the Church, 
and provided new, secular means for the imagined community to interact with one another.149  Print-
capitalism also allowed the ideals of  nationalism, as well as those of  the French and American 
Revolutions to spread rapidly, allowing for the mass distribution and "piracy" of  models of  the 
independent state.150  In the European context, there was a linguistic barrier between the sacral 
language and the vernacular, limiting access to an educated few.  This created a lopsided relationship 
whereby the priestly and educated classes held the keys to "ontological truth", whilst the uneducated 
masses remained reliant on those at the top for access.  Print-capitalism and the expansion of  
education evened the playing field, as scripture became increasingly accessible to the growing 
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middle-class intelligentsia.  In the Middle East, however, the sacral language and the vernacular were 
one and the same.  Islam, moreover, did not place the same emphasis on a priesthood nor did it 
privilege access to ontological truth to a select few.151  Whilst illiteracy was certainly an issue in the 
Middle East, the rise of  standardised education and print-capitalism broadened access to both the 
pan-Arab nationalist movement and Islamic reform movements.  Simultaneously, the expansion of  
European missionary schools throughout the Levant in beginning in the 19th century, created a new 
middle-class urban intellectual elite – populated largely by Arab Christians, who would come to have 
a significant influence on the articulation of  secular nationalist movements in particular.  
 
In contrast to Anderson's model, where the rise of  secular consciousness through print-capitalism 
supplanted religious identification and encouraged territorial nationalism, print culture in the Middle 
East simply reinvigorated or fostered pan-Arab and Islamic identifications, forcing territorial 
nationalist movements to make concessions to populist pan-Arab and Islamic nationalisms in order 
to sustain their authority, which ultimately undermined the nature of  territorially based nationalism 
in the region.  Therefore, despite the relative decline in popularity of  pan-Arab movements in the 
1970s, a number of  Arab state have retained their attachment to what Hinnebusch calls ‘symbolic 
politics’152 – even to the point of  enshrining these symbolic relationships in their constitutional 
documents.153  
 
The Ethnic Origins of  Nations -- Anthony Smith: 
In contrast to Anderson, Anthony Smith's ethnonationalism distinguishes between the development 
of  the nation in the western and eastern contexts, with the West having paved the way, through war, 
revolution and the civic ideals of  the Enlightenment, for the East to eventually replicate.   In this 
way, he argues that the roots of  nationalism in each context were unique, but, as a consequence of  
the modern international system, all fit, more or less, under his umbrella definition of  the nation as 
'a named community possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public 
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culture and common laws and customs.'154  Smith attempts to pave a middle ground between 
'perennialists' (Armstrong 1982; Geertz 1973),155 who argue that collective cultural associations are 
not only very ancient, but entirely natural or inevitable, and 'modernists' (Anderson 1983, Gellner 
1983, Hobsbawm, 1983)156 who insist that nations are an entirely modern phenomenon, most 
typically associated with the advent of  capitalism.157  Ethnonationalism posits that nations have their 
roots in much older entities called ethnies, which, depending on historical circumstance, may or may 
not ultimately form into nations, and, even more infrequently, into 'full nation-states'.158   
 
Ethnie, according to Smith, are 'named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and 
cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of  solidarity', and represent the 
base from which contemporary nations and nationalisms emerged.159  As Smith suggests, nations 
today must have an ethnic base, which they should work into a coherent aggregate.  If  nations do not 
have a real ethnic component, with the aforementioned characteristics, they must, in the words of  
Hobsbawm, attempt to invent one.160  The cultural aspects of  the modern nation then are 
determined, to a large extent, by the ethnic roots or ethnie of  the majority, which, in most cases, both 
informs the national culture and serves to mobilise populations.161  Not all ethnie aspire to 
nationhood, but, as Smith argues, within the international system of  nation-states, ethnie must 
become politicised in order to survive, which means that they must adopt, to some extent, 'features 
of  rational political centralisation, mass literacy and social mobilisation.'162  Logically, this means that 
multiple ethnie and nations can exist within a given state, but as Charles Smith points out, 'Anthony 
Smith's idea of  ethnie does not permit any denouement other than its evolution into full- fledged 
nationalism, even if  the ethnie do not occupy the territory with which they identify.'163  Therefore, 
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ethnie have been forced by modern convention into the nationalist model simply to participate at the 
state and international level.     
 
The picture that emerges is one which Smith himself  admits to being confusing, without clear 
distinctions between ethnie, nation, state or nation-state, which it may be useful to elaborate upon in 
more plain terms.164   Ethnie form the backbone of  modern nations, whether they are invented or 
based on some real cultural cohesion.  The modern political system has forced many of  these ethnie 
to take on political characteristics in order to operate within the state system, but not all ethnie have 
become "true" nations, which Smith defines as named communities 'possessing an historic territory, 
shared myths and memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs.'165  States, 
like the United Kingdom can encompass several nations with Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and 
England all claiming status as sub-national groups.  It follows then that, 'few states today are full 
"nation-states" in the sense of  being congruent and co-extensive'.166  Rather, the majority of  states 
today are perhaps more accurately described as national conglomerates, comprised of  multiple ethnies 
and, quite often, multiple nations, which, in turn, inform the national identity of  the state.  States are 
only "full nation-states" when their international borders reflect and coincide with the boundaries of  
the nations that form their foundation. 
 
If  we examine Smith's definitions of  nation more closely, it becomes clear that, by attributing 
features to the nation that are more commonly associated with the state, such as citizenship and 
common legal rights and duties, Smith fails to suitably distinguish between the concepts of  nation 
and state.  In his most recent definition presented in his 2002 article, "When is a Nation?" Smith 
defines the nation as, 'a named community possessing an historic territory, shared myths and 
memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs.'167  This is in contrast to his 
admittedly more idealised definition168 from his 1991 book National Identity, in which he defines the 
nation as, 'a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical 
memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all 
members.'169  In the former he attempts to reconcile, as Guibernau argues, his insistence on 'mass 
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public culture', a 'common economy', and 'common legal rights and duties' with less idealized forms 
that seem more commonplace in the contemporary international system.170  Although Smith asserts 
that his definition of  the nation 'clearly sets it apart from any conception of  the state', with the state 
being defined in the Weberian sense, his attribution of  legislative duties to the nation, such as those 
involved in citizenship, are self-contradictory.  The state, not the nation, is responsible for the 
drafting of  written laws and holds the sole power over the granting of  'citizenship rights and duties' 
within a given territory.171   
 
When applied to the Middle Eastern context, Smith's definition of  the nation leads to a number of  
contradictions.  Take, for example, the history of  confessionalism in the region.  Under Ottoman 
law, the various ethno-religious groups were able to take advantage of  both the Ottoman (Shari'a) 
courts, and the courts within their own Millet or ethno-religious community.  After the collapse of  
the Empire, this confessional court system continued across much of  the Levant.  In the 
contemporary Palestinian context, the Basic Law provides for equal protections of  all citizens 
'without distinction based upon race, sex color, religion, political views or disability', but 
simultaneously states that 'the principles of  Islamic shari'a shall be a principal source of  
legislation.'172  As such, 'matters governed by shari'a law and matters of  personal status, shall come 
under the jurisdiction of  shari'a and religious courts, in accordance with the law.'173  However, are we 
to assume that, because Palestinian Christians have the option of  a different legal system than 
Muslims, they would not both consider themselves to be part of  the same nation?  Conversely, if  the 
state's official legal system is based upon the faith of  the majority and non-Muslim legal 
independence is restricted to the realm of  family law, are the non-Muslim members of  the 
Palestinian proto-state considered to be part of  the broader Palestinian nation, which has 
characterised itself  as Islamic through the legal system?174  This extends to notions of  citizenship, as 
the rights and duties of  each citizen may differ based upon their confession, gender or other 
categorisation, which creates a potentially stratified society, contrary to Smith. This is an issue 
common to Christians across the Middle East, particularly as governments like that of  Egypt, Syria, 
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Iraq, and Palestine continue to place at least symbolic emphasis on the role of  shari’a in legislative 
matters.175   
 
Finally, if  a nation were to lose control over its legislative and economic dimensions, would it cease 
to be a nation?  The Palestinian case offers an interesting example of  why a more clear-cut 
distinction needs to be made between concepts of  nation and state.  In the Palestinian Territories, 
citizenship and legal rights are granted in a very limited way to the Palestinian Authority, who has the 
power to issue passports its citizens (excluding residents of  East Jerusalem).  This stateless nation 
holds power over the granting of  passports, but does not have control over its 'common legal rights 
and duties', meaning that, in effect the granting of  passports remains a symbolic act, as control of  
the borders and legal repercussions of  citizenship remain under the control of  the State of  Israel.  
Management of  the Palestinian economy is also very limited, with the Israeli government continuing 
to collect tax revenue on behalf  of  the Palestinian Authority, while severely regulating imports and 
exports in the region.  Despite Golda Meir's 1969 comments to the contrary, the Palestinians 
undoubtedly constitute a nation; much of  the conflict now having to do with Palestinian aspirations 
for statehood in order to guarantee rights which, according to Smith, they should already possess as 
a nation, namely control over citizenship, law and the economy.   
 
Ethnic and Territorial Nationalism: 
This final section exploring Smith will turn to the development of  nationalism itself, addressing the 
ways in which Smith has arrived at his definition of  the nation.  As Smith rightly points out, 
ethnically mixed states tend to produce citizens who are divided in their allegiance and associations 
between the state and the ethnie, but how does the nation fit into this?176  This divided allegiance 
happens more frequently, as Smith suggests, in states where the territorial boundaries are not co-
extensive with the national boundaries.  Smith therefore distinguishes between two types of  
nationalism: territorial and ethnic.  The first, which Smith argues, is more or less the Western 
European model of  the nation-state, defines the nation in terms of  territory, sovereignty, and the 
legal basis of  citizenship, where the nation is a 'community of  laws and legal institutions'.177  In fact, 
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Smith takes this one step further by stating that territorial nationalism is difficult to imagine without 
the 'realization of  sovereign statehood.'178  Territorial nationalism is also characterised by the often 
artificial imposition of  a 'civic religion', which can be thought of  in Andersonian terms as the 
construction of  the “imagined community” of  the nation, which invents a shared history and 
culture, and occasionally revives a language – e.g. Zionism and the Hebrew language, in order to 
satisfy the necessity for an ethnic core, which Smith insists is essential for the project of  nation 
building.  Territorial nationalism tends not to be based around a unified ethnie, but is more typically a 
modern construction, with the more dominant nation asserting control over an often heterogeneous 
population.   
 
Nations and nationalism, as Smith argues, were 'Western concepts and Western formations'.179   
Their influence on successive nationalist movements, particularly in colonised Asia and Africa, was 
considerable.180  The colonial project exported not only western technology and bureaucracy, but 
there was also significant political and cultural exchange, particularly through nationalised education 
and print capitalism.  Through this exchange, indigenous elites in the post-colonial era sought to 
replicate the Western model of  territorial nationalism in their newly formed states, but, because of  
the external and arbitrary imposition of  the Westphalian state system, these elites found difficulty in 
uniting their often ethnically and religiously heterogeneous populations.  They then attempted to 
unify their populations based on ethnic and religious populism either through the application of  
force from a strong centralised government (Syrian regime), cultures of  resistance (Palestine), 
socialising wealth (Gulf  states) or creating a new civil religion based on much older ethnic ties.  
Typically these polyethnic/religious states have been dominated by a prevailing ethnie, which has 
sought to either exclude or co-opt181 smaller ethnie into its national narrative.182  However, as Smith 
argues, the early post-colonial history of  these ethnic nationalist movements had been largely 
unsuccessful.  Rather, as he argues, they have been forced to make considerable concessions to the 
territorial model of  nationalism, to the extent that they have adopted significant legislative aspects 
of  the territorial model.  In other words, ethnic nations, despite their initial trajectory, have largely 
adopted a western model of  territorial nationalism.  
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In the Middle East, as the next section will discuss, the post-colonial imposition of  a western-style 
state system made any moves by ethnic or territorial nationalist movements extremely problematic 
because the new Arab states faced highly diverse and multiple ethnie, to which their populations 
continued to identify, whilst pan-Arab movements faced the same 'geographical, economic and 
political problems of  any pan-movement.'183 It is therefore argued that, despite Smith's insistence 
that these movements will all seek to replicate the Western territorial model and hence fit neatly into 
his definition of  the nation, the plurality of  identity in the region, and the multiple stateless and 
transitional nations, make Smith's definition of  the nation problematic in the Middle Eastern 
context. 
 
The Development of  Middle Eastern States 
As the previous section suggests, the particularity of  state development in the Middle East 
necessitates a critical approach to the analysis of  nationalism in the region.  However, as this section 
will make clear, we cannot discount either Anderson or Smith's theories outright, partly because of  
the interconnectedness of  the global political system, which has 'made the nation-state a compulsory 
model'.184  Indeed, as Uri argues, although notions of  nation and state may have been partly 
introduced or imposed in the Middle East through western colonialism and cultural borrowing, they 
have now 'become indigenous to the political debate of  the Middle East today'.185  This means that, 
despite the unique historical trajectory of  Middle Eastern states, they have had to adopt certain 
aspects of  this more generalisable notion of  the nation-state simply as a consequence of  the 
international political order.  However, as Zubaida argues, despite the importation of  the nation-
state model, the politics and administration in Middle Eastern states have, since the early post-
colonial era, moved away from the ideals of  constitutionalism186 'sometimes to the point of  
complete abrogation' of  constitutionally enshrined rights and values.187  It is here that the theories of  
nationalism must be reconsidered: at the intersection of  the Western model of  the nation-state and 
the socio-cultural organisation of  Middle Eastern societies.  As this section will argue, equating the 
development of  nationalism in the West with the Middle East is problematic, partly because of  
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historical context, but also because of  the nature of  power relationships in the region, which 
continue to have roots in traditional associations and loyalties.   
 
In the European context, nationalism and the eventual development of  nation-states coincided with 
the development of  capitalism and subsequent division of  labour and the growth and empowerment 
of  the middle class.  This process, accompanied by revolution and the undermining of  the authority 
of  the Church, created a social space for these revolutionary political discourses, which were 
gradually integrated into the new political process, and became part of  how these newly founded 
nation-states functioned; with a variety of  political parties and mechanisms for debate and inclusion 
of  dissenting voices.  In this way, Western states acted 'in unison with society' in that the 
government represented a variety of  voices and motivations, rather than an authority distinct from 
the will and voice of  the people.188 The reverse was true in much of  the Middle Eastern context 
where states have taken a top-down approach in which authority and legitimacy are not derived from 
society, but are a force external to society that co-opt and sacrifice traditional units like the tribal and 
religious leadership in order to foster authority through the widespread use of  coercion.189 
 
This has been accomplished partly through neopatrimonialism, with the central governments 
entering into clientistic relationships with the periphery, using traditional social structures to benefit 
the state, whilst at the same time maintaining the vertical power relationships between government 
leaders and the society.190 In this way, the horizontal solidarities upon which national integration 
relies have been prevented from prospering.  The consequence of  these factors has been that Middle 
Eastern states have typically produced strong centralised governments who use coercive means to 
unify otherwise segmented populations.  Although authoritarianism has masked sectarian tensions, it 
has not been able to create states that successfully integrate multiple sub-national groups into a 
broader state-level national identity, primarily because the groups in power have tended to look out 
for the interests of  the networks that support them rather than those of  society as a whole.191  This 
has been the case in post-Saddam Iraq, where the controversial election of  Nouri al-Maliki in 2006, a 
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Shi’a Muslim, has exacerbated sectarian tensions192 between Iraq’s Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi’a 
communities owing largely to his attempt to further the powers of  his own party and ethno-religious 
group.193     
 
However, national identity in the Middle Eastern context has also been affected by the ways in 
which Middle Eastern states were created in the post World War I era.  As Hinnebusch argues, the 
consolidation of  nation-states in the Middle East has been 'obstructed by the profound flaws 
originating in its largely external imposition: the resulting often arbitrary borders and ill fit between 
states and national identities means that loyalty to the individual states is contested by substate and 
suprastate identities.'194 This was due, in large part, to the colonial processes by which the former 
Ottoman territories were divided, which in some cases reflected certain pre-existing entities, but for 
the most part involved either the restructuring of  former Ottoman provinces, as in the case of  
Trans-Jordan, or combining several provinces, as in Syria and Iraq.195 As a result, the new states took 
on a rather artificial shape, 'with their new names, their new capitals, their lack of  ethnic 
homogeneity and their dead-straight boundaries' not being reflective of  any organically derived 
divisions.196 The immediate effect of  this fracture was that these new states and their citizens had no 
real nationalistic attachment to the state, and often times only a flimsy attachment to its territorial 
boundaries.  Common colonial practices like census taking and the issuing of  identity cards were 
used to re-categorise and re-identify populations, whilst central governments drafted laws by which 
the relationship between citizen and state, as well as the principles of  the newly defined nationalism 
were established.197  The census had the dual effect of  becoming a ‘principal reference for social 
differentiation’, hence exacerbating divisions, which organically may have not been consequential.198  
But the census and new views of  citizenship also had the effect of  further defining who was 
included as members of  the new states -- often through proof  of  ancestral territorial attachment to 
the state within its newly defined borders.199  However, implicit in this attempt at territorial 
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nationalism was the presumption that nationalism could be limited to the boundaries of  the state, 
whereas, in reality, nations in the Middle East have acted more as 'a set of  interconnected organisms 
separated only by porous membranes', than the territorial particularity of  the western model.200 
 
As a result, Arab political elites have attempted to secure their legitimacy through a number of 
populist strategies aimed at creating a singular identity for their citizens, whilst attempting to absorb 
traditional and localised power structures on the periphery through patronage of traditional elites.  
These problems of legitimacy are also connected to the economic situation of Middle Eastern states.  
The shift in the 1950s and 60s in many Arab states to a socially rooted pan-Arabism promised a 
great deal more development and security for larger portions of the population through modernising 
reforms.201  The Nasser period (1956-1970) in Egypt offers a clear example of this phenomenon, 
which was reproduced across much of the Arab world.202  Initial socialisation of the Egyptian 
economy in the 1950s, with the strong backing of the USSR, provided considerable political stability 
throughout the 1950s and 60s, despite the steady, but subdued support for the Muslim Brotherhood 
and parties on the left.  Economic stability and the momentum of Arab Nationalism were enough of 
an incentive for the Egyptian people to support the Nasser regime.  This support declined with the 
failure of the 1967 War with Israel and the subsequent, but unrelated decline in economic support 
from the USSR.  In response, the Egyptian government privatised large parts of the Egyptian 
economy, which concentrated wealth within an inner political circle of regime supporters who 
owned interests in mining, agricultural and other industries, and profited from the export of raw 
materials to the developed world.203  Economic development was then used as a way of ‘solving 
strategic puzzles’ like an unruly public or decline profits, rather than for the sake of development 
itself. 204  This resulted in an export-based economy in which self-sustaining industry was not 
fostered locally – an effect that was similarly reproduced across the Arab world.  As a result, 
unemployment became widespread, as did dissatisfaction with the ruling regimes. 
 
States responded to this dissatisfaction by expanding their security apparatuses and the use of 
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coercion, which furthered the gap between the state and the society.205  Simultaneously, the 
expansion of patronage networks undermined the growth of a universal sense of national identity, as 
the relationship with the ruling regime became the primary mode of belonging to the state.206  In 
response to the failed political policies of these regimes, and of pan-Arabism more generally, the 
Arab public began to look for alternative political solutions.  Although political Islam had a strong 
presence in the Arab world throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, its widespread repression 
by secular-nationalist regimes meant that it never caught on as a political movement.  The success of 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, however, provided the intellectual and political momentum for 
these movements to gain ground against regimes across the Arab World.207  Consequently, it became 
clear to Arab leaders that any attempt to legitimise their authority must include what had then 
become popular issues, namely, anti-colonialism, the Palestinian/Israeli Conflict, and Islamism.  
This was accomplished, in part, through what Hinnebusch and other have termed 'symbolic politics', 
with the Arab leadership co-opting issues more broadly central or symbolically relevant to the Arab 
world.208   
 
The situation in Palestine, whilst subject to many of these same concerns, had the added effect of 
the Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the 1967 War, which exacerbated 
economic hardships, whilst also increasing national solidarities.209  Unlike neighbouring Middle 
Eastern states whose national identities were perhaps more ambiguous throughout this period, the 
presence of Israel as a coherent threat would ultimately, as Bowman argues, both unify the 
Palestinian population and provide an extremely effective scapegoat for the failures of the national 
leadership.210 However, the failure of the Oslo Peace Process and ongoing economic, social and 
other hardships has undermined the ability of the Palestinian Authority to govern and be viewed as a 
legitimate authority.  Although it has attempted to foster civil society and encourage development, it 
is viewed as increasingly corrupt and ineffective.  This is due, in part, to its failure to fulfil basic 
requirements for legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian public.  As the next section will discuss, the 
relationship between legitimacy, authority, and national identity in the Middle Eastern context is 
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closely related to levels of state attachment – especially so for minorities.  If a state has not derived 
its authority from society, but through coercion, national identity will not be an organic outgrowth 
from society, but rather a top down and artificial construct.  In other words, these states will attempt 
to create a nation in order to legitimise themselves or to secure legitimacy through its association 
with broader supranational or suprareligious identifications.  
 
Legitimacy and authority: In order for a political or social actor to exercise authority or to hold a significant influence on 
society – including the obligation to perform actions for this social or political body – it has to prove 
its legitimacy to the society.  On an individual level, belief  that a political or social actor is legitimate 
is highly subjective and responsive to one's own moral and social worldview.  The process of  
legitimisation is one that is carried out in the social space – as actors attempt to prove their 
legitimacy in response to a changing social and political context.  As Hurd argues, actors can attempt 
to prove their legitimacy either by adhering to some normative principles that the society upholds or 
by fulfilling interest-based societal demands in a more populist manner.211  In this way, we can 
describe both a normative understanding of  legitimacy and a descriptive understanding.   
 
The descriptive view of  legitimacy is largely based on the work of  Weber, who 'emphasizes the 
macro-social consequences of  citizens' belief  in the legitimacy of  their rulers'.212  Weber described 
legitimacy as 'the basis of  every system of  authority, and correspondingly of  every kind of  
willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief  by virtue of  which persons exercising authority are lent 
prestige'.213 Legitimacy, in Weber's paradigm stems from three sources: tradition: the political or social 
order is sufficiently "old"; charisma: the people have faith in the system because of  one or several 
charismatic leaders; and legality: 'the rationality of  a rule or law'.214 If  one or more of  these conditions 
are met, the political body is viewed as legitimate.  Additionally, once a legitimate authority is created, 
it structures society 'in such a way that even those who do not share the belief  in its legitimacy face 
incentives to behave as if  they did.'215  These incentives, whether they are in some way coercive or 
material, consequently shape individual and group behaviour. 
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This view has been criticised by Beetham, who argues that Weber's overly descriptive view of  
legitimacy neglects 'people's second order beliefs about legitimacy', i.e. an individual's internalised 
sense of  morality, spirituality, and justice.  In other words, legitimacy is not, ipso facto, persuasive.  
Rather, people must believe that authority is justified in terms of  their personal beliefs.216   As an 
example, the free and fair election of  a leftist presidential candidate can be considered to be 
descriptively "legitimate", whilst being considered normatively "illegitimate" by conservatives whose 
own beliefs might view this election as proof  of  some systemic injustice or corruption merely 
because of  a disconnect between their worldview and that of  the candidate. This highlights a more 
normative view of  legitimacy, which holds that government must conform to society's moral or legal 
norms in order to be considered legitimate – both internally and externally (membership in the UN 
is partly based on adherence to normative standards of  international law).  Unlike the descriptive 
model, the normative view is less concerned with what individuals actually think, and more in what 
they should think under perfect conditions. 
 
Under stable conditions in a nation-state, it is difficult to fully ascertain whether individuals truly 
view a political authority as legitimate or whether they are merely acquiescing to the ruling authority.  
This is partly due to the fact that, within these stable states, political choices themselves are less 
consequential to the overall manner in which the state is structured.  In other words, we elect 
political candidates in the hope that they might be able to make changes that suit our worldview, but 
we do not expect them to completely change the nature of  the political system itself.  In stateless or 
unstable conditions, the connection between political choice and legitimacy may become more 
apparent simply because political choices can be extremely consequential to the overall nature of  the 
political and social reality.  This is particularly true when religion comes into play, in that a religious 
party may be the only legitimate choice for a pious person – choice then being limited by a normative 
understanding of  legitimate authority.  Under stateless conditions, it is then more apparent which 
actors have the most legitimacy and also how they come to shape the national narrative and social 
context.   
 
These issues of  legitimacy and authority are crucial to understanding the nature of  state 
development in the Middle East for a number of  reasons.  Firstly, because of  the external 
                                                 216. Peter, "Political Legitimacy." 
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imposition of  the state system in the region, governments were forced from the outset to compete 
for legitimacy with a host of  other potential actors. The sudden and arbitrary imposition of  the state 
system created a gap in legitimacy, as both state and citizen struggled to define their relationship 
with one another, whilst continuing to negotiate allegiances to tribe, region, and supra-national 
identities.  The lack of  congruence between notions of  nation and state in the Middle East created a 
situation in which the state exercised authority, but not legitimacy and remained in competition with 
a host of  other identities to which its citizens identified.  
 
The Palestinian context is not immune from wider trends in the development of  nations and states 
in the Middle East.  It has been the case the Palestinian political parties have had to adhere to 
populist issues: Pan-Arabism, Islamism, and socialism.  But unique to the Palestinian case of  
legitimacy and authority is a culture of  resistance in which political parties prove their legitimacy 
partly through their perceived ability to resist Israel. In this culture of  resistance, as Kårtveit notes, 
'practices and gestures that signal resilience in the face of  an Israeli occupation, and solidarity with 
victims of  Israeli violence are seen as expressions of  national belonging.’217  The notion of  samud has 
been a core element of  national discourse and party politics in Palestine since the 1948 War and 
establishment of  the State of  Israel.  Political parties must adhere not only to ideological or religious 
norms, but also be able to successfully project their image as resistance groups.  In the post-Oslo 
landscape, the nature of  samud or at the very least its iteration in the political and public discourse 
has changed significantly along with popular sentiment.  This can be seen quite clearly in the shift in 
popular discourse about the conflict from a long secular-dominated discourse to one in which 
religion is increasingly relevant.218   
 
One notable shift in the practice of  samud, which respondents indicated began during the Second 
Intifada, is the enforcement of  public protest by youth wings of  political parties.  During the 
fieldwork for this project in the summer of  2014 at the height of  the Gaza War219, local shops across 
the West Bank closed in solidarity with the victims of  the Gaza War.  Due to the hardship that days 
of  closed doors would cause to local business owners, several stores remained discretely "open".  
However, groups of  young men patrolled the streets ensuring that shops remained closed under the 
                                                 217. Kårtveit, Dilemmas of Attachment: Identity and Belonging among Palestinian Christians., 28 
218 Lybarger, Identity and Religion in Palestine. 
219 Lizzie Dearden, "Israel-Gaza Conflict: 50-Day War by Numbers,"  Independent (2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-gaza-conflict-50-day-war-by-numbers-9693310.html. 
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threat of  violence or destruction of  property.  One respondent, a local shop owner in Bethlehem, 
had had her storefront bombed by a Molotov cocktail during the Second Intifada for such an 
offence.  Although these dissenting shop owners most certainly felt solidarity towards their fellow 
countrymen, the solidarity of  the First Intifada, demonstrated in the famous Beit Sahour tax 
boycott220 has been splintered as political and ideological infighting has increased.  Expressions of  
resistance and national solidarity are also increasingly coloured by party and ideology, which, as the 
next section will discuss, has important implications for the expression of  national identity. 
 
Statelessness: 
As discussed in the introduction, nationalism in the Palestinian context has taken a slightly different 
historical trajectory than other Middle Eastern states because of  the ongoing lack of  a state.  Much 
like its neighbouring Arab states, the Palestinian Authority has attempted to codify a sense of  
national identity, whilst playing to supra-national affiliations like the Arab and Islamic worlds. The 
Palestinian Basic Law explicitly mentions Arab unity as a goal: ‘Palestine is part of the larger Arab 
world, and the Palestinian people are part of the Arab nation.  Arab unity is an objective that the 
Palestinian people shall work to achieve’, while listing Islamic shari’a as a ‘principal source of 
legislation’.221 These concessions to symbolic politics highlight the ongoing importance of suprastate 
identities within the Palestinian context.  Increasingly, however, the declining legitimacy of  the 
Palestinian Authority has decreased its ability to influence and shape public opinion.  This is due, in 
part, to economic hardship and the perceived corruption of  the PA, but also because they are 
increasingly viewed as an ineffective liberation organisation.  This perspective was observed 
throughout the 2014 Gaza War, in which numerous respondents linked the PA’s failure to respond to 
Israeli aggression to their inability to govern.  In a PCPSR survey conducted four months after the 
War in December of  2014, 53% said they would elect a Hamas candidate for president versus 42% 
for Fatah, whilst 81% viewed the PA as a corrupted institution.  Further, overall satisfaction with the 
PA government was 26%.222   
 
Although the PA has attempted to create many of  the physical and ideological structures of  a state, 
its declining popularity has eroded its influence on the public.  Further, as Lybarger, Wedeen, 
Kårtveit and others have argued, the lack of  a sovereignty, has meant that national identity, as such,                                                  
220 Bowman, "Christian, Muslim Palestinians Confront Sectarianism: Religion and Political Identity in Beit Sahour.", 53 
221 Palestinian National Authority, "Amended Basic Law (Current)." 
222 Palestinian Centre for Survey and Policy Research, "Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No 54," (PCPSR, 2014). 
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is not necessarily transmitted by one official organ, but is both a product of  semi-institutional 
networks like political actors and civil society, and everyday interactions.  In the case of  Palestine, 
these are primarily acts of  resistance, shared experiences of  trauma or shows of  solidarity with those 
under more immediate threat of  violence or imprisonment.223   
 
In this way, as Kårtveit notes, national solidarity can be temporarily invoked through a clear 
articulation of  the culture of  resistance in protests or everyday actions.224  However, the articulation 
of  a specific national ideological programme is highly contested, as the formal channels for 
constructive national debates like elections, lobbying, civil society, etc. have become either 
inconsistent or nonexistent.  Consequently, the ideological divide has sharpened as these dialogues 
have become largely insulated within their own political camps.  Whilst this is by no means unique to 
Palestine – one can certainly see the same phenomenon happening across the globe, however the 
reality of  statelessness means that articulations and demonstrations of  national identity are highly 
fluid, individualised, and politicised.  Therefore, those parties with the most public support can 
influence not only the ideological stance of  individuals, but also their conception of  a Palestinian 
national identity.  This relates back to Weber's notion of  legitimate authority, in which a critical mass 
of  popular legitimacy can create a situation in which the relative influence of  actors increases 
regardless of  whether or not society completely agrees with them.  Similarly, Lybarger argues that 
those actors with the greatest amount of  institutional strength are 'more successful in articulating 
the hopes and fears accompanying an emerging historical moment; these groups would generalize 
their particular interpretation of  events, embedded within the narratives and symbols of  distinct 
sociopolitical milieus, to individuals and groups beyond their immediate sphere. Others not directly 
affiliated with these groups/milieus would nevertheless absorb their orientations.'225  The result 
being that national identity shifts along with popular sentiments.  As the popularity of  political Islam 
increases in the region, the demonstration of  religion in the public sphere – including issues of  
public morality, display of  religious symbols and behaviour, and the nature of  political debate – also 
increases.  Consequently, the articulation of  national identity becomes shaped by this increased 
public role of  religion, which has the effect of  alienating groups that feel threatened by the Islamist 
dicourse – including Christians and secular-oriented Muslims. 
                                                  223. Kårtveit, Dilemmas of Attachment: Identity and Belonging among Palestinian Christians., 85 224. Ibid., 28 225. Lybarger, Identity and Religion in Palestine., 19 
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Secularism and post-colonialism: 
As discussed in the introduction, in the post-colonial era, from the outset, Middle Eastern states had 
to not only enforce a new territorial nationalism that often contradicted the social realities on the 
ground, but also reconcile the disconnects between "modernisation" and secularisation with a more 
communally orientated public.  In the Western context secularism has been associated with the 
modernisation of  European economies and state systems beginning in the seventeenth century.  As 
the state began to play a larger role most aspects of  public life, it supplanted the church. 226 The 
validity of  this “secularisation thesis” is contested particularly in the Middle Eastern context where 
religion continues to play a significant role in public life. 227   This is partly explained by the fact the 
modernisation processes that occurred in the Middle East often came with strict social controls, 
which made the secularisation of  the public problematic, 'insofar as it did not seek to separate 
religion from politics, but rather subjugate religion to political control.'228  This had the effect of  
politicising religion as Muslim institutions struggled with the state, 'often in an effort to loosen the 
state's control over society.'229 As the state was made increasingly illegitimate through heavy-handed 
and repressive tactics, the relative legitimacy of  religion remained quite strong as it was viewed as an 
indigenous rather than colonial concept.  Notions of  secularism then became intimately tied with 
the history of  Western colonialism, but also Middle Eastern authoritarianism.230 Consequently, the 
legitimacy of  the state was tied to the legitimacy of  secularism as an ideology – 'the decline of  
secularism was the same as the decline of  the postcolonial state'.231  For their part, Middle Eastern 
Christian communities have had a complex relationship with secularism.  As a political ideology, 
parties that support secularism are generally more popular with Christians, as the alternatives, like 
political Islam, are viewed as potentially detrimental to their interests.232  However, as Christians were 
heavily involved and invested in the development Arab and Palestinian nationalisms, they naturally 
sympathised with anti-colonialist movements.  Therefore, secular Palestinian nationalism, as iterated 
by the Soviet-aligned Palestinian political parties in the 1960s233, became an acceptable mode of  
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secular politics, as it was both anti-western and secular.  As discussed in Chapter Six, this explains 
the continued popularity of  socialist parties amongst the Palestinian Christian communities.   
 
In the broader Palestinian political context, the PA has proved to be increasingly ineffective in the 
post-Oslo era, both in their resistance towards Israel and then in their ability to create a successful 
outcome for the Palestinians in peace negotiations.  As a result, the relative success of  Hamas as 
both a provider of  social welfare (which the PA was lacking after the Second Intifada) and as a 
successful revolutionary movement, increased their legitimacy to the extent that the public discourse 
itself  has become increasingly religious, whilst the traditional leadership appropriates aspects of  the 
religious discourse in order to 'bolster their legitimacy'.234  In this context, because religion remains a 
powerful ideological force in the public imagination, legitimacy remains tied to religion, resistance, 
and postcolonial movements. 
 
In traditional societies, identification was more localised, i.e. based largely upon regional structures 
(whether they were tribal, ethnic, religious or otherwise), and was, by its very nature heterogeneous 
and only loosely territorial.  Palestine is clearly a "modern" society and is therefore subject to this 
same fluidity, but traditional identifications continue to play a crucial role.235 It is clear in the 
Palestinian context that not only the secularism model, but also Hall's argument that the post-
modern subject is somehow completely severed from tradition are problematic.  Realistically, whilst 
both individualism and globalisation play a much larger role in self-identification for Palestinian 
youth in particular, religion, tribalism, and traditional networks of  loyalty continue to play a very 
significant, but perhaps less obvious, role – particularly in light of  statelessness. Therefore, the 
transfer of  allegiance from traditional affiliations like tribe or religion to the nation is incomplete.   
Without a state, there is no one fixed point to which an individual can transfer allegiance, but rather 
a whole host of  actors vying for legitimacy in the eyes of  the public.  As a result, the more 
legitimacy an actor has, the more they come to shape the national imagining.  Because, as Bowmen 
notes, Palestinian nationalism was largely founded upon an antagonism towards Israel, and because 
of  the difficult daily realities of  life under Occupation, the legitimacy of  actors is largely based upon 
their ability to resist Israel (either successfully or unsuccessfully).236  Added to this, the more an actor 
                                                 234. Nasr, "Lessons from the Muslim World.", 71 235. Lybarger, Identity and Religion in Palestine.; Kårtveit, Dilemmas of Attachment: Identity and Belonging among Palestinian Christians. 
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can be shown to reflect popular cultural sentiments – such as an increased desire for Islam to play a 
more public role – the greater their legitimacy.   
 
In this context, Wedeen, Zeberi, and others have discussed the role of  pious nationalism within 
Arab states, where religion has continued to play a significant role in the public discourse and 
politics.  Pious nationalism expressly codes nationalistic rhetoric and issues of  public morality and 
control in religious language – either Islamic (Hamas), Christian or some mixture of  both (Fatah).  
This model can largely forgo territoriality in the place of  membership in the global religious 
community. However, while the long-term goal might be unification of  the religious community in a 
single territory, national aspirations may take priority.  Hamas, for example, views Palestine as an 
Islamic waqf, however its political ideology and goals are largely based upon a territorial nationalism, 
which prioritises the liberation of  Palestine over the establishment of  a global Muslim Caliphate.237 
In other words, its national identity is simultaneously Palestinian and Islamic.  However, the 
emergence and rise in popularity of  Islamic political movements in Palestine in the 1980s created an 
'alternative Islamic nationalist project' parallel to and interacting with the quasi-secular nationalist 
project of  the PLO.238   
 
Also somewhat unique to the experience of  Palestinian nationalism is the focus on the present and 
future rather than the distant and mythical past.  Although historic figures, events, and sites of  
religious significance are a large part of  Palestinian nationalism, the focus of  national imagining 
tends to be on the contemporary struggle against Occupation and, to a lesser extent, the imagined 
future after Occupation.  Indeed as Bowman notes, 'Although there tends...to be an imagined 
utopian future state in which all of  the other's antagonisms will have been elided, the chief  emphasis 
of  the nationalist imaginary is on the contemporary struggle to expel or extinguish the sources of  
constitutive violence.'239  Common articulations of  Palestinian identity will most typically begin with 
a personal anecdote about the Occupation or reiteration of  common Palestinian problems resulting 
from Occupation, rather than an emphasis on what might be thought of  as typical Palestinian 
cultural elements. This is why, when asked the question: how would you define what it means to be a 
Palestinian?, a typical response would include several minutes of  discussion about the amount of  
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suffering, both personal and national, that the Israeli occupation has caused.  As the head of  a 
Palestinian NGO that works with young students related, 
 
When we ask students to define themselves we get the whole identity linked with victimisation: refugee, occupied, suppressed, you know isolated, that whole understanding of  Palestinian identity.  And then what we ask them to do is to define identity from the future, what does it mean to be a Palestinian in the future, what does the future hope to create? And how does that identity look like?  And of  course it's completely different than this.240    
There are also significant differences between self  and collective imaginings of  Palestinian national 
identity, which are affected by upbringing, religion, daily experience, wealth, etc.  In other words, we 
can identify structures of  identity within a national discourse for example, but, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, there are simultaneously a host of  psychological and other factors that play a role in 
our individual interpretation of  these national discourses.  
 
Conclusion: 
As this chapter has shown, the particularity of state development in the Middle East necessitates a 
critical approach to the study of national identity in the region.  It was argued that the ongoing role 
of religion in public life and the continued salience of suprastate and substate identities in the Middle 
East, contradict a number of key assumptions made by Anderson and Smith.  Further, the 
experience of statelessness in the Palestinian context runs contrary to models in which the sovereign 
state is the primary vehicle for the definition and transmission of national identity to the public.  
Rather, the lack of a sovereign state and a legitimised state apparatus opens national identity to the 
influence of a variety of actors (political, religious, institutional), with equally varied ideological 
perspectives.  Those actors with the most influence then have the greatest effect in shaping this 
identity, as well as the future shape of the Palestinian state.  
 
The decline of secular-nationalist politics in Palestine, and the decreasing public faith in the PA has 
important implications for the Palestinian Christian communities who may feel that they no longer 
identify with popular public expressions of  nationalism.  As Chapter Two discussed, this is 
connected to the ways in which they participate politically and socially, as their experience of  the “in-
group” of  the nation strongly impacts upon their willingness to participate or associate with the 
                                                 240. CRO Employee 3, interview by Quinn Coffey2014, Bethlehem. 
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group.  If  they feel alienated from an increasingly narrow or exclusionary definition of  the nation, 
then they are likelier to identify with their communal identities, which may feel under threat.  
However, the same applies to their experience of  the confessional communities themselves.  In the 
case of  the Rum Orthodoks and Latin communities, long-standing issues over the identity and 
vocation of  the Patriarchates of  Jerusalem has had a significant impact on whether or not 
individuals choose to associate themselves with their confessional communities.  The following 
chapter provides a historical context to these struggles over the identity of  the Patriarchates, with an 
emphasis on the social and political roles of  the church hierarchies.   
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Chapter Four -- Contextualising Rum Orthodoks and Latin History in the Holy Land: 
 As the previous chapter discussed, the history of  state development in the Middle East has had a 
profound impact upon the experience and growth of  Arab and Palestinian nationalisms.  The role 
of  Christians in the early development of  Arab and Palestinian nationalism was equally profound, as 
Middle Eastern Christians provided much of  the intellectual momentum that would come to shape 
both pan-Arab and state-specific nationalisms in the region.  These forces were also shaped, to a 
large extent, by the institutions of  the churches themselves.  In addition to the presence of  a 
number of  eastern-rite churches across the Middle East, whose histories span millennia, the 
introduction of  European missionary churches, the Arabic language printing press, and the 
translation of  numerous works of  the Enlightenment into Arabic -- largely facilitated by Christian 
printing houses -- informed the growth of  an indigenous nationalist culture of  its own right.  
However, as a consequence of  the rise of  nationalism across the Middle East, the Christian lay 
communities began to call for greater rights and access within the Patriarchal hierarchies themselves, 
which had long been dominated by foreign clergy.  Indeed, throughout their historical development, 
both the Greek Orthodox, and considerably newer, Latin Patriarchates of  Jerusalem have struggled 
to define both their identity and vocation as "foreign" churches with significant indigenous lay 
communities.  For the Orthodox Patriarchate, this has manifested itself  in a centuries-long struggle 
between an ethnic Greek Patriarchal hierarchy and Arab lower clergy and laity, spurred on by the 
advent of  Greek and Arab nationalism in the 19th century.  As Sir Ronald Storrs, British Military 
Governor of  Jerusalem observed in 1917,  
If  anything, Palestinian Orthodoxy suffered by such external contacts as it possessed; for the attempt to preserve it less as the church of  the Palestine Orthodox than as an outpost of  Hellenism almost of  the modern Church of  Athens was a source not only of  constant intrigue and wire-pulling, of  anxious colloquies with the Greek Consul in Jerusalem, and of  journeys by the Archbishop of  the Jordan to Athens, but also of  increasing discouragement and bitterness to the Orthodox Arabs of  the country. The only spiritual exhortation received by the unfortunate "Arabophone" from his earliest youth was administered, if  at all, in a language which not one in a thousand could understand.241    This often-contentious relationship is partly due to the fact that, unlike many of  the other churches 
in the Holy Land who have undergone a process of  "Arabisation" over the past 100 or so years, the 
Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of  Jerusalem remains governed almost exclusively by ethnic Greeks.242   
In fact, in the modern history of  the Patriarchate, there have only been two Arab Bishops, Bishop                                                  241. Ronald Storrs, Orientations: The Memoirs of Ronald Storrs (New York: G.P. Putnum's Sons, 1937)., 426 242. Itamar Katz and Ruth Kark, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem and Its Congregation: Dissent over Real Estate," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 37 (2005)., 509 
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Symon of  Taybeh and the recently appointed Archbishop Theodosios (Atallah Hannah) of  
Sebastiya.  However, neither Arab Bishop has held voting rights within the Patriarchate's decision 
making body, the Holy Synod of  Bishops, making their actual impact on the administration of  the 
Patriarchate largely symbolic, despite the considerable role that Archbishop Atallah Hannah plays as 
a political advocate for the Palestinian people.243  
 
By contrast, the Latin Patriarchate of  Jerusalem, despite being founded in 1099 as part of  foreign 
occupying forces during the Crusades, has evolved over the course of  the 20th century into a largely 
Arab institution in the contemporary context.  However, this process was gradual and not without 
complications.  As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the Latin Church is one of  several 
Catholic institutions in the Middle East, but is uniquely European in its liturgical practices in 
comparison to the far more numerous eastern-rite Catholic communities.  Therefore, upon its 
reestablishment in 1847, the Latin Patriarchate of  Jerusalem struggled to define its vocation and 
identity in the Holy Land -- particularly in light of  the presence of  well-established and far more 
numerous eastern-rite Catholic communities.  The Eastern-rite Catholics were understandably 
cautious of  the Latin presence, as European missionaries frequently sought to Latinise local 
parishes.  However, after this practice was banned in 1894 by Pope Leo XIII, the Jerusalem 
Patriarchate slowly began to accommodate the so-called "oriental-rite" liturgical traditions.244  As the 
Palestinian Latin community grew from roughly 4,000 members in 1847 to 40,000245 by the early 
1920s, the role of  the Patriarchate began to change.  The first modern Latin Patriarch of  Jerusalem, 
Msgr. Valegera saw the value of  establishing a local church, with local clergy.246   As one Palestinian 
Latin priest related:  
They recognised the need to have a local church and to not have a missionary church – a missionary church meaning the priests come from Europe to help the local Palestinians.  No, they wanted local priests and local bishops so that we could have a local church.  And this is important and we can see it everywhere for the Catholic Church – including here in Palestine.  So now we have an Arab Patriarch and auxiliary bishops – they are Arabs.  And that was a gradual change.  Where we don't see this happening with the Orthodox.247     
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Indeed, since the early 20th century, the Latin Patriarchate has become a definitively Arab institution, 
with numerous Arab bishops, two Arab Patriarchs, and hundreds of  Arab priests serving the 
Palestinian community.248  Although its presence in the Holy Land has been considerably shorter 
than that of  the Greek Orthodox, the relative impact of  the Latin Patriarchate is significant both in 
terms of  its social and political impact on the Palestinian Christian communities.  
 
At the local level, the Catholic Church maintains 43 schools in Palestine, 13 of  which belong to the 
Latin-rite.249  This compares with only three run by the Greek Catholics and 12 by the Greek 
Orthodox.250   Additionally, the Latin Church is affiliated with 43% of  Palestinian scout groups, 
which are considered by respondents to be an integral part of  both the nationalisation of  Palestinian 
youth and their after school development.251    This is in addition to numerous hospitals, housing 
developments, elderly care and other establishments.252  Therefore, relative to the size of  the Latin 
community itself, roughly 8,000 followers in the West Bank, it has a considerable impact on 
Palestinian society.253  The Latin Patriarchate also benefits from its relationship with the institutions 
of  the Vatican, both in terms of  its influence in international politics and its ability to develop and 
finance social institutions in the Holy Land.  In addition to the strong history of  Vatican diplomacy 
on behalf  of  equal rights in Jerusalem, in recent years it has turned its efforts towards the Palestinian 
people themselves – most recently with the recognition of  the State of  Palestine on 26 June 2015.   
 This chapter details the historical trajectory of  these two communities as they continue to define 
their identity and vocation as important local institutions in Palestine.  This chapter will not give a 
point-by-point description of  the history of  these two institutions, both because this is beyond the 
scope of  this study and because it has been accomplished thoroughly in dozens of  other 
publications.254  Rather, it focuses primarily on issues of  identity and politics, highlighting the 
significance of  particular historical trends to the contemporary context.  The Latin presence in the 
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Holy Land began with the siege of  Jerusalem in 1099.  Therefore the first several sections focus 
primarily on the early development of  the early Orthodox community and institution of  the 
Patriarchate.   
 Early Social Dynamics: 
The considerable Greek cultural influence in the Middle East is not a new phenomenon.  Its origins 
are rooted in the Byzantine era when Greek culture was spread through trade, politics, and religion 
throughout the Middle East and in the coastal regions of  the Levant.  It was the Byzantines who 
first established the Church of  the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem in the 4th century and who financed 
the maintenance and protection of  holy sites in the pre-Islamic era.255 However, the socio-political 
climate of  the Middle East during the Byzantine period was by no means a monolithically Hellenic 
world.  In fact, the numerous ecumenical councils convened from the 4th through 7th centuries, as 
well as the movement of  various ethnic and religious groups throughout the Empire, significantly 
transformed the makeup of  the Christian communities throughout the region.  The Councils of  
Ephesus (431 c.e.) and Chalcedon (451 c.e.) drew a line in the sand between what became known as 
Oriental Orthodox communities (commonly, but incorrectly, called "monophysite"256 in the 
historical literature or self-identified as miaphysite; non-Chalcedon; Jacobite) and the Eastern 
Orthodox (diaphysite; Chalcedonian; Melkite) communities aligned with Constantinople.257  
 
For the purpose of  this study, the Council of  Chalcedon was of  particular importance partly 
because it resulted in the elevation of  Jerusalem to the status of  Patriarchate in 451 c.e.  Although 
Jerusalem was seen as a site of  great spiritual significance for early Christianity, the city itself  had not 
maintained a level of  economic and political importance during the early Byzantine period.  The 
status of  the city changed, however, with the establishment and recognition of  holy sites in the 
Byzantine province of  Palestina Secunda beginning in the 4th century.  In addition to the construction 
of  the Church of  the Nativity in 333 c.e.258 and the Church of  the Holy Sepulchre in 335 c.e.,259 a 
number of  monasteries were established throughout this period, which greatly increased the 
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religious significance and relative importance of  Jerusalem in the Eastern Christian World. Although 
the initial purpose of  the Jerusalem Patriarchate was likely symbolic, over time, and with the 
continued emergence of  rival churches, control and protection of  holy sites became its primary 
vocation.260  This role was further evidenced by the creation of  the monastic fraternity known as the 
Brotherhood of  the Holy Sepulchre in the 4th century, who were tasked with the protection of  holy 
sites and who also had the responsibly of  electing the Patriarchate's Holy Synod.261   
 
Arab Conquests: 
After the successful Arab conquest of  Jerusalem in 637, Patriarch Sophronius famously surrendered 
the city to Caliph 'Umar, and accepted certain economic and social capitulations in lieu of  the 
conversion of  the city's Christian inhabitants.  Although historians dispute the details of  this 
surrender and subsequent 'Umari Covenant,262 the narrative has been adopted by the Orthodox 
Patriarchate as a recognition of  Greek supremacy over the holy sites in Jerusalem because the treaty 
allegedly alludes the Greek nation.  It is therefore cited as legal precedent for the primacy of  
Orthodoxy in the region's holy sites.  As the Orthodox Patriarchate's website states: 
Caliph Omar by personal decree (ahtiname) recognized the Patriarch of  "the imperial nation" (namely the Greeks), the position of  leader of  the nation and spiritual leader of  all the Christians of  Palestine, even of  the heterodox, as well as the legation of  honour among all the Christian leaders, granting him guarantees of  goodwill, security and freedom from taxation on behalf  of  future Muslim leaders. However, his successors, high handed Arab leaders, proved to be very tough. The Christian community started to become afflicted by intense efforts of  Islamization and anti-Hellenic cleansing.263  
The Arab conquests effectively disrupted Greek control over the Patriarchate of  Jerusalem for 
several centuries. In the absence of  Constantinople's influence, the ubiquity and control of  
Byzantine culture in the Levant sharply declined.  This extended not only to the practice of  the 
liturgy, but also to the selection of  patriarchs, church leadership, and clergy  – a majority of  whom 
were now selected from within the communities themselves.264  
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The relative autonomy of  the Patriarchate of  Jerusalem from the influence of  Constantinople 
during the early Islamic period was periodically interrupted by the Crusades and subsequent Arab re-
conquest throughout the period between the 11th and 12th centuries.  During the Crusader 
occupation of  Jerusalem 1099-1187, the Patriarch of  Jerusalem resided in exile in Constantinople, 
along with a majority of  Greek Bishops, allowing the Ecumenical Patriarch to briefly reassert 
control over the institution of  the Patriarchate.265  However, the Arab Orthodox remaining in the 
Holy Land experienced a period of  marginalisation under Crusader rule – both socially and 
liturgically.  This was due to the fact that the Frankish Crusaders, who were of  the Latin-rite, 
regarded the Arab Orthodox as duplicitous due to their mixed cultural background (using the Greek 
language for the liturgy and speaking in Arabic vernacular). As Jotischky explains, 
Customs that deviated from the Roman norm were understandable if  they derived from distinct liturgical and theological traditions, because such traditions were themselves indices of  an ethnic identity.  Thus the Armenians, who possessed their own distinctive language, dress and customs, were highly regarded, despite the collapse of  their union with the Roman Church and the refusal of  most Armenians to abandon monophysite doctrines.  In contrast, the native orthodox, though members of  the same church as the Latins, were despised because their religious customs did not appear to derive from the same root as their ethnicity.266  
Despite the fact that the Arab Orthodox community fell under the same ecclesiastical authority as 
the Franks during the Crusader period, the Franks themselves had a difficult time characterising the 
indigenous Orthodox community.  They were, in many ways, culturally Arab, and yet their liturgical 
practice was significantly influenced by Byzantine culture: 'they were Greek Orthodox, but not 
Greek; Arabic speaking, but not Muslim; Christian inhabitants of  a Christian state, yet subject to the 
rule of  the conquerors.'267   This level of  multiculturalism caused the Franks to have a 'universally 
negative' perception of  local Christians because the duality of  their culture and religious practice was 
seen as duplicitous.268   
 
The crusader period ended with the fall of  Saint-Jean-d'Acre and the death of  the Latin Patriarch in 
1291.269  With the Arab re-conquest of  Jerusalem in 1187, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of  
Jerusalem was re-established.270  Although the Arab Orthodox community welcomed the Arab re-
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conquest of  Jerusalem, they only experienced a short-lived growth in Arabisation of  the 
Patriarchate, which vacillated between Greek and Arabic influence until the 15th century.   
 
The origins of  the Latin Patriarchate of  Jerusalem: 
As noted above, when the Crusader armies entered Jerusalem in 1099 they found that the Orthodox 
Patriarch had fled, along with a majority of  his bishops, to Constantinople.  Without the input of  
the Vatican, the Franks installed a Latin Patriarch in the vacant see.  This was done, 'without the 
necessity or the ambition to create a Latin Catholic community in the Holy Land', but primarily to 
assert Latin control over the region's holy sites.271 Therefore, there was not an effort to convert local 
Christians to the Latin rite.272  It is for this reason that a significant indigenous Latin community did 
not develop during the Crusader States period.  After the fall of  Acre in 1291 and the death of  the 
Latin Patriarch, the hierarchy retreated to Europe, where the title of  patriarch remained largely 
titular until its re-establishment in 1847.273 
 
Although the institutional presence of  the Latins in the Holy Land was effectively ended with the 
Arab re-conquest of  Jerusalem, the Franciscan Order established a province and custody of  the 
Holy Land in 1219.274 Through diplomatic efforts with the Mamluk Caliphate, the Franciscans were 
able to maintain Latin rights to the Church of  the Holy Sepulchre and Church of  the Nativity 
throughout the 600 year absence of  the Latin Patriarchate.  This Franciscan presence was 
maintained  in the Holy Land, often in very hostile contexts, until today.  However a significant 
indigenous Latin community did not develop until the reestablishment of  the Patriarchate in 1847.275  
 
Ottoman Period: 
Rum Orthodoks Community: 
The Ottoman period had the most significant impact on the identity of  the Greek Orthodox 
Patriarchate of  Jerusalem.  This is because the Ottomans not only changed the political and social 
realities of  the region, but the combined effects of  the millet system, Tanzimat reforms, and 
European missionary work reshaped individual conceptions of  the nation, state, citizenship, and the 
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role of  religion in public life.  In addition, the attempted centralisation of  authority within the 
Patriarchate of  Constantinople helped to more deeply engrain ethnic and territorial nationalism 
across the Ottoman Empire.   
 
The Ottoman Empire ruled over a vast ethnically and religiously diverse.  Due to the fact that within 
the Islamic tradition 'religion is theoretically the sole legitimate basis for defining minority status', all 
non-Muslims minorities were organised into broad confessional communities known as millets.276  
Each millet was headed by its own 'highest ecclesiastical authority', which, in the case of  the 
Orthodox millet, was the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople.277  Although the early Islamic 
period saw the balance of  power shift towards the Middle East, leading to the relative autonomy of  
the Patriarchates of  Jerusalem, Antioch and Alexandria, the reestablishment of  the seat of  imperial 
power in Constantinople once again put the Ecumenical Patriarchate in close proximity to the ruling 
authority.  Indeed, 'the supreme position of  the millet başı [head of  nation] and the nearness to the 
Sultan, allowed the Patriarch of  Constantinople, with the growth of  the Ottoman Empire, to extend 
authority over all Orthodox Patriarchates.'278 Traditionally, because of  the autocephalous nature of  
the Ancient Orthodox Patriarchates, the Ecumenical Patriarch held the title of  primus inter pares (first 
among equals), holding no special ecclesiastical or administrative dominion over the other 
Patriarchates.  However this restructuring of  the Orthodox hierarchy allowed for the 'concomitant 
consolidation of  supremacy'279 of  the Ecumenical Patriarchate over all other Orthodox Christians in 
the Empire -- regardless of  the vast cultural, liturgical, linguistic, and ethnic diversity within the millet 
itself.280  
 
As Tsimhoni argues, this was partly because the Ottoman system preferred to deal with groups of  
people rather than individuals under the law.281  As such, 'the status of  the individual dhimmi282 
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[protected non-Muslim minority] was derived from his membership in a protected community called 
a millet, headed by a millet başı who, in addition to his spiritual and ecclesiastical powers, was 
responsible to the state for administration of  his millet.'283  As a result, non-Muslim religious groups 
were, generally speaking, lumped together into major confessional branches, 'irrespective of  
difference in self-identification by the various groups'.284 Initially only two Christian millets were 
established: the Rum Orthodoks Millet and the Armenian Millet.  All Orthodox Christians were placed 
under the authority of  the Ecumenical Orthodox Patriarchate of  Constantinople and all ethnic 
Armenians and other non-Chalcedonians were placed under the authority of  the Armenian 
Apostolic Patriarch until the establishment of  the Syriac Orthodox and Catholic millets in subsequent 
decades. 
 
The Ecumenical Patriarchate, more so than the three other ancient Patriarchates, maintained a 
definitively Greek character because of  its location in the Phanar, the traditionally Greek stronghold 
in Constantinople.  With Greek domination of  the millet leadership, the Greek Orthodox hierarchy 
were able to not only extend the influence of  the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but also to install 
Hellenic higher clergy within the other Patriarchates under its dominion.285   As Roussos notes, this 
had the effect of  extending Greek influence across those portions of  the Middle East under the 
control of  the Ottomans,286 which led to a consolidation of  power amongst the Greek Orthodox 
such that 'the vast majority of  Palestinian Christians became Orthodox during the long years of  
Ottoman Rule', just as many in the Levant had converted to non-Chalcedonian faiths when the 
balance of  power favoured them under Arab rule.287  This was due to the simple fact that economic 
and political power once again favoured Greek Orthodoxy.288  Further, because the Orthodox millet 
                                                                                                                                                             somewhat openly.  As Emon notes, “the dhimmi rules were a legal expression of the way in which the Muslim polity contended with the fact of diversity and governed pluralistically.”  In practice, the dhimmi rules were applied unevenly across the Islamic lands since the 7th century.  These regulations were largely abandoned with the introduction of the Ottoman Tanzimat Reforms in the 19th century.  Anver Emon, Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmis and Others in the Empire of Law (Oxford: Oxford Islamic Legal Studies, 2012).  283. Tsimhoni, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem During the Formative Years of the British Mandate in Palestine.", 166 284. O'Mahony, "Palestinian-Arab Orthodox Christians: Religion, Politics and Church-State Relations in Jerusalem, C. 1908-1925.", 63 285. Roussos, "Eastern Orthodox Christianity in the Middle East.", 107-08 286. "How Greek, How Palestinian? The Patriarchate of Jerusalem in the Mid-War Years." 287. O'Mahony, "Palestinian-Arab Orthodox Christians: Religion, Politics and Church-State Relations in Jerusalem, C. 1908-1925.", 64 288. The rural Syriacs were able to more easily integrate into the early Islamic Caliphates because they were not viewed as having been associated with the rival Byzantine Empire like their urban dwelling Greco-phone neighbours, who represented a potential fifth column in the ongoing conflict with Byzantium. 
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was the primary administrative and political unit for a majority of  Christians, positions of  social, 
political and economic prominence were directly tied to posts within the millet hierarchy – as the vast 
majority of  high-level political roles within the Ottoman bureaucracy were limited to Muslim 
subjects prior to the Tanzimat reforms of  the 19th century.289 The millets themselves had near total 
autonomy from the Sublime Porte in 'areas of  religious, ritual, charitable and educational affairs, as 
well as in the maintenance of  law courts to deal with maters of  personal status', all under the 
authority of  the Patriarch of  Constantinople.290  
 
The Greek character of  the Patriarchate of  Jerusalem was also secured through the considerable 
influence of  the Greco-phone Phanariotes of  Istanbul.  This was due to the fact that they maintained 
strong ties and economic relationships with the Ottoman Empire's main European rivals.  As such, 
the Phanariotes began to exercise considerable influence on the Sublime Porte, who became 
increasingly reliant on their economic relationships with Europe, whilst they sought positions of  
power within the millet bureaucracy because of  their social and economic prestige.291   By gaining 
access to positions within the Patriarchate, the Phanariotes were able to influence who was elected to 
high office within the four ancient Patriarchates, and well as manage their administrative affairs.292  
 
The Greek dominance over the Patriarchate of  Jerusalem was also furthered by the organisation of  
the Brotherhood of  the Holy Sepulchre and the Patriarchal constitution. As it evolved from its 
establishment in the fourth century, and particularly in the Ottoman period, the members of  the 
Brotherhood became 'exclusively Greek'.293  The Brotherhood itself  was responsible for the 
appointment of  clergy and the larger task of  appointing the Patriarch.  However, the rules 
governing appointment to the Brotherhood prevented 'decisive participation of  the laity in the 
administration of  the church of  Jerusalem.'294   This was due to the Patriarchate's constitution, 
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which, on the one hand, required that parish priests be married in order to become ordained, but 
also restricted membership in the Brotherhood to unmarried monks.295   
 
It was typical for parish priests, who were responsible for the day-to-day pastoral care of  their 
communities, to come from the indigenous Arabic or Syriac speaking communities.  However it had 
become customary to 'restrict the choice of  Bishops and members of  the order to Ionian Greeks'.296  
As a result, the indigenous parish priests bore the brunt of  communal responsibilities, whilst the 
'majority of  bishops became merely titular with no actual diocesan responsibilities', focusing rather 
on the preservation and maintenance of  holy sites.297   This prevented the majority of  the Arabic 
and Syriac-speaking laity from participating in the election of  higher clergy, the Patriarch, and the 
administration of  Patriarchal finances – which also meant that the majority of  the Patriarchate's 
funds went towards the preservation of  holy sites.  This led to the growing discontent of  both the 
parish priests, who resented their limited role in Patriarchal affairs, and the Arab Orthodox laity, 
many of  whom were drawn to the Latin or Russian Orthodox Churches during the 19th century 
because of  better schools, hospitals, and other social welfare institutions that were established in this 
period. 
 
Indeed, the intervention of  European missionaries and the capitulations granted to them by the 
Ottoman authorities had the effect of  deepening 'economic and cultural divides' within the millets 
themselves – particularly as certain Catholic and Orthodox Christians came under the protection of  
the French and Russian Empires.298 This was, in many ways, the precursor to the growth of  a 
national consciousness amongst these communities as they struggled for greater autonomy from the 
millet hierarchy. The intervention of  Catholic missionaries and the protection granted to them by the 
Ottoman authorities also led to the splintering of  the Orthodox millet, both because of  conversions 
to Catholicism on religious grounds, and because of  dissatisfaction with the nature of  the Orthodox 
hierarchy.  As a result, 'the Melkite Catholic Church split from the Greek Orthodox in the see of  
Antioch, the Chaldean Catholic Church grew out of  the Nestorians, the Armenian Catholic Church 
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from the Apostolic Church and so on.'299  The Ecumenical Patriarchate responded by furthering its 
control over the appointment of  higher clergy across the various Patriarchates, which further 
alienated indigenous clergy who resented the changing status quo.300  With the emergence of  
European missionary schools and the Arabic-language printing press in the 18th and 19th centuries, 
both clergy and laity began to express their discontent with the Patriarchate and the Ottoman 
Empire in nationalistic terms.   
 
Greek Nationalism: 
As Arab national consciousness began to develop amongst the Arab Orthodox in the Ottoman 
Empire, a parallel Greek nationalism also developed, based largely in the Ionian peninsula.  Through 
trade relationships developed with other European countries, the Greek middle class were exposed 
to nationalist ideals growing throughout Europe at the time.301  Inspired by these movements, the 
Greek intelligentsia began the process of  reinvigorating, and in some cases, reinventing the Greek 
language and culture.  Part of  this reinvigoration of  culture and history included an emphasis on the 
distant and glorious past, in which the Byzantine Empire spanned much of  the Mediterranean basin.  
This led to the development of  the Megali Idea, which sought to reclaim historically Greek lands in 
Anatolia and the Levant and redeem their 'enslaved compatriots abroad.'302 
 
This struggle for Greek self-determination came to a head in the 1821 Greek War of  Independence 
in which the Greeks liberated a small amount of  territory on the Ionian Peninsula from Ottoman 
control.  As a direct result of  this growing Greek Megali Idea, from the 1920s onwards, the 
Patriarchate of  Jerusalem experienced a growing nationalism, in which their historic rights to 
property in the Holy Land began to be viewed in terms of  its relevance to Greek cultural and 
national heritage,303 satisfying an important part of  the ancient and remote history required for 
nationalism to be successful.304  Whilst there had always been a Hellenic identity at the core of  the 
Patriarchate, 'after the Greek War of  Independence in 1821 (and due to the penetration of  the Latin 
church into the region) the members of  the confraternity [Brotherhood of  the Holy Sepulchre] 
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developed a Greek national hyper-consciousness.'305  This "hyper-consciousness" was expressed 
through the continued Greek monopoly over the Patriarchate and also, as the next section will 
discuss, in opposition to Russian and Arab Orthodox interests. 
 Arab Nationalism and Russian Interests: 
Towards the latter half  of  the 19th century, the Arab subjects of  the Empire also began to express 
their desire for a greater say within the Ottoman bureaucracy.  The Arab Orthodox, partly because 
of  their tendency to be well educated, were often at the forefront of  the burgeoning Arab and 
Palestinian nationalist movements.  Since the early 19th century, European missionaries – first French 
and British – began to establish a number of  educational institutions across the Levant.306 As 
Hourani notes, a major impact of this European influence on the development of Arab Nationalism 
was an emphasis on the importance of national unity or ‘the willingness of all who share the same 
country to co-operate on a level of equality.’307  National Arab unity was first articulated through the 
concept of al-umma al-arabiyya, “the Arab Nation”, which conceptualized membership in the national 
community based upon shared culture, ethnicity, and language rather than religion – thus 
incorporating both Christian and Muslim Arabs, whilst excluding the Ottoman Turks. 308 Early 
iterations of Arab Nationalism were therefore heavily influenced by European notions of secularism 
and egalitarianism, whilst ‘Christians in Palestine as in other parts of the region, saw a promise of 
equality and a way out of their status as ‘dhimmi’ under Ottoman rule.’309 
 
Although the Catholic and Protestant-run missions were the first to have a significant impact on 
education in the Levant, by the mid-19th century, the Russian Empire had followed suit. Their 
activities were greatly increased after the establishment of  the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society 
in 1882.  By the end of  the 19th century, more than 6,500 students attended schools run by the 
Society.310  However, unlike their Catholic and Protestant counterparts, the schools, ‘fostered the 
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common consciousness of  their students with their Arab Muslim countrymen’, many of  whom were 
also educated in the Society's schools.311   
 
Many of  these young and educated Arab Orthodox students went on to found Palestine's first 
nationalist newspapers, such as Filastin, and Karmil, and also to author several nationalist books, 
some of  which were funded by the Russian Consulate.312 In this period, Arab Orthodox solidarity 
with the Muslims – often in opposition to the growing threat of  Zionism – provided a considerable 
front within which to spread nationalist sentiments.  The tone of  Arab Orthodox in the late 19th 
century became directed towards the ejection of  foreign interests from Palestine – whether they 
were Greek, Jewish or otherwise – often communicated in Filastin and Karmil.313   The movement 
was also encouraged by the Arabisation of  the Patriarchate of  Antioch in 1899.314     
 
Although the primary language of  instruction in the Russian schools was Arabic, students also 
studied the Russian language and culture – in some cases students from wealthier backgrounds 
travelled to study in Russian universities.315   These Russian educational institutions – despite their 
origins in pre-Bolshevik Russia -- came to influence the development of  socialist politics amongst 
the Palestinian Christian communities, as many of  the students who grew up within these schools in 
the late 19th century could read and write in Russian and were undoubtedly influenced by the works 
of  Marx and Lenin.316 This was furthered by the support that the USSR gave to the Palestinians 
throughout the early 20th century.317   
 
Russian interests in the Middle East were twofold. Firstly, the Russians wanted to secure access to 
Black Sea trade routes to the Mediterranean, which had been monopolised by the Ottomans prior to 
the 19th century.  Secondly, after Russia was granted guardianship over the Orthodox Christians of  
the Ottoman Empire in 1774, they had dreamed of  'becoming the new centre of  the Orthodox 
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faith'.318  From a political perspective, the Russian Empire also saw Orthodoxy as a way to more 
subtly influence Middle Eastern politics.  As the Foreign Secretary to the Russian Tsar Nicholas I 
argued,  
 
We must establish our presence in the east not politically but through the church.  Neither the Turks nor the Europeans, who have their patriarchs and bishops in the Holy City, can refuse us this.  While our influence was still strong we could afford to conceal our activities and thus avoid envy, but now that our influence in the east was weakened we, on the contrary, must try to display ourselves so that we do not sink in the estimation of  the Orthodox population who still believe in us as of  old. ....Jerusalem is the center of  the world and our mission must be there.319   However the newly independent Greeks, who had maintained a monopoly over the Orthodox faith 
for centuries, also maintained interests in preserving the Hellenic nature of  the ancient Patriarchates. 
The Patriarchate of  Jerusalem was also cautious of  Russian activities in the Levant because they 
feared that the nationalisation of  churches, which was then becoming widespread in the Balkans and 
western parts of  the Empire, would spread to churches in the Levant, cutting them off  from the 
influence of  the Greek hierarchy, purging themselves of  foreign clergy and, perhaps most 
importantly, cutting off  funding from land revenues.320   
 
The conflict between the interests of  the Greek, Russian, and Arab Orthodox entered a new phase 
in the wake of  the deposition of  Patriarch Cyril II in 1872. Patriarch Cyril had been elected Patriarch 
in 1845, despite opposition from the Phanariotes and Ecumenical Patriarchate, who viewed him as 
pro-Russian and too concerned with pastoral and educational enterprises.321 Unlike previous 
Patriarchs, Cyril sought to improve the education of  the Brotherhood of  the Holy Sepulchre, and 
also addressed many of  the pastoral concerns of  the local Arab Orthodox community.322 In 1870 
the Sultan Abdulaziz issued a firman creating a semi-autonomous Bulgarian Exarchate, which the 
Patriarchates of  Constantinople, Antioch, and Alexandria strongly opposed because they feared that 
this could cause other churches to seek nationalisation.  Patriarch Cyril, however, did not support the 
other three Patriarchates in their designation of  the Bulgarian church as schismatic and was deposed 
by the Synod as a result. The Arab Orthodox, who saw the pastoral work of  Cyril as beneficial to 
their community and also identified with the struggle for the self-determination of  the Bulgarian 
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Church, rallied in support of  Cyril.  As a result they suspended relations with the Patriarchate and 
staged a series of  protests supported by the Russians.323  Cyril was quickly replaced by Patriarch 
Procopius – a staunch supporter of  Greek hegemony in the Brotherhood – who was deposed two 
years later because of  mass protests by the Arab Orthodox and Russian pressures.  Within a few 
decades, the conflict over the identity of  the Patriarchate of  Jerusalem had transformed into a proxy 
for much larger national and regional conflicts.   
 
The Tanzimat Reforms: 
Beginning in the mid 19th century, the Ottoman Empire, now facing the growing threat of  European 
incursions into its territory (Crimean War, Greek War of  Independence, French and British 
capitulations), began to issue a series of  modernising institutional reforms, known collectively as the 
Tanzimat.  The first major reform, the Hatt-ı şerif in 1839, broadly sought to reform the tax system, 
court, and military organisations in order to guarantee equal rights to all Ottoman citizens, regardless 
of  religious affiliation.  It was ultimately less important that later reforms but began the process of  
liberalising the state.324 The second such reform, the Hatt-ı hümayun in 1856, went much farther 
towards granting equal rights to non-Muslims in the empire.  Its aim was to reform 'the position of  
the non-Muslims in their relationship with the State, as well as in the internal situation of  their 
communities'.325  
 
Most importantly, these reforms helped to introduce the concepts of  equal rights and self-
determination to the Arab Orthodox communities, as well as open up the intellectual space 
necessary for the community to begin to debate these issues.  After significant lobbying from the 
Arab Orthodox community, these reforms paved the way for the authoring of  a new, more inclusive 
constitution within the Rum Orthodoks Millet in 1862, which attempted to 'diminish the influence of  
the higher clergy' by stipulating that 'a general assembly with two councils: one to deal with religious 
and clerical matters and the other with the education and welfare of  the flocks.'326 These mixed 
councils were managed by a combination of  clergy and lay members of  the community and were 
the first among many more attempts to grant equal rights to the Arab Orthodox community.  
However, these reforms were never fully implemented in the Jerusalem Patriarchate because of  
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resistance from the Greek clergy and ongoing Russian, Greek and Ottoman conflict over the nature 
of  the Patriarchate.327   
 
In 1872, with the encouragement of  the Imperial Orthodox Society, the first communal 
demonstrations of  Arab Orthodox against Greek control over both the higher clergy and the 
Brotherhood of  the Holy Sepulchre occurred, with a renewed demand for the formation of  a mixed 
council.328 Owing to Russian support and pressure, the Patriarchate drafted a new constitution 
(Katastatikon) in 1875,329 which recognised the 'right of  the local community to a mixed council 
composed of  clerics and lay members for the administration of  education and welfare; the 
establishment of  local councils in local centres; the admission of  local members to the Brotherhood, 
and a certain participation of  the indigenous priests in the election of  the patriarch.'330  Although the 
Katastatikon was never implemented, its demands highlight the fact that the primary concern of  the 
Arab Orthodox in this period was the role of  the Patriarchate in the development of  social welfare 
institutions, particularly in light of  the growing development seen under Latin and Protestant 
patronage.  The lack of  social welfare provided by the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate relative to the 
Latin and nascent Protestant churches in the area drew many Arab Orthodox students to Latin and 
Protestant schools, leading to the perception amongst Arab Orthodox that the Greek clergy were 
partly to blame for conversions to these other faiths.331 
 
The next major step towards reform occurred in 1908 in the wake of  the Young Turk Revolt.  The 
new Turkish constitution, drafted in July 1908, called for communal councils to control communal 
properties and affairs, as opposed to Patriarchal monopoly over control.332 The Arab Orthodox, in 
cooperation with their Muslim and Russian allies, staged a number of  protests in Jerusalem drawing 
the attention of  the Ottoman government.333  By 1910, these protests had grown and the Ottoman 
government was forced to take action.  A new law was drafted that accepted Arab demands for a 
mixed council which would receive one-third of  the Patriarchate's annual income for use in 
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education and social welfare projects.334 Their demands for greater participation in the 
administration of  the Patriarchate and election of  the Patriarch, as well as inclusion of  Arab clergy 
into the Brotherhood of  the Holy Sepulchre were, however, not granted.  However, this new law 
proved unsuccessful as the outbreak of  the First World War disrupted the council from ever 
functioning.335  Consequently, the Ottoman period came to a close without the Arab Orthodox 
gaining any lasting concessions to their demands.  One crucial development to come out of  the 
Ottoman period was the development of  an Arab Orthodox national consciousness, which 
continued to develop as an important part of  the larger pan-Arab movement and, eventually, 
Palestinian nationalism.  This movement was, in some ways modelled after the 'nationalist church 
movements in the Balkans' and drew strong inspiration from the successful Arabisation of  the 
Patriarchate of  Antioch in 1899.  The election of  the first Arab Patriarch in Antioch was 'hailed by 
the Arab nationalist intellectual Sati' al-Husri as 'the first real victory for Arab nationalism'.336 
 Latin Community: Just as the Orthodox Church began to be strongly influenced by the machinations of  European 
colonialism in the 18th century, the eastern Catholic communities, though significantly smaller in 
number, came under the influence and protection of  the French Empire from the 17th century 
onwards.  Capitulations between the French and Ottoman Empires date back to the mid-16th 
century when French citizens living within the Ottoman Empire were granted the right to practice 
their own religion in Ottoman lands.  In 1740 France was granted the right to protect all Latin-rite 
Christians, and subsequently all Eastern-rite Catholics in the Empire.337 The 1740 capitulations also 
gave France the authority to represent the Vatican in diplomatic affairs with the Ottoman Empire; 
however, the Vatican did not recognise these rights officially until 1888.338     
 
Although France had made significant diplomatic inroads with the Ottomans in the 18th century, 
growing Russia aggression in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the northern Mediterranean, 
combined with growing Russian diplomatic pressure, lead the Ottomans to issue a firman in 1757, 
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which granted the Orthodox control over the administration of  holy sites in Palestine, despite the 
fact that these rights had been held exclusively by the Latins since 1690.339   Following the Russian 
victory in the Russo-Turkish War of  1768-74, Russia was granted the right to protect Orthodox 
Christians in the Ottoman Empire in exchange for the return of  the Ottoman provinces of  
Wallachia and Moldavia.340  Importantly, this gave the Russians increased diplomatic leverage over 
the Ottomans throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries.   
 
The French Revolution in 1789 briefly turned France's attention away from the Holy Land.  
However, the political philosophy that emerged from the Revolution came to influence France's 
policy towards the Ottoman Empire, as they increasingly saw notions of  liberty and democracy as 
being key to awakening the 'dormant civilisations of  the east'.341   Napoleon's invasion of  Egypt in 
1798 was couched in these same revolutionary philosophical terms – of  course with the more 
pronounced intention of  countering British and Russian naval power in the Mediterranean.342    
 
However, France's diplomatic position in the Ottoman Empire was further diminished due to their 
ongoing relationship with Egypt.  During the 1821 Greek War of  Independence, the Egyptian 
military, under the leadership of  Pasha Muhammad Ali, assisted the Ottomans in retaking parts of  
the Ionian peninsula under the condition that Egypt would be granted increased autonomy from the 
Ottoman Empire.  When these promises were not delivered, Egypt invaded parts of  Syria and 
Palestine in 1831, which they would retain until an Ottoman counter-offensive in 1840.  The 
subsequent conflict again saw the intervention of  European powers, with the British, Austrian, 
Prussian, and Russian Empires supporting the Ottoman military and France initially supporting 
Egypt.343   Although France changed its position nearing the end of  the crisis, their relationship with 
the Ottomans became strained.  As a result, the position of  the Latin-rite Christians in the Empire 
also declined.   In 1847, the silver star on the Church of  the Nativity, a symbol of  the Latin presence 
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in the holy sites, was stolen.344  In reaction to these events, the Vatican decided to re-establish the 
Latin Patriarchate of  Jerusalem in 1847, in order to help reassert Latin rights to holy sites.   
 
The conflict over the rights to holy places in Palestine in this period was, in many ways, a proxy for 
larger international conflicts between France, Britain, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, which 
ultimately led to the Crimean War in 1853.  In order to help ease the conflict over holy sites, the 
Ottomans issue a firman in 1852, which became the definitive legal ruling on the issue of  Greek, 
Latin and Armenian control over holy sites.  This firman, commonly referred to as the Status Quo 
Agreement was ratified internationally by the Treaty of  Berlin in 1878345 and is upheld to this day.346  
 Re-Establishment of  the Latin Patriarchate: the Latin-rite in an eastern context: 
By 1847, there were some 4,000 Latin-rite Catholics living in the Holy Land, many of  whom had 
been drawn to the Latin-rite because they identified with the relatively "modern" European liturgy 
and because of  the growing presence of  Latin social welfare initiatives.347 Given the relatively small 
size of  the Latin community, the establishment of  a Latin-rite Patriarchate in Jerusalem was viewed 
with suspicion by the much larger indigenous Melkite Catholic community.348   This was due to its 
unclear vocation, but also because of  the ongoing influx of  Latin-rite and other European 
missionaries who initially sought to Latinise eastern Catholicism. This crisis deepened during the 
First Vatican Council, which 'was undertaken in the absence of  the oriental prelates', leading the 
Melkite Catholic Church to believe that the Latin Patriarchate of  Jerusalem intended to marginalise 
eastern Catholic leadership and liturgical traditions. Although349 this was partly true of  the Latin 
missionaries to the Holy Land, the first Latin Patriarch of  Jerusalem, Msr Valegera believed that 'all 
the eastern churches should comply with the canon law followed in the Catholic Church, provided 
that freedom is left to each church vis-à-vis its heritage and liturgy.'350 Therefore, despite the lack of  
input from eastern clergy in Vatican I, it did seem as if  the Jerusalem Patriarchate had taken the fears 
of  the Melkite Catholic Church into consideration.  
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These fears were ameliorated during Pope Leo XIII's pontificate when he made efforts to foster 
dialogue between eastern-rite and Latin Catholicism.  The papacy was well aware of  the Latinising 
tendency of  Catholic missionaries to the Holy Land, despite an earlier ruling in Pope Benedict XIV's 
1755 encyclical Allatae Sunt, which forbade Greek Catholics from passing to the Latin Rite.351  
However, despite the efforts of  subsequent popes to stem Latinisation, by the end of  the 19th 
century it had 'become so systematic in the Eastern Churches that after the International Eucharistic 
Congress of  Jerusalem in 1893' Pope Leo XIII issued an encyclical Orientalium Dignitas in 1894 in 
which he warned:  
Any Latin rite missionary, including secular or religious clergy, who induces with his advice or assistance any eastern rite faithful to transfer to the Lain rite, will be deposed and excluded from his benefice in addition to the ipso facto suspension a divinis and other punishments that he will incur as imposed in the aforesaid Constitution Demandatam.352  Under Pope Pius XI, the de-Latinisation of  the Holy Land was treated with such seriousness that he 
considered abolishing the Patriarchate entirely – an idea that was ultimately abandoned due to 
diplomatic reasons, which included fears of  disrupting the 1852 Status Quo.353  
 Local or missionary church?: 
From the moment of  its re-establishment in 1847, the Latin Patriarchate of  Jerusalem began to 
encourage the growth of  a local clergy to serve the needs of  the growing Latin community.  Under 
the authority of  Patriarch Valegera, the Patriarchate began to recruit members of  the local 
community into the seminary in order to begin the growth of  an indigenous clergy, who 'could 
understand the mentality of  the country and speak its languages.'354  To that end, in 1852 a Latin 
seminary was established first in Jerusalem and then moving to Beit Jala in 1857.  This seminary 
became a centre for the growth of  an indigenous Arab clergy who went on to fill the highest ranks 
of  the Patriarchate.  As one high ranking Palestinian Latin priest related, 
 
When the Latin patriarchate was restored in 1848, the Pope sent the Patriarch and he came here alone with no clergy at all and he was received by the Franciscans.  Then he went to Europe to ask for more help to come.  And immediately he began to look for local seminarians, and he found four at that time and he sent them to Lebanon to the Jesuit seminary there.  And in a few years there were a few priests who came to join the Latin patriarchate  -- they were 4 or 5 – from Europe still to help.  So immediately he sent them to Beit Jala here to begin the seminary.   They said 'we came for the parishes' and he said 'the parishes can wait, first 
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the seminary'. And he called back those four seminarians in Lebanon to come join the seminary here in Beit Jala and that was in 1852.    So immediately he thought about having local clergy.  He continued to go to Europe to ask the help – not of  priests, but of  young people. In the 1970s, the last Italians were ordained by the Latin Patriarchate.  But slowly you can see that we have more and more Arab clergy.  It took until the Second Vatican council to be open to having Arabs in the Patriarchal hierarchy.355  The Latin seminary was important, not just because of  its role in training local clergy, but also as a 
symbol of  the Latin Church's commitment the local community.  Through the Latin seminary in 
Beit Jala, the hierarchy of  the Latin Patriarchate transformed, over the course of  the 20th century, 
from a foreign to a largely indigenous institution; one that is viewed as understanding and 
responding to the needs of  the Latin community quite well.  
 The British Mandate: Orthodox Community: During the British mandate, the question of  the Orthodox Patriarchate of  Jerusalem took on a new 
dimension.  Despite the fact that the Ottoman millet system formed, 'the backbone of  the legal 
system the British inherited', the protection that non-Muslim communities received under the 
Mandate was expanded – often exacerbating sectarianism at the expense of  Arab solidarity, as 
political participation was tied to membership within confessional communities.356 However, it was 
these factors that ultimately transformed both the Arab Orthodox movement and Palestinian 
national movements from loosely organised ad hoc organisations, to an organised and politically 
relevant force in opposition to both the Greek hierarchy and the emerging Zionist movement.  
 
Within this context, the Patriarchate itself  was facing financial difficulties – both due to the collapse 
of  the Ottoman Empire and the Bolshevik Revolution.  Consequently, revenue streams from 
Bessarabia, the Balkans, and other parts of  Russia, as well as the income generated from pilgrimage 
from these regions diminished.357  When these incomes dried up at the end of  the First World War, 
the Patriarchate took on high interest loans in order to sustain itself.  When the British arrived in 
1917, 'they found the Patriarchate bankrupt and saddled with an enormous debt of  over £E 
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500,000', mainly accrued during the tenure of  Patriarch Damianos.358   However, by November 1917, 
Damianos had retreated, along with the Ottomans to Damascus, bringing the Holy Synod of  
bishops with him.  This left only a handful of  Brotherhood members in Jerusalem to handle 
Patriarchal affairs. Given their lack of  options in the face of  changing post-millet political climate, the 
Brotherhood in 1918 appealed to the Greek government for financial assistance.  This shift away 
from the authority of  the Ecumenical Patriarchate of  Constantinople and towards the Greek State 
characterised the Mandate period, as the Greek state became 'the centre of  the Hellenic world', 
heavily influenced by Greek nationalism and the Megali Idea, which added a new diplomatic 
dimension to the affairs of  the Patriarchate.359 
 
The Greek government, who had been on the allied side during the First World War, sent a 
delegation to Jerusalem in 1918 to assess the financial situation of  the Patriarchate.  The delegation 
delivered a report to General Allenby that denounced Patriarch Damianos, requesting both that he 
be deposed because of  his pro-Turkish stance,360 and that the Greeks be allowed to intervene in the 
financial and administrative affairs of  the Patriarchate.361  However, the British Mandate authorities 
remained unconvinced.  They too viewed Damianos as unacceptably pro-Turkish, but were cautious 
of  giving the Greek State too much influence over the Patriarchate because they calculated that this 
would exacerbate tensions between the Arab Orthodox and Greek hierarchy.362 In the interim, the 
Brotherhood elected Archbishop Porphyrios as locum tenens in 1918 primarily because he was the 
highest ranking bishop in Palestine at that time, and requested that the British allow for the 
deposition of  Damianos.363 The Arab Orthodox protested this move because, whilst they were not 
particularly fond of  Damianos, they objected to the unconstitutional manner of  Porphyrios' 
appointment.364  
 
The British issued a moratorium on the outstanding debt, and continued to decline Greek offers of  
financial assistance, due both to scepticism about Greece's intentions and Arab objections to such a 
loan.  In 1918 the British allowed for the return of  the exiled Synod of  Bishops, but did not allow 
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Damianos to return until 1919, and only then after pressure from the Arab Orthodox and Muslim 
associations.  However, with Damianos reinstated in his position as patriarch, he 'began a struggle 
for the preservation of  the Greek privileges and character of  the Brotherhood and for the granting 
of  a Greek loan', much to the dismay of  the Arab Orthodox.365  
 
Simultaneously, the growing presence of  Jewish immigrants in Palestine had helped to crystallise the 
burgeoning Arab and Palestinian nationalist movements – firstly through the development of  
Muslim-Christian Associations and then the Palestinian Arab Congress.  These two associations 
were partly spurred on by the controversial relationship between the Orthodox Patriarchate and the 
Zionist Palestinian Land Development Company, who had entered into negotiations for the sale of  
Patriarchate land beginning in 1919.366   In response to the growing threat of  Zionism and apparent 
complacency of  the Orthodox Patriarchate, in 1923 the First Arab Orthodox Congress was held in 
Haifa.  In total, 54 delegates from all of  the dioceses participated in the Congress and elected 
executive committee to represent the Orthodox community.  Importantly, the Arab Orthodox 
Congress represented the first real synthesis of  nationalistic and religious aims through its 
borrowing of  the Arab and Palestinian national movements' 'modern structures of  representation 
and authority', which had the effect of  'politicizing the Orthodox movement'.367 Although the 
Congress repeated many of  the same demands the Arab Orthodox community had made for 
decades – such as a mixed council and greater Arab say in Patriarchal finances – a major aim of  the 
Congress was to redefine the identity of  the Patriarchate itself.  As Robson notes, 
 
To this end, it called for: renaming the patriarchate "The Jerusalem Orthodox Patriarchate"; admitting Arabs to the Brotherhood and clerical hierarchy; Arab participation in patriarchal financial administration; Arab control of  church schools and orphanages; a majority-Arab mixed lay-clerical council with powers over administration, patriarchal elections, and admitting non-Arab members to the Brotherhood; and mandating Arabic as the liturgical and administrative language of  the church, the bishops, and the religious courts.368  Emerging nationalist sentiments were clearly at the core of  these demands, as both the Greek and 
Jewish community were painted as foreign entities whose aim was to dominate and displace the 
indigenous Arab Muslim and Christian communities.  In response, the Mandate authorities 
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organised the Bertram-Young Commission in 1926 to review the long-standing conflict between 
Arab Orthodox and Greek clergy, as well as the financial issues of  the Patriarchate.  In the end, the 
Commission's report recommended that Arab Orthodox be admitted to the Brotherhood of  the 
Holy Sepulchre, with greater lay participation in the administration.369   
 
Although the progress for Arabisation of  the Patriarchate was marginal in this period, the Arab 
Orthodox Congresses emerged as important platforms for 'a developing national consciousness', 
both for the Arab Orthodox and Muslim communities.370  The British Mandate ended without the 
Arab Orthodox making significant gains and the establishment of  the Jewish state in 1948 once 
again transformed the social and political dynamics between the Greek clergy and Arab laity.   
However, in the intervening years between the Mandate and the 1948 War, the position of  the Arab 
Orthodox within the Palestinian nationalist movement grew increasingly important, as priorities 
shifted from communal to national concerns (and also towards secularism). 
 
Latin Community: 
The end of  the Ottoman period significantly improved the freedom of  Palestine's Christian 
communities, which experienced an average growth of  around 2.7% in the years between 1920 and 
1948 – the largest period of  growth in the 20th century.371  However, the influx of  Jewish immigrants 
to Palestine in this period posed a challenge to the Palestinian community as a whole – particularly in 
light of  the favourable position the Jewish community held with the British authorities.372  In the 
1920s, Latin rights to holy places were again contested as the growing Jewish community began to 
challenge the status quo, particularly in the Old City of  Jerusalem.  This led Latin Patriarch 
Barlassina 'to adopt an openly anti-Zionist stance', which the Patriarch tried, unsuccessfully, to 
convey to both the Mandate authorities and Catholic European states.373  Indeed this stance proved 
unsuccessful throughout the Mandate period, which came to affect Vatican policy towards the city 
of  Jerusalem, as will be discussed in the next section.   
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Although Christian communities grew substantially under the British Mandate, the 1948 War with 
Israel and subsequent refugee crisis caused a significant decline in the Latin community: 'of  the 
10,000 Latins who were found in Jerusalem and the neighbouring towns after the 1948 War, only 
3,000 remained in the early 1970s.'374 However, the experience of  the 1948 War, the increasingly 
uncertain status of  Jerusalem, and the growing number of  Arab clergy transformed the Latin 
Patriarchate of  Jerusalem into an institution rooted in the Palestinian experience by the middle of  
the 20th century.  
 Jordanian and Israeli Rule: Orthodox Community: Following the 1948 War and subsequent refugee crisis, tensions between the Greek hierarchy and 
Arab laity briefly subsided as efforts were directed towards the growing refugee crisis.375  The 
Patriarchate attempted to restore relations with the Arab Orthodox community by aiding in the 
refugee crisis and expanding parishes.376  However, the conflict was resumed in 1955 with the death 
of  Patriarch Timotheos.  The Arab congregation, who had as of  yet, not made lasting progress 
towards its demands, again pushed for greater rights, including the reestablishment of  the mixed 
council, granting of  one-third of  the Patriarchate's income for social welfare projects and a role in 
the management of  Patriarchal finances and properties.377  The Arab Orthodox leadership pressed 
the Jordanian government to suspend the election of  a new patriarch until some of  their demands 
had been granted.  In 1956 a fourth Arab Orthodox Congress was convened in Jerusalem to address 
the above demands, in addition to demands for foreign (non-Arab) members of  the Brotherhood of  
the Holy Sepulchre to acquire a good level of  Arabic language and to establish an Orthodox 
theological seminary in Palestine.378  These demands were brought forward to the Jordanian 
government, but were never implemented.  In June of  1956, a government order to allow for 
patriarchal elections was issued.  Prominent Arab Orthodox leaders protested the move in highly 
nationalistic language – referring to the Arab Orthodox struggle in terms of  a wider post-colonial 
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struggle to expel foreign rulers.  Although379 the 1957 constitution was partly implemented, it 
stopped short of  granting any power over the Patriarchate's finances and land holdings to the Arab 
Orthodox community.380  
 
Despite this fact, the first Arab Bishop was appointed to the Synod of  Bishops in 1960, along with 
the appointment of  an Arab monk to the Brotherhood of  the Holy Sepulchre.  The mixed council 
was established and held several meetings prior to the 1967 War, but was never granted funding.  As 
such, the new constitution was never fully implemented within the Patriarchate, and the disruption 
of  the 1967 War once again created a setback for the Arab Orthodox.  Although the Arab Orthodox 
began to gain minor concessions that allowed for the expansion of  the Patriarchate's role in pastoral 
affairs, control over the Patriarchate's assets became a major focus of  the post-1967 period.  The 
Patriarchate's policy of  cooperation with governing authorities in order to maintain the status quo 
of  Greek leadership and control over holy sites was slightly disrupted by Jordanian rule, however it 
resumed when Israel gained full control over Jerusalem in the aftermath of  the 1967 War.381  
 With the Israeli occupation of  the West Bank in the wake of  the 1967 War, the mixed council was 
suspended.  The Greek hierarchy was able to recover its position of  dominance by establishing good 
contacts with Israeli authorities.  Following the War, Patriarch Benedictos drafted a letter to the 
Israeli authorities in which he described the assets of  the Patriarchate along with a detailed historical 
survey of  legal precedent in relation to Greek control over assets, requesting that the status quo be 
maintained.382  The Israeli authorities honoured the status quo, and decided against making any 
changes to the rules governing church assets.   
 
For their part, the Rum Orthodoks community was deeply affected by the 1967 War, which not only 
prompted a renewed refugee crisis, but also mass emigration out of  Israel and Palestine.  It was also 
clear in this period that many Arab Orthodox organisations now identified themselves as 'Palestinian 
nationalist institutions' and being supported by their sister organisations in Amman.383   In fact, as 
Roussos notes, the period after 1967 was similar to the Mandate period for the Arab Orthodox, in 
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that they began to prioritise national versus communal identifications and concerns.384  The Arab 
Orthodox community, because of  its pan-Arab and Palestinian nationalist sentiments, did not 
establish contacts with the Israeli authorities, unlike their Greek counterparts.  Along with the 
growth of  nationalist sentiment amongst the Palestinian Christian communities more generally, 
expressions of  political and national solidarity were increasingly secular – with the advent of  groups 
like the PFLP, DFLP, PPP, Ba'ath party, etc. -- all left-leaning, secular or atheistic political groups.  
Indeed, many of  the middle-class Palestinian Christian leadership became 'leading advocates of  
nationalism, secularisation and radicalisation of  the Palestinian national struggle'385 within their 
communities and the Palestinian community in general. The Arab Orthodox played a major role in 
the establishment of  leftist political parties, who traced their roots in the Arab Orthodox Congresses 
throughout the early 20th century and Russian influence.   
 In 1977 the dynamic changed yet again with the election of  the Likud coalition in Israel, who, many 
argued, prioritised the Judiasation of  Jerusalem and further facilitated Israeli settlement activity in 
East Jerusalem and the West Bank.386  Despite the good relations between the Patriarchate's 
leadership and the Israeli authorities, the election of  Likud placed a strain on the relationship 
because, as Dumper notes, the appointment of  many ultra-nationalist Israelis to the Ministries of  
Justice, Religious Affairs, Housing, and the Israeli Lands Administration had the effect of  
undermining the relationship between Israel and many within the Church leadership.387   However, 
Patriarchal land sales and leases to Israel continued throughout this period and the intensified 
Palestinian nationalist struggle furthered the perception that land sales were in fact facilitating Israeli 
settlement projects in East Jerusalem, thereby further exacerbating the contentious relationship 
between Greek clergy and the Arab Orthodox.388   
 
Latin Community: 
Although the Palestinian Latin community did not face many of  the internal challenges that their 
Orthodox compatriots faced during this period, they were similarly affected by the political and 
social turmoil of  the mid-20th century.  However, the 1948 War and subsequent refugee crisis 
                                                 384. O'Mahony, The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land : Studies in History, Religion and Politics., 50 385. Ibid., 50 386. Roussos, "Eastern Orthodox Christianity in the Middle East.", 11 387. Michael Dumper, "The Christian Churches of Jerusalem in the Post-Oslo Period," Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 2 (2002). 388. O'Mahony, The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land : Studies in History, Religion and Politics., 50 
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prompted the Vatican to play an enhanced role in the lives of  the Palestinian Latin community. In 
addition to the 'massive relief  effort' undertaken to aid Palestinian refugees, the Vatican began to 
seek political and diplomatic solutions to resettle or return refugees to the Holy Land – seeking 'in 
particular the return of  Palestinian Christians to Jerusalem, Bethlehem and its surrounding Christian 
villages'.389   From 1948 onwards, Vatican diplomacy has focused on the right of  return for 
Palestinian refugees, resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a host of  other 'wide-ranging diplomatic 
and ecclesial' support networks to help sustain the Christian presence in the Holy Land in addition 
to calls for the internationalisation of  Jerusalem.390   
 
The 1967 War and Israeli occupation of  East Jerusalem renewed the Vatican's call for 
internationalisation of  the city.  However, the Vatican's policy no longer called for the creation of  a 
special territorial delineation, corpus separatum, for the city.  Rather, it lobbied to preserve the 
pluralistic nature of  the city, in which the three major monotheistic religions should be granted equal 
and fair access to shared holy sites within the city.  Pope Paul VI also called for the 'free enjoyment 
of  the legitimate civil and religious rights of  persons, residences and activities of  all communities 
present on the territory of  Palestine' – a hereto unprecedented level of  diplomatic pressure to assure 
the rights of  Palestinians.391   
 
Although the Vatican under Pope Paul VI showed increased concern for the Palestinian Christian 
communities, and Palestine more generally, it must be further contextualised within its larger policy 
to seek a viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, in which Palestinian and Israeli rights are 
balanced.392   It is also important to note that the Vatican was not immune from diplomatic pressures 
from other states and actors: 
The Holy See has been subjected to contrasting pressures during this time: the United States insisted on the opening of  diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Israel; Israel periodically accused the Holy See of  a pro-Arab bias, connecting this stance to religious prejudices which in reality had by then been overcome; and the Arab countries of  the Middle East, with the tacit consent of  their respective Roman Catholic communities, expressed dissatisfaction with Vatican policy and asked for more decisive support for the Palestinian cause. Despite all this, the Holy See has continued to adhere strictly to its position.393  
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The First Intifada: 
Orthodox community: 
The outbreak of  the First Intifada in 1987 again shifted the dynamic between Greek and Arab 
Orthodox.  The progression of  the Palestinian nationalist movement and its eruption into the mass 
movement of  the Intifada had the effect of  further nationalising church issues.  As stated in the 
introduction, the struggle of  the Arab Orthodox against the foreign Greek clergy became, in some 
ways, a proxy for the struggle between the foreign occupying force and the Palestinians, just as the 
sale of  Patriarchal land to the Israelis became akin to a treasonous offence – the land was no longer 
just part of  the church, but now it was part of  the Palestinian homeland.394  However, the period of  
the Intifada also saw the Patriarchal authorities breaking with their tradition of  full cooperation with 
the governing authority of  the state, due to pressures from both the Palestinian Christian 
community and support from other Jerusalem churches.  Between 1987 and 1992, Patriarch 
Diodoros joined the heads of  other Jerusalem churches in signing the Statements by the Heads of  
Christian Communities in Jerusalem, which condemned Israel's activities in the Occupied Territories, 
along with engaging in a series of  boycotts and strikes.395   
 In 1990, St. John's Hospice was occupied by radical Israeli settlers, which briefly increased solidarity 
between the Greek clergy and Arab Orthodox Community.  Following the occupation, the Church 
of  the Holy Sepulchre, the holiest Christian site in Jerusalem, was closed for 24 hours, and between 
1987 and 1989 the Christmas celebrations were halted and public services suspended.  As Dumper 
discusses, 'these were significant steps not only in terms of  expressing solidarity with the Palestinian 
national movement and the suffering of  the people, but also in demonstrating the degree of  intra-
church coordination.'396 
 Since 1990, as Katz and Kark note, the Arab Orthodox community's activism has intensified.  The 
issue of  land sales to Israel has become a major point of  contention, with the congregation 
demanding inclusion in the management of  Patriarchal assets.  Since the Arab Orthodox Initiative 
Committee conference in 1992, three additional conferences addressing land sales and asset 
management have been held.  The 1992 conference was also significant in that it had the support of  
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both the Jordanian government and the PLO, who also pressured the Patriarchate to halt land 
sales.397   
 
Latin community: 
The Latin community also faced considerable challenges during the Intifada years.  However, unlike 
the Rum Orthodoks community who continued to struggle for greater Arab rights throughout these 
troubled years, the 1987 appointment of  a Palestinian priest to the office of  the Patriarch 
represented a shift towards the needs of  the local community.  Indeed, Patriarch Michel Sabbah’s 
appointment was symbolic not only of  the Vatican’s changing stance towards the Israeli/Palestinian 
Conflict, but also of  the evolution of  the Latin Patriarchate into a truly indigenous institution.398  As 
such, Patriarch Sabbah became, in many ways, a powerful symbol of  the Palestinian struggle for 
national self-determination, supporting non-violent resistance during the Intifada and Christian and 
Muslim solidarity.399 Additionally, he has 'been in the forefront of  political and theological struggles 
regarding the future of  Jerusalem', becoming, in many ways, 'the Vatican's point man...initially 
favouring a special status for the Holy City, and then later quietly abandoning this policy in favour of  
a more pro-Palestinian stand' in regards to the Old City of  Jerusalem.'400 In this sense, Sabbah has 
followed closely with Vatican policy regarding both Jerusalem and the Palestinian question, and he 
has used his limited autonomy to take an even stronger stance in support of  the Palestinians. 
However, the institution of  the Patriarchate itself  is constrained to the extent that their authority is 
not limited to Palestine, but also Israel and Jordan.  Therefore, any political stance must take into 
consideration their special relationship with these three states.  Despite these limitations, the 
institution of  the Patriarchate joined other Christian churches in Jerusalem in a boycott of  official 
ceremonies associated with religious holidays.401   
 
At the grassroots level, a number of  respondents related the important role that parish priests played 
during the Intifada.  During the siege of  Beit Sahour in August of  1989, priests ‘brought supplies to 
people and took them to hospitals when 24 hour curfews were in place’.402  This is despite the fact 
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that a number of  parish priests were Jordanian, Italian, and from other Catholic countries.  In this 
way respondents indicated that these Latin priest were ‘just as Palestinian as us’.403  In many ways, the 
Latin Patriarchate in this period enhanced its grassroots support as an institution that had “proven 
itself ” to be a strong supporter of  Palestinian rights.   
 
Oslo Period: 
Orthodox Community: 
The Oslo Accords also had an impact on the relationship between clergy and laity in the Greek 
Orthodox community in Palestine.  When the Palestinian Authority was established, a new Ministry 
of  Religious Affairs was also established, which, along with the Minister for Christian Affairs, 
managed Christian administration in the West Bank and Gaza.  Due to the fact that the institution 
of  the Patriarchate is now under Israeli authority, a majority of  the issues between Arab Orthodox 
and Greek clergy, particularly those involving land sales and asset management, are carried out in the 
Israeli courts.  In 2001, the Orthodox National Council requested that the Israeli Supreme Court 
review the reestablishment of  the mixed council, in addition to numerous petitions to the 
Patriarchate itself.404     
 
Latin Community: 
As with the First Intifada, the Oslo Period saw the Latin community increasingly affected by the 
diplomatic relations of  the Vatican with Israel and the newly established Palestinian Authority. 
Although the Vatican was not directly involved with the 1991 Madrid Conference, which set the 
stage for the Oslo Process two years later, it became more deeply involved in diplomatic 
negotiations between Israel, the PLO, and neighbouring Arab states during this period, whilst also 
establishing official diplomatic relations with Israel, Jordan and the PLO in 1993 and 1994.405   
Vatican relations with Israel, although progressing positively throughout the early 1990s, were 
damaged with the 1995 assassination of  Yitzak Rabin, who many viewed as a partner for peace, and 
the subsequent election of  a right wing coalition to the Israeli Knesset, who proposed 'Jerusalem as 
the capital of  Israel'.406 This change in policy towards Jerusalem affected the implementation of  the 
Vatican-Israeli Fundamental Agreement, in regards to the Latin Patriarchate's property rights and tax 
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exemption status in Jerusalem.407  This obviously dampened the prospects of  the peace process 
throughout the early 2000s.  Pope John Paul II's visit to Israel in March of  2000, during the 
beginning of  the Second Intifada, was framed in his wish for mutual recognition and rights for the 
three monotheistic faiths.  This visit was also symbolically important towards repairing the Vatican's 
relationship with Israel and the PLO.  Indeed, John Paul II saw the resolution of  the contested 
status of  Jerusalem as being key to resolving the conflict in the Middle East.408 
 
During John Paul II's papacy, he cited his disapproval for unilateral decisions about the future of  
Jerusalem, such as Israel's declaration of  Jerusalem as its capital,409 and the ongoing development of  
Jewish sections of  the Old City of  Jerusalem, which might endanger the fragile demography of  the 
city, and hence its Christian population.  This concern for the changing demography of  the city goes 
back to at least 1971, when the Vatican newspaper, the Osservatore Romano, published an article 
criticising the development of  the Jewish quarter of  the Old City, calling it a move to imprint 
'Jerusalem with a particular character prejudicial to non-Jewish members of  the population, both 
Christian and Muslim', which ultimately forced these communities, 'in the name of  city planning, to 
retreat into smaller confines, and ultimately to seek elsewhere a future which the climate of  their 
homeland no longer makes available to them.'410  In other words, it endangered the already 
precarious balance between the three monotheistic religions in the city, causing the most 
demographically insignificant amongst them, the Christians, to continue to emigrate. 
 
Contemporary Context: 
Orthodox community: 
In the contemporary context, many of  the issues that the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate faces are 
related to the competing nationalisms of  these two communities.  In 2005, former Greek Orthodox 
Patriarch of  Jerusalem, Ireneos I, was deposed by the Jerusalem Patriarchate's Holy Synod after he 
was allegedly implicated in a controversy over the sale of  the Patriarchate's real estate, in which the 
Patriarchate allegedly entered into a 'multimillion-dollar transaction involving the sale or long-term 
lease of  prime land holdings owned by the Greek Orthodox church near Jaffa Gate in the Old City 
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of  Jerusalem to Jewish investors'.411  Although Patriarch Ireneos I was eventually exonerated by a 
Palestinian Authority Commission report, whose opinion it was that the Patriarch was victim of  'a 
very well calculated plan...schemed by a number of  clerics opposing Ireneos in collaboration with 
Israeli Extreme Right Wingers',412 popular public sentiment within the Arab Orthodox community – 
largely spearheaded by the highest ranking Palestinian member of  the Orthodox clergy then 
Archimandrite Atallah Hanna -- suspected that the sale of  land by the Patriarchate was part of  a 
larger conspiracy to "Judiaise" Jerusalem, or, at the very least, part of  the ongoing policy of  the 
Greek Orthodox Patriarchate to maintain its position as the primary guardian of  the holy sites 
through cooperation with the governing power.413   
 
The identity and vocation of  the Patriarchate continues to be a point of  contention between the 
Greek hierarchy and Arab laity.  Whilst the Greek clergy cite the early role of  the Patriarchate – as 
the guardian of  the region's holy sites -- as historical precedent for its actions in the present, the 
Arab laity continue to petition for greater access to positions of  power within the Patriarchate, 
particularly in relation to the management of  property and finances, citing discrimination and racism 
as the root of  the issue.  However, the Greek clergy argues that its barriers to greater access to 
positions of  power for the Arab clergy and lack of  sufficient pastoral care is not a result of  racism 
or nationalism, but rather because pastoral care was never part of  the Patriarchate's raison d'être.  
Therefore, they argue, any social welfare provided by the Patriarchate throughout history was 'was 
coincidental and in addition to its major and primary function and duty of  looking after the Shrines 
for the benefit of  all the Orthodox Christians everywhere.'414 It seems, therefore, that significant 
changes to the identity of  the Patriarchate are not forthcoming, despite the fact that the community 
is rapidly decreasing in size. 
 
Latin community: 
Following the failure of  the Oslo Process to grant any change in the status of  Jerusalem, and the 
worsening of  conditions for the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, in 2000 the Vatican 
signed the Basic Agreement between itself  and the PLO, which recognised the PLO as the legitimate 
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representative of  the Palestinian people and also recognised the right of  the Palestinians to 
statehood.  This document also highlights a shift in the Vatican's diplomatic priorities from a focus 
on the status of  Jerusalem, towards greater concern for the Palestinian people, as well as the 
beginnings of  diplomatic recognition of  the Palestinian state.  The Basic Agreement reiterated the 
Vatican's stance that Jerusalem has significance for the three monotheistic faiths, calling the city 'inter 
alia a privileged space for inter-religious dialogue'.415  The Basic Agreement also framed the just 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in terms that recognise 'the inalienable national legitimate 
rights and aspirations of  the Palestinian People' – a clear statement in support of  the Palestinians – 
whilst calling any unilateral decisions about Jerusalem --a subtle reference to the Israeli right -- 
'morally and legally unacceptable'.416  Importantly for the future of  the Palestinian Christian 
population, the Vatican made its diplomatic agreement contingent on the PLO agreeing to preserve 
equal rights and duties of  all Palestinian citizens – regardless of  their religion.   
 
Citing growing international support for the recognition of  Palestinian statehood, in particular the 
United Nations General Assembly's 2012 recognition of  the state of  Palestine, the Vatican finalised 
recognition of  Palestinian statehood in June of  2015 in the Comprehensive Agreement with the PLO.  
Although faced with staunch opposition from the Israeli side who said that this recognition would 
cause set backs for the peace process,417  the Vatican believed that it would provide a 'stimulus to 
bringing a definitive end to the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which continues to cause 
suffering for both Parties'.418 This move towards recognition of  the Palestinian state followed a 
much-anticipated 2014 visit to Jordan, Palestine and Israel by Pope Francis.  After a mass attended 
by 30,000 worshippers in the Church of  Nativity in Bethlehem, the Pope remarked, 'I wish to invite 
you, President Mahmoud Abbas, together with [Israeli] President Shimon Peres, to join me in 
heartfelt prayer to God for the gift of  peace. I offer my home in the Vatican as a place for this 
encounter of  prayer', which again highlighted the important role that the Vatican hopes to play in 
the resolution of  the Conflict. 
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The Vatican now takes a more direct role in the peace process – either by offering to mediate any 
peace agreement or through its recognition of  Palestinian statehood, which it hopes will pressure the 
Israeli government to take the peace process seriously.  For the Palestinian population, the Pope's 
visit and the Vatican's recognition of  Palestinian statehood reinforced the important role that the 
Palestinian Christian community plays – both as a connection to allies in the West and through their 
contributions to Palestinian culture and politics. 
 
Conclusion: 
As this chapter has discussed, the historical trajectories of  both the Latin and Orthodox 
communities in Palestine have been marked by their interaction with European colonialism and the 
growth of  a national consciousness. The evolving nature of  the identity and vocation of  the 
Patriarchates diverged in the early 20th century, when the Latin Patriarchate began to take the 
concerns of  the indigenous community to heart, whilst the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate continues 
to struggle in defining itself  as both a relevant actor in the local context and honouring its ancient 
identity and vocation.  In the case of  the Rum Orthodoks community, these struggles have been 
manifested in a number different ways over the course of  the 20th century.  Namely, Arab demands 
for greater access to positions of  authority within the Patriarchate, participation in the management 
of  Patriarchal finances, and the much larger conflict over the identity and vocation of  the 
Patriarchate itself.  In this way, the Palestinian Orthodox community, whilst extremely devout and 
proud of  their heritage as Orthodox Christians, struggles to see either the material or psychological 
benefits of  membership in the church.   
 
In contrast, the considerably newer Latin Patriarchate has taken a different historical trajectory, in 
which early efforts to train local priests and provide significant financial and institutional 
development in Christian communities has generally received a positive reception within the 
community.   These historical struggles over the identity of  these communities have had a tangible 
impact on how the lay communities experience and communicate their identity as Palestinian 
Christians.  This, in turn, affects the level of  attachment individuals feel towards their confessional 
communities, the influence of  religious leadership, and levels of  religiosity, which, as the next 
chapter discusses, can impact upon social and political action in a significant way.    
 
  
  
  113
Chapter Five -- Navigating Communal and Political Identities:  The previous chapters have provided historical context to the development of  national and religious 
identities in the Palestinian Christian communities.  These identities have developed in parallel to and 
in concert with Palestinian identity as a whole – with the Palestinian Christians providing not only 
significant intellectual contributions to Palestinian and Arab nationalism, but also significant 
economic and social contributions to Palestinian society.  However, the ongoing issues of  
emigration, demographic decline, the Israeli Occupation, and Islamisation have created a crisis of  
identity in the Palestinian Christian community, as it seeks to redefine its role in an increasingly 
fragmented Palestinian society.  In this context, the negotiation between religiosity, communalism, 
and nationalism can have a significant effect on social and political action, as individuals navigate 
between loyalty to the state and to their confessional communities.419 However the fluidity and 
multiplicity of  identity(s) suggests that these are not two mutually exclusive forces.420  Rather, 
sufficiently broad and inclusive nationalisms can more easily incorporate religious pluralism without 
necessarily undermining the authority of  the state – particularly if  there is a separation between 
religion and politics at the state level.  In situations of  statelessness, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
the paradigm changes because the lack of  an effective state apparatus opens the field to other 
political actors defining the nation – both rhetorically and structurally.  In this context, if  religious 
minorities feel alienated from the national identity because it is increasingly defined by a religious 
majority, then they will naturally begin to retreat towards their communal identities.  If  they feel 
alienated from both their political and communal identities, they may seek to emigrate in search of  
economic, social, and political freedoms.  As such, the level of  attachment individuals feel towards 
both their national and their communal identities is extremely consequential to their social and 
political actions.    
 
This chapter explores the interplay of  religious, communal, and national identities in order to 
determine their effect on social and political action in the Palestinian Christian communities.  The 
first section, which focuses on the Rum Orthodoks and Latin communities in Palestine,421 examines 
the role of  communal identity in political decision making, Palestinian Christian perspectives on the 
role of  their church in their political life, and finally how the history of  these denominations affects 
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political action and national belonging in the contemporary context.  The second section of  this 
chapter explores notions of  political identity, examining how Arabism, political affiliation, and 
notions of  citizenship affect national belonging and state attachment in the Palestinian Christian 
communities. 
 
Communal Identity in the Palestinian Christian Communities: 
The Contemporary Imagining of  the Rum Orthodoks Community: 
 
Last December was the celebration of  Saint Saba's day and we went to the monastery of  Mar Saba to celebrate – it's a big day.  When the Patriarch came we were waiting in the front door to greet him.  And when he came into the church he gave his speech and prayers in Greek.  And most of  us there were Palestinians.  We were thinking, "Who are you speaking to?"  Honestly.  There were some few Greek and Russian visitors and maybe some others – all of  those are minorities in comparison to the Palestinians who were there and who are living locally.422    - Lay member of  the Greek Orthodox Church, late-20s, Beit Sahour  What the above quotation illustrates is that the perceived disconnect between the Greek higher 
clergy and the Palestinian laity continues to centre on issues of  language, culture, and identity.  These 
issues also have a strong impact on the function of  the Orthodox parishes at the local level as 
respondents indicated a growing disconnect between the realties of  their social/political lives and 
the guidance they receive from their religious leadership.  A 2006 survey of  Palestinian Christians, 
conducted by the Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Centre, found that 78% of  Palestinian 
Orthodox Christians said that there was not a close relationship between the church and most 
adults.423   Further, 72% of  respondents indicated that parish priests and nuns should strengthen 
their pastoral efforts, whilst 61% thought that there was little cooperation between parish priests and 
the laity on pastoral issues.424  Similarly only 36% of  respondents indicated that church-related 
development and charitable organisations were actively fulfilling the needs of  society, compared to 
45% amongst the Latin community.425 This suggests that there is a correlation between the perceived 
value of  church institutions and attachment to the church.   
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Without devaluing the significance of  spirituality, belief  and faith more generally, this data also 
suggests that the utility of  religious identity – both in terms of  the material benefits gained from 
membership in a confessional community,426 and the psychological benefits of  self-esteem generated 
from membership in a social group,427 are important factors in the choice between ecclesiastical, 
communal or national identities. If  either the material or psychological elements are lacking, 
identification with the group begins to lose its value.  In the case of  the Rum Orthodoks community, a 
perceived lack of  pastoral care, combined with a negative perception of  Patriarchate itself, has 
unsurprisingly lead to a decline in individual attachment to the confessional community.  This was 
reflected in narrations of  identity amongst Orthodox respondents, who were far more likely to 
identify with either the communal identity "Christian" or political/ethnic identities "Arab" or 
"Palestinian", than to identify as Rum Orthodoks.     
 
This is indicative of  several trends within the community.  Firstly, there is either a real or perceived 
detachment between church life and the daily realities of  the Arab Orthodox Community – this is 
particularly true amongst the younger generation who were comparatively less likely to characterise 
themselves as either "religious" or "very religious".  This is due, in part, to the dissatisfaction that 
respondents felt with the level of  spiritual and pastoral guidance gained from their clergy,428 but also 
because many respondents felt that the Orthodox Church was increasingly disconnected from their 
social reality.  This was particularly true in terms of  ecumenical relations.  As one respondent 
indicated,  
What I have noticed in the past three or four decades is that the Christian laypeople feel closer to each other.  One important aspect of  this is mixed marriage, which we don't even call mixed.  But these mixed marriages make people feel closer to each other. My two sisters are Orthodox, you know married to Orthodox people -- so yes we can talk about a mosaic of  churches if  we look at laypeople – how they work with each other, etc. But still for the hierarchy, no, we don't have an ecumenical movement – we don't discuss important issues amongst ourselves. Ok we may have a statement about the future of  Jerusalem or something like this but nothing ecumenical to get closer. 429   -- Palestinian Latin Priest, mid-50s, Beit Jala  
 The church, in this way, is lagging behind the changing social dynamics of  a community that is 
increasingly characterised by its relative openness to other the other Christian denominations.  
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Although there was little evidence that this has led to mass conversions away from Orthodoxy, 
younger respondents indicated that they were drawn to the relative openness of  the other 
denominations.  As one Orthodox university student suggested, 'Although I'm Orthodox, I'm more 
into Catholicism because I think the Orthodox are more into rules and commitment than the 
Catholics.'430 University-aged respondents frequently expressed the desire for more solidarity 
amongst the Christian community as a whole, 'We are Christians first, not Catholic or Orthodox.'431   
 
From the perspective of  the Arab Orthodox clergy, ecumenical relations were good, but there was 
an indication that the ethnic Greek clergy were less open to ecumenism.   
There is a good relationship between Arab [Orthodox] clergy and other denominations, but sometimes we find discrimination from some of  the Greeks.  They are stuck to the Greek Orthodox – "we are Orthodox, we just love Orthodox" or "we just deal with Orthodox" but for the Arabs here in Bethlehem, they deal with many different denominations because they get married between Orthodox and Catholics so they are mixed.432     -- Arab Orthodox Priest, mid-30s, Bethlehem  Similarly, several respondents indicated that they did not feel that non-Orthodox were able to easily 
attend Orthodox services:  
 QC: Do you face any issues if  you try to attend mass at other churches?  I: No, no not at all.  But we have problems in the churches that are run by the Greeks, but not with the Palestinians.433  -- NGO leader, mid-50s, Beit Sahour  Although Arab Orthodox parish priests were highly regarded amongst the community, the 
perception of  the Greek clergy, both from the perspective of  the laity and Arab clergy, was relatively 
low.  This negative perception was rooted in two sentiments. The first is that the Greek clergy is not 
concerned with the welfare of  the Palestinian laity: 'the main problem with the Greeks all over 
Palestine, is that they do not care about the problems of  the Palestinians'.434  The second is that the 
Arab Orthodox felt that the Greeks did not trust them to govern the affairs of  the Patriarchate: 'The 
Greeks believe that they are the only ones capable of  preserving the church.'435  This was connected 
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to the perception that the Greek hierarchy's actions and motives were governed primarily by a desire 
to maintain the Status Quo in holy sites, rather than address the needs of  the community in the 
present.  Respondents indicated that this was partly accomplished through the rules concerning the 
appointment of  Bishops: 
The highest authority is the Patriarch of  Jerusalem – the largest church here – which has a lot of  real estate, power, holy places – so who's in command?  The Greek Patriarch with Greek Bishops who form this fraternity or Synod or Brotherhood.  I think they don't trust local people – they want only married priests, so they encourage them to get married before ordination.  But Bishops cannot be married.436  ; 
The bishops can't be married.  Basically if  you're a monk, you can become a bishop.  You can't become a bishop unless you're not nominally a monk.  So there's two parts.  And the Greek clergy won't allow the local Arab clergy to choose the celibate monastic path.  That's the point and that's what happens here.  Plus there is a lot of  disparagement from the monastics towards the secular clergy here.437     The dominance of  Hellenism over the hierarchy, and the perceived lack of  concern towards the 
indigenous community, is then telegraphed into the practice of  the liturgy itself.  Although 
respondents viewed the Orthodox liturgy as being integral to their Rum Orthodoks identity, they also 
expressed the desire for a greater flexibility in the church sermons themselves to allow for a 
theological contextualisation of  social and political issues – an issue common to Orthodox and Latin 
communities.  Whilst this is partly up to the discretion of  the parish priests, some of  whom are 
highly political, the inconsistency in social and political guidance from the church leadership has led 
to a decline in their influence relative to other actors.  A majority of  respondents indicated that their 
parish priests infrequently discussed social and political concerns in church and connected this to 
their feelings of  hopelessness about their daily life.  Unsurprisingly therefore, respondents indicated 
that they rarely look to their religious leadership for guidance on political and social issues.438  
Further, respondents indicated that they most often discussed social and political issues with friends, 
without guidance from religious leadership.439  
 
For their part, the Arab Orthodox clergy continue to petition for greater rights within the 
Patriarchate of  Jerusalem often with the support of  Palestinian Bishop Atallah Hanna.  During the 
2014 Gaza War, the Orthodox Club of  Amman issued a Statement of  the Arab Orthodox Clergy of  
                                                 436. Latin Priest 1, "Personal Interview." 437. Lutheran Priest, interview by Quinn Coffey2014. 438. Quinn Coffey, "Survey of Palestinian Christian Political Participation," (2014/15). 439. Ibid. 
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Jerusalem on Reforming the Patriarchate in which they denounced Israel's role in the Gaza War and 
renewed demands for greater Arab participation in the Jerusalem Patriarchate:  
Out of  our zeal for our Church of  Jerusalem, the Mother of  Churches, and our unshakeable faith in the unity of  our Orthodox, Catholic and Apostolic Church, our confidence in the justness of  our demands as clergy and laity, we reject the racist domination over our Church of  Jerusalem that has been in a state of  decline for more than five centuries, caused by the lack of  pastoral care of  her children; the squandering of  her endowments given to her by our ancestors in order to prop up Greek hegemony over our Church of  Jerusalem; the non-application of  the Church's pastoral regulations in their canonical, pastoral and administrative dimensions; the replacement of  pastoral bishops of  dioceses with patriarchal vicars; the prohibition on Arab clergy entering the monastic life; the cancellation of  their salaries; their being banished from their parishes and monasteries as an act of  revenge and personal score-settling simply because they are calling for spiritual revival and setting things right in our national church. This is all to say nothing of  the neglect and marginalization of  the Arab Orthodox flock who just a short time ago were the only Christian significant community in this country but who now because of  the practices of  the Church's leadership do not even number half  of  the Christians.440  
This statement highlights the connection between issues of  identity at the level of  the Patriarchate 
and problems at the parish level – including the growing distance between the lay community and 
the church, which the Arab clergy felt would be remedied by refocusing the efforts of  the 
Patriarchate away from its position in holy sites and towards the community that they feel it is meant 
to serve.  This is why issues like land sales to the Israelis and the relative lack of  support given by the 
Orthodox hierarchy to Palestine have 'lead so many people to lose faith in the church', because, in 
the opinion of  the Arab clergy, Greek dominance has pushed 'away any efforts to bring indigenous 
concerns and make them central.'441  
 
When asked about the conflict over the identity of  the Patriarchate in recent interviews, Orthodox 
Patriarch Theophilos III, replied:  
 There is a bigger question here. The name of  the patriarchate and all Eastern Orthodox Christians locally here is "Rum." This is how they are recognised and identified by the Muslim Arabs and Palestinians, in general. It is a matter of  cultural identity or identity crisis that many people have difficulties understanding the meaning of  "Rum." The West has also brought them confusion about their identity, which could be remedied with education and [an] understanding [of] history. And you have to refer back to your roots. You cannot disregard the Byzantine presence that was here. The stones are talking -- everything is talking.442  
                                                 440. Arab Orthodox Clergy, "Statement of the Arab Orthodox Clergy of Jerusalem on Reforming the Patriarchate," news release, 2014. 441. Palestinian Academic, "Personal Interview." 442. Anna Koulouris, "Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem Theophilos Iii: The Greek Orthodox Church and the Future of Jerusalem," Palestine-Israel Journal 17, no. 12 (2011). 
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As Patriarch Theophilos III's comment suggests, the Patriarchate continues to view itself  as an 
essentially Byzantine institution, with an ancient and unchanged vocation.  Interestingly, although the 
Patriarch admits to there being an identity crisis within the Orthodox Patriarchate, he suggests that 
this is due to a misunderstanding of  history on the part of  the Arab Orthodox community, not the 
Greek hierarchies' steadfast rejection of  any changes to the status quo.  Therefore, it would appear 
that any significant changes to the nature of  the Orthodox Patriarchate are not forthcoming, despite 
the impact of  this struggle on the declining Palestinian Christian community. 
 
Contemporary imagining of  the Palestinian Latin Community:  As the previous chapter discussed, although the Latin Patriarchate of  Jerusalem initially had 
struggled to define its vocation, and hence its identity as a European-rite church in an eastern 
context, over the course of  the 20th century it has evolved into an important local institution -- one 
that is responsible for the largest share of  social welfare in the West Bank and Gaza Strip out of  any 
other religious organisation.  Additionally, despite the initial strife between the Greek Catholic and 
Latin hierarchies, the ongoing struggle against the Israeli Occupation, the existential threat to 
Christians across the Middle East, and the shift towards Islamism in Palestinian politics has 'allowed 
a certain rapprochement between Latins and Greek Catholics, which has been facilitated by both 
sides renouncing proselytism as well as by the increased Arabisation of  the Latin Church.'443   In this 
sense, although the identity of  the Latin Church in the Holy Land is marred by the history of  the 
Crusades and Latinisation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the local community has not faced 
the same uncertainty over its identity as their Orthodox compatriots.  This is owing to the fact that it 
has, since its re-establishment in the 19th century, sought to ground itself  in local traditions, language, 
and culture – regardless of  the ethnicity of  the clergy.   
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the perceived utility of  particular social identities (e.g. Latin, Christian, 
Palestinian, Catholic, Orthodox, etc.), combined with self-esteem generated from membership in the 
social group affects whether or not individuals choose to identify with them.  This affects the 
relative influence of  these social identities on political, social, and other issues.  In the case of  the 
Palestinian Latin community, the combination of  the "Arabisation" of  the Patriarchate and the 
development of  pastoral institutions is positively correlated with levels of  religiosity and self-
                                                 443. O'Mahony, "The Vatican, Jerusalem, the State of Israel, and Christianity in the Holy Land.", 139 
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identification with the communal identity.   Additionally, respondents indicated that ecumenical 
relations between the Latins and other denominations were viewed positively, which affected 
individuals' perception that their church reflected the demographic and social trends within the 
increasingly interfaith Palestinian Christian community. 
 
However these positive trends within the Latin community have not been sufficient to counter the 
ongoing issue of  emigration, which, as this study shows in Chapter Seven, are partly dependent 
upon how the church addresses or contextualises social and political issues in a religious context.  As 
one Latin priest related,  
I: The question that's always important – and this is part of  the tension between being a Palestinian and being a Christian – is how to be involved in public life as a Palestinian and a Christian. I think priests need to work harder to answer the questions of  young people.  And of  course they discuss this in youth groups, meetings, etc.  But this is an important question for everyone.  So, if  you want to be a Christian, ok, that's good.  You come to church, you're involved in church activities, but being a Christian also means being a good citizen.  What does it mean to be a good citizen?  These kinds of  questions are important to answer – many young people will ask this and not find the answers.    QC: And does this cause people to leave the church?  I: To leave the country – because what's the meaning of  my presence here?  What does it mean to be in Palestine – let me go to the States where I'll have a better future.444     In this passage you see that in the opinion of  the clergy there is not sufficient discussion of  social 
and political issues within the context of  the Latin faith and the result is the disappearance of  the 
community.  When asked what the Latin Patriarchate was doing to stem emigration, Latin Bishop 
William Shomali replied: 
What we do to fight this emigration? The best medicine is to give antibiotic to the virus. So if  the sickness – the disease is a bad economy because of  insecurity and lack of  peace, peace would be the medicine – the solution. If  there was peace here the situation would improve, the Christians would remain – willingly. So lack of  peace is one of  the problems and peace would be the solution.   But also, even if  peace is not there we should help our people in giving them faith that their presence here is important – is crucial – it's our vocation from the Lord – it's a blessing, it's a privilege. So we need spiritual motivation because people can be rich and leave. So we cannot say it's only an economic problem or political problem -- those difficulties are there -- but people can have a spiritual strength to say, ok it's difficult, but I will remain.445  
                                                 444. Latin Priest 1, "Personal Interview." 445. Latin Bishop, interview by Quinn Coffey2014, Bethlehem. 
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There was also the perception that social issues were addressed, but political issues were avoided.  
This was also reflected in survey data, which indicated a high level of  discussion in relation to social 
issues in both the Orthodox and Latin communities and a relatively low level of  discussion of  
political issues in both communities.446 As one NGO leader described:  
QC: Are political issues discussed very often in church?  I: No, more social issues.  In many of  our churches we don't – some priests don't prefer to talk openly about politics.    QC: I have heard others say that this is dependent on the background of  the priest?  I: Very, very few do this.  QC: Do you think they should talk about politics more often?  I: Of  course because it's part of  our life here.  You should, as a priest, always be with the people.  If  they are worried, you should try to pray and address their worries and how to overcome them.  Ok, you will not end the Occupation, but they need your guidance.447  
And this lack of  spiritual guidance on political issues was seen as directly contributing to a lack of  
resolve when faced with the opportunity to emigrate.  Again, this is suggestive of  the desire for 
religious contextualisation of  political and social issues – and the potentially problematic exclusion 
of  such contextualisation.  This also suggests that the religious leadership could potentially have a 
far greater impact on the political stance of  their communities if  they were more willing to engage 
with these issues.  Despite this fact, the Latin leadership is cautious not to paint itself  as a political 
institution:   
We are a church; we are not a political body… I cannot deny that we have some political role – but it is an indirect role…We publish statements continuously about the situation.  Today, for example, there will be a statement in Arabic about our request for immediate ceasefire in the Gaza War.  So we express our position, 
                                                 
446 Sabeel, "The Sabeel Survey on Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and Israel."; Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Adapted Data from the Pcpsr Surveys."Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research", 2000-2010. 
447 CRO Employee 1, interview by Quinn Coffey2014, Beit Sahour. 
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especially when politics intersects with ethics, because religion has an ethical impact on society. So we can’t say the state is free to do whatever it wants – no the state should be ethical and we should help the state by publishing ethical statements.’448   Despite the relatively high levels of  religiosity in the Latin communities and levels of  satisfaction 
with pastoral and other social welfare initiatives, self-identification with ecclesiastical identity was 
relatively low, with political (Palestinian, Arab) and communal (Christian, Arab Christian, Middle 
Eastern Christian) identities typically taking priority.449  This suggests that, although ecclesiastical 
identity was an important part of  the overall construction of  identity for respondents, there was a 
far greater shared sense of  community amongst Christians and Palestinians more generally.   
 
Contextualising the Faith: Liturgical Issues: 
In the case of  both the Catholic and Orthodox communities, the rigidity of  the liturgies themselves 
may be a factor in the leadership’s difficulty with contextualisation.  As one respondent noted: 
It’s very difficult to change the liturgy in other denominations.  To change liturgies it takes dozens of  years to change one small thing – and a lot of  people and decisions.  This is one of  the, forgive me for using this word, but “advantages” of  the Free Evangelical Churches who are able to write something and advocate for it.  A Catholic person can write something and advocate it to the people, but for the church to adopt it it’s a different story.450    --Palestinian Academic, mid-40s, Bethlehem  This may also explain the steady growth of  the various Protestant communities in Palestine over the 
past several decades.  These communities are small in number, but their leadership have become 
some of  the most outspoken Christian activists451 for Palestine, advocating, for example, for a 
Christian liberation theology which contextualises the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the Christian 
faith.452 As Robson notes, ‘the concept of  ‘liberation theology’ first arose in Latin America in the 
1960s, when the Latin American Episcopal Conference began to engage with questions of  poverty 
and political activism from a new, Marxist-influenced perspective.’453  This theology was further 
developed by the Peruvian Catholic priest Gustavo Gutierrez who, in his 1971 book A Theology of  
Liberation, called on Latin Catholics to combat issues of  economic, social and class injustice through 
                                                 
448 Latin Bishop, "Personal Interview." 449. This data is based off of the identity card exercises. 
450 Palestinian Academic, "Personal Interview." 
451 E.g. Father Naim Ateek (Anglican); Father Mitri Rabeb (Lutheran); Geries Khoury 
452 http://www.sabeel.org/ourstory.php 
453 Laura Robson, "Palestinian Liberation Theology, Muslim–Christian Relations and the Arab–Israeli Conflict," Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 21, no. 1 (2010)., 40 
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social and political action.454  In this way Liberation Theology positioned itself  as an anti-colonialist 
indigenous grassroots Christian movement, with certain parallels to the types of  political and social 
actions taking place in Palestine.   
 
However, the difference in context between the Latin American and Palestinian experiences of  
oppression, and consequently their solutions to it, were different enough to necessitate a new 
approach.  In 1989 the Palestinian Anglican priest Naim Ateek published his Justice, and Only Justice: 
A Palestinian Theology of Liberation, which set out a number of goals of the movement and its basic 
theology.  As related by Ateek, the goals of liberation theology were to: 
 
 ‘Analyze the context of  injustice and oppression as realistically and faithful as possible; 
 To be anchored in both the Bible and in the reality on the ground; 
 Empower Christians and encourage them to strengthen their faith in the God of  justice and 
love so that they do not lose faith in god in spite of  the oppressive occupation; 
 Give the people hope for the future and inspire them to resist the evil through tools that are 
authentically true to their faith, i.e. through nonviolence; 
 Emphasize that faithfulness to God and to Jesus Christ means critiquing an condemning 
violence from whichever source.’455  
 
Ateek situated Liberation Theology in an Arab and Middle Eastern cultural context; positioning 
Christianity as an ‘authentically Palestinian Arab religion standing alongside Islam in the fight for 
political justice’, while also supporting non-violent resistance.456 Ateek went on to help found the 
Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center in Jerusalem, which became important not only for 
the further development of Palestinian Liberation Theology, but also as a resource for ecumenical 
relations and international outreach that continues to this day.  
 
However, Palestinian Liberation Theology is by no means a monolithic trend.  Indeed the notion of 
“contextualized theology” was introduced several years prior to Sabeel by the al-Liqa’ in Bethlehem.  
                                                 
454 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation (New York: Orbis Books, 1973). 
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Al-Liqa’ was founded as a centre for Christian-Muslim interfaith dialogue in 1982 as part of the 
Tantur Ecumenical Institute in Jerusalem, whose focus was international ecumenical outreach.   In 
1987 al-Liqa’ split from Tantur in order to focus on issues more central to Palestinian daily life.  To 
support those aims, in 1987 al-Liqa’ published Theology and the Local Church in the Holy Land: Palestinian 
Contextualized Theology, in which it calls for the development of a contextualized theology that aims to  
‘live and interact with events so as to interpret them and assist the Palestinian Church in discovering 
her identity and real mission at this stage of her earthly life.’457  As part of this goal of 
contextualisation and internal activism, al-Liqa’ has made the education of Palestinian Christian 
youth a primary goal.  As one respondent involved with this work relayed, ‘we are not aware of our 
history and identity as Palestinian Christians and the churches and leadership have not done enough 
to fix these issues in the curriculum.’458  Therefore, the Centre sees the need, not only for 
contextualisation of the faith, but also the Christian identity itself.   
 
The question is whether Palestinian Liberation Theology has made an impact on the issues of 
identity that have adversely impacted church membership.  Although these two examples illustrate 
intellectually and spiritually rigorous resources for those in the Palestinian Christian community 
looking for answers, empirical data suggests that neither movement has been able to gain widespread 
support amongst the lay community.  As Robson notes, this is partly because  ‘nearly all of the 
material on the Palestinian liberation theology movement has been written in European 
languages.’459 Therefore, the Palestinian Liberation Theology movement has been directed primarily 
at western-oriented elite Palestinians and the western Christian world, which explains the disconnect 
between church and NGO leadership who praise the work being done by documents like the 
Kairos, and the perspectives of the lay community who continue to struggle with how to be 
Palestinian and Christian. 460    
 Political identity: As the previous section discussed, there is a strong correlation between the perceived utility of  
membership in confessional communities and the relative influence of  church leadership in political 
and social life.  This was affected by several factors:                                                  
457 Samuel Kuruvilla, "Liberation Theology in Latin America and Palestine-Israel: Practical Similarities and Contextual Differences," in Theologies of Liberation in Palestine-Israel: Indigenous, Contextual, and Postcolonial Perspectives, ed. Nur Masalha and Lisa Isherwood (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2014)., 10 
458 NGO Employee 3, interview by Quinn Coffey2014, Bethlehem. 
459 Robson, "Palestinian Liberation Theology, Muslim–Christian Relations and the Arab–Israeli Conflict.", 47. 
460 Ibid., 48 
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1. The level of  material utility a confessional community provides 2. Contextualisation of  daily life within the faith 3. The identity of  the church – Greek; Arab; Palestinian; ecumenical  Apart from the limits that communal identity places on political choice, church leadership seems to 
have an insignificant effect on political action within the Palestinian Christian communities.  There 
are, of  course, counterexamples such as former Patriarch Michel Sabbah and Bishop Atallah Hanna, 
both of  whom frequently make political statements and have made a strong impact Palestinian 
nationalism more generally.  But in terms of  impacting political action and choice, data indicates that 
pragmatism is a far more salient factor than the influence of  the religious leadership.  Given this 
relative lack of  influence from the religious leadership, this section explores how Palestinian 
Christians negotiate their political role in Palestinian society.   
  
As discussed in the introduction, the lack of  a strong, and more importantly, popular state apparatus 
in Palestine has meant that loyalty and nationalism are both more open to interpretation and more 
easily manipulated by political, religious or cultural movements – each with their own particular 
brand of  Palestinian nationalism.  Consequently, while there are certain core elements of  Palestinian 
nationalism, its particular iteration by political actors and the interpretation at the popular level can 
be wildly different. Consequently, the lack of  a codified national identity, coupled with the ability of  
political groups to promote their own ideological programmes, creates a landscape in which the 
narrative of  national identity can be adjusted to fit a group's own beliefs.  This is why it is possible to 
have a simultaneous vision of  the Palestinian nation as an Islamic Waqf  (Hamas), as quasi-secular 
(Fatah), or as part of  a wider and largely secular Arab world (pan-Arabism). 
 
This is significant to the case of  the Palestinian Christians for several reasons.  Firstly, the 
increasingly public displays of  Islamic religious piety – including dress, gender segregation, and 
public protests – has meant that the public sphere is increasingly defined within an Islamic religio-
cultural milieu.  Secondly, this has impacted significantly upon political choice, in that Palestinian 
Christians may vote defensively or pragmatically, rather than for the candidate they feel is the most 
suitable.  As one respondent noted: 'If  I vote Fatah it is only to vote against Hamas because I don't 
believe in the ideology of  Hamas – but I don't believe in Fatah either and you have many, many, 
many people like me.  You know we lost our faith – confidence, trust in political leaders in those two 
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parties.'461  Finally, it impacts on Palestinian Christians' feelings of  being part of  the nation; 
influencing the decision to emigrate, vote, run for political office, and a host of  other issues.  As 
noted by one responded, 'there are some Palestinian Christians that, because they're so disenchanted 
with current status and identity, they don't affiliate themselves with the current identity.'462 This 
section explores the relationship of  the Palestinian Christian community to this changing social and 
political landscape, addressing issues of  nationalism, citizenship, and political affiliation in the 
context of  statelessness.   
 
Relationship with Arabism: 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, Palestinian Christians have a long history with Arabism 
going back to the late Ottoman period.  They were crucial in the establishment of  Arab nationalism 
and continue to have a strong connection with the larger Arab identity, despite the failure of  pan-
Arabism to resolve the Israel/Palestinian Conflict.  This relationship with Arabism is somewhat 
unique amongst Middle Eastern Christian communities – the majority of  whom eschew the label 
"Arab" (Copts, Assyrians, Syriacs, and Armenians in particular).  As noted by Corbon, these historic 
relationships with Arabism respond to a number of  different factors including the ecclesiastical 
identity of  the church itself, its history, and the political successes (and failures) of  the communities 
themselves.463   
 
From a social and political perspective, the close relationship of  Palestinian Christians to Arabism is 
related to the history of  these communities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the 
combination of  European influence, Turkish nationalism, and the disenfranchisement of  indigenous 
Orthodox communities from their ethnic-Greek dominated patriarchates. 464   This led to the 
development of  an Arab Orthodox consciousness, which developed alongside a largely secular 
vision of  pan-Arab and Palestinian nationalisms throughout the first half  of  the 20th century.  Pan-
Arabism, as a largely secular phenomenon, theoretically allowed Christians to participate in the 
growing nationalist discourse as equal partners to their Muslim peers.  In contrast, the Oriental 
Orthodox communities not only had a stronger sense of  having distinctive national identities that 
                                                 461. Latin Priest 1, "Personal Interview." 462. CRO Employee 3, "Personal Interview." 
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predated the Arab invasions of  the 7th century, but they also had their own cultures and languages 
(e.g. the various Assyrian dialects and Coptic).  Therefore, they have tended to portray themselves as 
ethnically and culturally different from the Arab Muslim majority. 
 
In the contemporary Palestinian context, the relationship with Arabism is also affected, to a large 
degree, by generational difference, in that those who have grown up in the post-1974 era, i.e. after 
the decline in popularity of  pan-Arabism, have tended to have less of  a relationship with pan-
Arabism because of  its decline as a popular ideology following the humiliating defeats of  Arab 
forces in the 1967 and 1974 Wars with Israel.  Whilst a majority of  the younger generation continue 
to have a relationship with more general aspects of  Arab culture – language, music, dance -- they 
tend to prioritise either Palestinian nationalism, communal or regional affiliations over the prospects 
of  a united Arab nation. These relationships have also crucially affected political choice for these 
individuals.  In an interview with a Palestinian Christian born before the establishment of  the State 
of  Israel, we see how the relationship with Arabism has changed over time, and also why it has 
changed: 
I used to argue that I am more comfortable with being an Arab nationalist, so my identity then is basically Arab.  So I put aside my identity as a Christian.  Or I'd say: I'm an Arab Christian – a Palestinian Christian.  And I see no conflict between the two.  And there aren't conflicts necessarily.  Where the problem lies is not in developing your identity – it's really in how your identity affects the way you look at others...There are the family identities and then there are the national identities, there are the human identities --the problem we are having in the Middle East is that religious identity has become a way of  looking at others.465  In this instance, he reflects upon the initial difficulties of  being an Arab nationalist, whilst also 
maintaining his public identity of  being Christian.  This reflects the largely secular origins of  pan-
Arabism.  In an attempt to unite the highly diverse Arab world, religious distinctions were avoided.  
But, as he explained, the breakdown of  Arabism from the late 1960s onwards has shattered the 
illusion of  Arab unity – most particularly for Christians, who may feel uneasy about their 
relationship with territorial nationalism, as religion has started to play a greater role in its iteration:  
When I was growing up, we were more involved in the Arab nationalist movement.  We were seeing the Arabs as one nation.  But now it has been proven that the Arabs are not one nation because you are talking about different states.  And also the question of  identity is not simply a Christian / Muslim identity it's also a question of  identity also within the society.  Am I a true Jordanian?  Am I a true Palestinian?  And what does it take to be a true Palestinian?466 
                                                 465. Palestinian Politician 2, interview by Quinn Coffey2014. 466. Ibid. 
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This disillusionment with Arabism was also expressed by a Latin priest in his 50s, who related the 
feeling of  being excluded from the wider Arab identity because he is not a Muslim.  He distinguishes 
between Arab culture – language, food, dance, etc. -- and membership in a larger Arab national 
community: 
I: The concept of  Arabism is confusing because if  you speak of  it as a culture, it means much more to me personally, but if  you mean Arabism as belonging to the Arab world -- no I don't want to belong to the Arab world.  QC: Why is that?  I: Because I don't feel that there is such a thing as the Arab world -- those are Arab countries fighting each other, killing each other.  I don't believe in the Arab world, there is no such thing in the political sense.  The cultural sense yes, but it's much easier for me to visit Europe, USA -- any country in the world – than it is for me to visit Syria -- they don't want me as a Palestinian to go there you know. And I was refused a visa to Saudi Arabia when I was dean of  faculty of  arts [at a local university] and there was a meeting for deans of  faculties of  arts in the Arab world.  I was denied a visa.  I was never denied a visa to Schengen states in Europe.  So what does it mean to belong to the Arab world?  Nothing for me.  I don't feel – I feel much more welcome in Italy or France or the UK.467  This highlights the fact that, even with the older generation who may have been personally involved 
in the Arab nationalist movement, the increasingly religious tone of  the Arab world has created 
disillusionment within the Arab Christian communities.  Despite the lack of  belief  in a wider Arab 
nation, there is nevertheless a strong sense of  belonging to a wider Arab culture.  
 
The self-identification as "Arab" is also related quite closely to political affiliation and the level of  
political participation.  For respondents who identified as either supporters of  Fatah or the PFLP 
(or the left more generally), self-identification as "Arab" in the identity card exercise is in the top two 
identifiers nearly 100% of  the time.  For those who do not support any political party, "Arab" is 
either absent or given much lower priority.   This may relate to the view that identifying as "Arab" is 
relating to a specific political philosophy or affiliation as in the following: 'When I have to take a 
stand for the Palestinian situation I would say that I am Arab.'468  In this case this individual uses the 
Arab affiliation to unite behind a particular political struggle or to contextualise his/her argument.  
Whereas when respondents identified as either moderate or very religious, they infrequently 
identified with broader political identities, suggesting that religious identifications took priority over 
                                                 467. Latin Priest 1, "Personal Interview." 468. Orthodox Community Member, "Personal Interview." 
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what they view as being political issues: 'I identify with religion first over regional or political 
issues.'469  
 
Political Affiliation: Although a majority of  respondents identified with either the Arab or Palestinian identities, self-
identification with specific political parties was very low.  Simultaneously, identification with specific 
political leaders or movements within the Christian community was largely contingent upon the 
leader or party's perceived efficacy to a much larger degree than the population as a whole.  As 
Sabella notes,  
Christians in Palestine are certain that leaders will have a difficult time managing Palestinian affairs, but are likely to withdraw their support if  leader(s) they admire do not act properly. Thus their support is conditional on performance to a greater extent than that of  the overall population, about half  of  which would give unconditional support.470    
This is reflective of  Palestinian Christians' high levels of  support for democratic processes, over, for 
example, authoritarianism: 42% of  Muslims wished for a system in which in the largest political 
group rules – without power sharing amongst smaller parties, whereas 86% of  Christians preferred a 
coalition style government formed based upon the percentage of  the total vote gained.471   This also 
reflects the pragmatism of  Christian voters, who were less likely to make political choices based 
upon ideological considerations and were therefore also less likely to self-identify with political 
groups or to support them at all.  According to PCPSR data, over the period between 2000 and 
2010, close to 40% of  Christians supported no party at all.472 This supports Sabella's findings that 
political choice in the Palestinian Christian communities is largely pragmatic, rather than ideological 
in that Christians' party affiliation may change with the development of  new electoral platforms, 
changing social issues, and economics.  This level of  political pragmatism was also reflected, as the 
next chapter will show, in the electoral cycles; Fatah support declined in the early 2000s after the 
failure of  the Oslo Process as the left increased in popularity, only to reverse in the 2012 municipal 
elections when the left failed to make sufficient economic improvements.   
 
Despite the level of  pragmatism shown by Christian voters, there are situations in which material 
utility is supplanted for group pride and the psychological utility of  defensiveness and/or samud as 
                                                 469. Focus Group Bethlehem University Students, "Personal Interview." 470. Sabella, "Comparing Palestinian Christians on Society and Politics: Context and Religion in Israel and Palestine.", 22 471. Ibid. 
472 PCPSR Survey Data 2000-2010 
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discussed in Chapter Three.  One rather instructive example of  this was observed in the fieldwork 
during the 2014 Gaza War. A young Christian man sat and watched the images on Palestinian TV of  
the carnage in Gaza and lamented the horrific loss of  life.  As the image changed to a picture of  a 
Hamas al-Qassam rocket brigade, the young man cheered and said, 'these guys are winning the war!'  
At this point in the war Palestinian causalities were upwards of  900, yet the popular opinion was that 
Palestine, and more critically Hamas, was winning.  I asked the young man, 'do you support Hamas?'  
He responded, 'no as a Christian of  course I cannot, but I respect what they are able to do against 
such a strong enemy.  Abbas has acted like a coward and I cannot support him anymore'.  He was 
referencing Abbas' initial call for calm in the first days of  the war.  Yet, even amongst Christians, 
who most certainly do not accept the ideology of  Hamas, the legitimacy acquired from resistance 
can overtake their religious or pragmatic concerns.  Another respondent explained Christian support 
for Hamas as follows:  'even some Christians they voted for Hamas in 2006.  It was not an act of  
accepting the ideology of  Hamas, but rather was against the failure of  Fatah and the peace 
process.'473  This is supported by PCPSR data, which reveals a growth in the support for Hamas 
during periods of  increased violence.474 
 
Hamas ran in 2006 as an opposition party.  They focused on the corruption of  the Fatah-led PA and 
the ineffectiveness of  the Oslo Accords.  They were able to gain popular support and challenge the 
rule of  Fatah, who, through the Palestinian Authority, had begun to establish a state apparatus.  As 
Fatah and the PA began to lose legitimacy, Hamas was able to challenge the very premises upon 
which the state has been built.  In other words, just as the PFLP once chided the Arab bourgeoisie 
for being pro-western and anti-Arab, Hamas was able to challenge Fatah for being pro-western, anti-
Islamic, and a failed resistance group.475  As such Hamas used the rhetorical value of  samud to 
undermine the authority of  Fatah.  As Wedeen argues, 'there is no necessary connection between 
idioms of  national solidarity and the likelihood of  political stability, as such national imaginings can 
be used to challenge existing regimes as well as to naturalize them.'476  This plays itself  out in the 
contemporary context as a struggle between defining Palestine as a religio-national state versus a 
                                                 473. Latin Priest 1, "Personal Interview." 
474 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research", 2000-2010. 
475 Ibrahim Natil, Hamas Transformation: Opportunities and Challenges (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015). 476. Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen., 20 
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secular-nationalist state, which has obvious consequences for how Palestinian Christians view their 
place in society.477  
 Notions of  Citizenship in a Future State: 
The notion of  citizenship and the shape of  the future Palestinian state were also discussed with 
respondents.  Within the context of  the fieldwork in 2014, the Gaza War and the rise of  Daesh 
(ISIL) had created a palpable sense of  unease within the Christian community.  Just as the Second 
Intifada saw a rise in the public expression of  Christian symbols and communalism in reaction to 
Islamic fundamentalism, the 2014 Gaza War and rise of  Daesh has again created a tense atmosphere 
in which Christians are uncertain of  their future in the Holy Land: 
There are neighbourhoods in Bethlehem where there are no Christians at all... they felt that their Christian presence is threatened in a way so they want to emphasise that 'we are Christians'.  So, for example, 10 years ago you will see big crosses on Christian houses illuminated by night: "we are Christian", what do you mean you know?  What do you want to prove?  I can understand it in that context, but here we're talking about small minority community...  QC: But what was this in reaction to exactly?    I: It's against the increasing popularity of  Islamic movements, and when Hamas, for example won the elections.  But with the Islamisation of  the society, some Christians feel threatened.  They are asking "if  they want an Islamic state, what does it mean for me?"  I am here, I am struggling, I was here before the Muslims, and they want an Islamic state – of  course it's different how they – what they mean by Islamic state, but regardless an Islamic state means a state where I will be second class citizen.  No, you know, people don't want that.  So in reaction to that Islamic movement you will see people who say "no we were here before the Muslims came, we are the Christians, the original inhabitants of  this land, etc, etc." but again you know you will find it, I'm sure you know, but this is a small minority among Christians.478  -- Palestinian Latin Priest, mid-50s, Beit Jala  Whilst the interviewee insists that the Christians he speaks of  are a minority -- the vast and silent 
majority are very much concerned with the shape that citizenship will take in a future state.  This is 
expressed in a number of  ways – at the voting booth, in daily conversations, and in their relationship 
with the Muslim community.  And whilst relations with the Muslim community are generally stable, 
there is, at the same time, an underlying concern about the growing disconnect between how the 
Muslim and Christian communities view the Christian role in the society at its most fundamental 
level.   
 
                                                 477. Lybarger, Identity and Religion in Palestine., 3 478. Latin Priest 1, "Personal Interview." 
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Whilst the Fatah discourse and the PA discourse more generally maintains a notion of  citizenship 
based upon the following: 'Palestinians shall be equal before the law and the judiciary, without 
distinction based upon race, sex, colour, religion, political views or disability', the Hamas discourse 
based, as it is, around the Islamic faith,479 presents an alternative understanding of  the notion of  
citizenship for non-Muslim minorities, in which not all citizens are necessarily equal in all aspects of  
the law.480  The concern for Christians in a future state – regardless of  which party is in control – is 
not whether or not the state is religious or secular, but merely that the Christian citizens maintain 
equal citizenship rights and duties.  As expressed by one respondent:  
I was in a lecture or something at Najah University In Nablus. And a young man, very nice young man, said "yeah we know that we are brothers and sisters and for us Muslims we should care about Christians --this is our duty and we should protect them".  And I said "protect them from whom?  Why should we be protected?  Does he want to make me the weak part?"  No I don't want to be protected.  I want to share and to protect each other – to be equal.  He was in good faith you know; he wanted to show you know that it's our duty as Muslims, etc.  But this is the view of  Hamas – that we should protect the Christians, etc.481  The notion that Christians do not need added protection as minorities was expressed in a number of  
interviews and this notion covered not only their feeling that they did not need protection for their 
person and property, but also that they did not feel that they need, for example, a quota system to 
ensure their political representation.  Rather, the vast majority were against any and all special 
treatment by the state because they felt that it set them apart from the rest of  the nation: 
 We hope that [a future state] will be a state where citizens are equal in front of  the law. Where Christians are considered as full citizens – we don't need protection as a minority – we want to be protected as citizens -- like any other. This is all what we need – not more. To be full citizens with full rights and full duties without distinction.482  And this issue of  citizenship "without distinction" is a crucial one indeed.  Following the March 
2014 decision to remove religion from the Palestinian ID cards, respondents were asked whether 
they felt this decision benefited them: 
 
                                                 479. Although the 2006 Hamas electoral platform was perhaps a more pragmatic assertion of Islamic hegemony, in which it insisted that equal rights would be guaranteed under a Hamas government, it continued to frame religious tolerance in an Islamic context: 'Our list [the change and reform list] adopts a number of invariables that stem from the Islamic frame of reference.  We believe these invariable to be unanimously agreed upon not only by our Palestinian people but also by our Arab and Islamic umma', echoing its 1988 statement 'Only under the shadow of Islam could the members of all regions coexist in safety and security for their lives, properties and rights', in which Islam is very much viewed as the primary source of truth and power (1988 Hamas Charter). 480. Palestinian National Authority, "Basic Law," ed. Palestinian National Authority (2002). 481. Latin Priest 1, "Personal Interview." 482. Latin Bishop, "Personal Interview." 
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This is beautiful. This is very important. And I don't think that they mean something bad with this, but they mean that we are one people – you are a Palestinian, you are a citizen, which means that you share equal rights with others – you have equal rights and equal duties with others. I don't need to know your religion. Maybe some people maybe say "we need to know"; no we don't need to know. We are human beings and we live in this society that should give us equal rights.483  
And indeed, when delving more deeply into the roots of  the contrasting notions of  citizenship, 
nearly every respondent mentioned the fact that religion is part of  the Palestinian national identity, 
regardless of  whether or not they actually practiced their faith.  Whilst respondents were hesitant or 
would outright refuse that they were not equal under the law within the context of  the PA, they were 
often quick to point out that equality and citizenship held slightly different meanings within the 
context of  the Middle East. 
QC: Would you characterise the Christian community as second-class within the legal framework of  the PA?   I: I wouldn't.  You know like when people hear sometimes expressions like "second-class" they have sometimes a baggage in their minds. So I would say that there is -- there isn't equality in every aspect of  the law. Now you want to say ok that's a second-class citizen.  But it's not like a second-class citizen.  Let's say if  I was applying for university. We will both be accepted regardless of  our faith. But let's say, I gave an example about [religious] conversion, then it's not equal. So there are aspects that need to be challenged in the law.484  
Regarding aspects of  the Basic Law relating to the treatment of  minorities, respondents were asked 
about the quota system itself  in relation to the concepts of  equality, tolerance and citizenship.  The 
vast majority of  those asked about the quota system were ultimately against it – with the view that it 
set them apart from the rest of  the nation.  And indeed several respondents mentioned the fact that 
the quota districts do not match the realities of  Christian demography, in which Christians are 
guaranteed the post of  mayor in 10 municipalities, in addition to six seats on the Palestinian 
Legislative Council, despite making up less than one percent of  the total population:485 
QC: Do you think things like having a certain number of  reserved seats in parliament and municipalities is a good thing or necessary?  I: Yes and no because if  we didn't have the quota we wouldn't have anybody in parliament – nobody would be elected of  course because of  our number. But from the other side, look at Bethlehem city for example; we are 20-22% of  the community, why the mayor should be Christian? Is this democracy?  No.  But again 
                                                 483. CRO Employee 2, "Personal Interview." 484. Palestinian Academic, "Personal Interview." 
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Arafat wanted this to happen in 12 municipalities and village councils in the West Bank but again we need to do more as Christians.'486  
Respondents also indicated that they felt the quota system provided a short-term fix for the problem 
of  an evolving government, as well as the public's understanding of  citizenship.  That is to say that 
they felt that with the current social context, issues like tribalism and religion often play a more 
significant role in electoral decisions than, say, the actual platform on which a candidate runs.  
Therefore, some felt that a Christian candidate would be defined primarily by his or her being 
Christian rather than their platform. 
QC:  You have reserved seats for Christians in the legislative council. Do you think this is good or necessary?   I: I look at it positively because I think it's like sometimes with a female quota, if  you don't have one, not only here but abroad, women often will not be elected. And so quota is important until really perceptions of  people are changed.'487  And indeed the feeling that, in order for a quota system to no longer be necessary a major change 
would have to take place in the way that people view their leadership, was expressed in this response 
to a question about Christians being able to attain high level positions in the PA: 
 I: I think it would be difficult to have a Prime Minister.  We [Christians] are only half  of  one percent of  the population.  I think we could have maybe three or four ministers, but the Prime Minister would be difficult because his duties are different.  And he has to do some things that Christians can't do.    QC: Like what?  I: Like praying and official things like meeting Muslim leaders; it is important that he be a Muslim.  We can understand this.  But we have ministers.  QC: So there are certain duties for the PM that they must be Muslim for?  I: Yes it is not easy for the PM to be a Christian.  It is difficult but I think maybe if  we had a genius PM that is a Christian maybe...I don't know...the identity of  people will have to change.  But at this moment I think it is difficult.488  
Those who have been elected under the quota system do ultimately represent the interests of  the 
entire community – both Christian and Muslim alike.  But again, there is a slight disconnect, perhaps, 
between the view of  Christian MPs and community leaders who view equal rights and                                                  486. CRO Employee 1, "Personal Interview." 487. Lutheran Priest, "Personal Interview." 488. Municipal Politician, interview by Quinn Coffey2014, Bethlehem. 
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constitutionalism in a way that is more in line with international standards and others who perhaps 
view these issues within a different cultural framework – one that is informed both by historic 
hegemony of  Islamic culture and the even older tribal systems that inform it.    
 
However, the general impression given by Christian MPs was that they were treated with equal 
respect and dignity as their Muslim peers and even that religion was not a topic that came up within 
their time in the Legislative Council.   
Well my experience is that a Palestinian who enters the parliament is representing all the people. Even though when I was elected – I was elected on the Christian quota seat for Jerusalem. But when you look at things really, and I remember from the year and a half  in which we had sessions, when I was speaking, I was speaking on behalf  of  my people – all of  them and not on behalf  of  the Christians. And the experience in the parliament was that I am accepted as a Palestinian representing other Palestinians and not as a Christian.489  When respondents were asked about the future Palestinian state, i.e. whether they preferred it to be 
secular or religious, one-state or two-state, etc., most were unable to give specific answers as to the 
shape they would like the state to take.  Understandably, their main concern was with ending the 
Israeli Occupation and having the freedom to choose the shape of  their government without the 
interference of  the Israeli or international authorities.  This is not to say that respondents did not 
have opinions on these topics, but rather that they had difficultly articulating specific desires for a 
future state because ending the Occupation was such a pressing concern.  When asked more broadly 
about their main concerns for a future state, respondents mentioned equal rights and the economy 
most frequently.   Equal rights, they thought, should be constitutionally guaranteed, but also 
reflected in the state’s definition of  citizenship – which must guarantee equal rights and duties 
regardless of  religious, ethnic, gender or other differences.    
 
When asked about preferences for a one or two-state solution, respondents had more to say.  One 
particular trend that emerged was that a far higher number of  young respondents supported the 
one-state solution than those over 30.  And the main reasons behind this were the lack of  freedom 
of  movement that they felt.   
I-1: I think in my opinion that we need a one state solution and a one state solution is really hard to get because for two state solution it's almost like how we are living right now and nowadays we don't have anything -- we don't have lands.  We can't go to the beach, we can't go to Haifa, we can't go to Jerusalem...  
                                                 489. Palestinian Politician 2, "Personal Interview." 
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I-3: We can't go to our lands.  I-1: And go and leave anywhere except with permits.  QC: Is the one state solution a popular idea here?  I-1: Yeah I think it is a popular idea because like we want to go without having permits.  For you it's really easy to go..  I-3: When you want to go travel anywhere you just buy a ticket and go.  Here we have to wait one month to have a visa, then we buy the ticket if  we got it.'490  
Others viewed the two state solution as a prerequisite for the ultimate goal of  a one state solution – 
but most recognised that at this point the two-state solution was no longer viable.   
QC: Is the ultimate goal a one-state or two-state solution?  I: The two-state is not functioning.  The one-state is still rejected, even by some Palestinians.  By many in fact.  Because people still need – they feel that they need to have their own national aspirations, they don't want to mix.  At least for awhile – you never know. Many people say that the two-state solution is a prerequisite for the one-state.  But the two state-solution is not viable – it's dead.  Even Cameron a few days ago said it's not possible.  Of  course we said this 10 years ago.  One of  the British organisations said this 10 years ago in 2004 – Christian Aid.  You know.  They said this about the viability of  the two-state and Cameron said this just yesterday.  So this is not viable and of  course the one-state I would say would bring justice to all.  Especially it would give the chance to give Palestinian refugees a chance to return to where they belong.  So you are attacking the root causes of  the problem, which is the ethnic cleansing of  the Palestinian people.  The two-state solution will not solve the problem.  We have 6.5, 6.7 million refugees.  What about those people?  If  you believe in human rights, you have to support those rights.'491  Similarly, other respondents felt that, whilst the one-state solution is the ideal, both Israelis and 
Palestinians were simply not ready for it.  Rather, they suggested that a protracted transitional period 
was needed before both sides could accept one another as equals. 
QC: Do you have a preference for a one or two-state solution or maybe another alternative?  I: No.  Until now I think we should opt just on the two-state solution.  I would never live under a one-state solution now because even if  we lived under a one-state solution we will be oppressed.  Now.  Look at the history of  Europe after the First and Second World Wars, they closed their borders each small country because you need time after a problem to process it.  And now it's open.  So the two-state solution is better right now because I will not be able now...if  I am always a Christian I will try to love this soldier that I meet every day.  I love him as a person, but I hate what he is doing.  Yeah?  The Kairos no?  But we are not prepared to live in one state now.  So the two-state solution with boundaries and each party should prepare 
                                                 490. Focus Group Bethlehem University Students, "Personal Interview." 491. CRO Employee 2, "Personal Interview." 
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maybe I don't know after 10, 20, 50, 100, 200 years we can open these borders, but nowadays it will not work.  Never.'492  Several respondents also indicated that their perspective has shifted somewhat dramatically on this 
issue over the past few years.  As hope dwindled after the Oslo process and the violence of  the 
Second Intifada, many had felt that their somewhat uncompromising position on the peace process 
had evolved out of  anger in some cases, apathy in others, maturity, desperation or even exhaustion at 
the repeated disappointments.   
QC: In terms of  one-state or two-state, the role of  Christians in the state, secularism, law, etc.  What is your opinion on these issues?  I: The Oslo framework, the First Intifada framework -- what we grew up knowing is what brings peace to this holy land.  In the last maybe five or seven years my own theology has shifted to see that it's much broader than this, it's bigger than this and much more important than just finding a political solution.  It's about how can we create this space where the communities in this land begin to honour the equal rights of  the others who live here in peace and dignity and respect and trust. And that is where my politics plays out.  And so I don't care one state or two-state, that is what I'm after, we restore relations between the Palestinians, Israelis, Jews, Christians, Muslims -- whatever identities that people want to affiliate themselves with.  Because the way things work now, the one state and the two-state solutions are non-working solutions so how can you get any of  these to work.'493  -- CRO Leader, mid 40s, Bethlehem  For most respondents, it ultimately matters very little how peace is achieved, just that it is achieved 
in the first place.  The decades of  non-action on the part of  the peace process has created a sort of  
air of  caution when discussing the future.  And indeed for the Palestinian Christian and Muslim 
youth alike, there are very real issues with talking about the future in a context that is not entirely 
about the Occupation.  Obviously, because the daily realities of  Palestinian life are an almost 
continuous reminder of  the Occupation, it will be a major rhetorical element, but there was concern 
amongst some respondents that they must seek to end the monopoly that Occupation rhetoric holds 
on the youth especially.  This was mentioned as a factor contributing to the difficulties respondents 
had when conceptualising the future state.   
QC: How do you define or discuss Palestinian identity and the future with youth in the context of  the Occupation?  I: It's a good question because this is a question that we challenge people with.  Part of  one of  our programmes is to define your identity, what does it mean to be a Palestinian.  One of  the programmes we do I called 'Melding your thinking'.  It's about methodology and a lot of  it is based on identity and understanding 
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one's self.  So with identity when we ask the same question [to the students] 'define yourself' and we get the whole identity linked with victimisation: refugee, occupied, suppressed, you know isolated, that whole understanding of  Palestinian identity.  And then what we ask them to do is to define identity from the future, what does it mean to be a Palestinian in the future, what does the future hope to create? And what does that identity look like?  And of  course it's completely different than this.  So for me defining myself  as a Palestinian I define it as a culture, as social norms, as traditions, as social habits, as art that I want to be part of   -- language, hospitality, because I've been through this process.'494   Conclusion: This chapter has explored how the interplay of  religious, communal, and national identities comes to 
affect social and political action in the Palestinian Christian communities.   The first section, which 
explored the experiences of  communal identity in the Rum Orthodox and Latin communities, revealed 
the ways in which historical issues over the identity of  the Patriarchates are manifested in the daily 
lives of  community members.  In the case of  the Rum Orthodoks community, it continues to face 
many of  the same challenges over identity and the vocation of  the church that it has faced 
historically.  These issues are reflected in the perceived disconnect between the ethnic Greek 
leadership and the community it is meant to serve through conflicts over language (Greek or 
Arabic), the liturgy, and the pastoral efforts made by the institution of  the Patriarchate.  
Consequently, the ethnic Greek leadership and parish priests were viewed in a somewhat negative 
light, whilst the Arab parish priests and leadership were generally well regarded.  At the parish level, 
many respondents felt that the Orthodox church was insulating itself  from the wider Palestinian 
Christian community with its strict rules on attendance for non-members and continued distaste for 
interdenominational marriage.  In this regard, many felt that the church was neglecting the changing 
social reality of  Palestinian Christians, in which intermarriage and ecumenism are becoming the 
norm.  These ongoing conflicts effectively undermined the connection that many individuals felt to 
the church.   
 
By contrast, the relatively positive perceptions of  the Latin Patriarchate and its diverse clergy were 
due largely to the transformation of  the Patriarchate into an essentially Arab institution, with Roman 
influences, combined with its significant social welfare and pastoral institutions.  This positive 
relationship with the institutions of  the Patriarchate was found to have a correspondingly positive 
effect on the experience of  social identity, in that individuals derived both psychological and material 
utility from membership.  This was furthered by the Latin Church’s relative openness to 
interdenominational marriage and attendees from other faiths. 
                                                 494. Ibid. 
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In the case of  both the Latin and Rum Orthodoks communities, respondents expressed a desire for 
their priests to contextualise social and political issues in the Christian faith.  The difficult daily 
realities of  life under Occupation brought up a number of  situations in which respondents were 
uncertain of  how to react as a Palestinian and a Christian.  These situations are particularly 
challenging when moral principles (e.g. non-violence) are confronted with violence, threats to the 
group or oppression. The relative lack of  guidance in that respect contributed to a widening gap 
between individuals and their churches, and also limited the influence that religious leadership had 
on the social and political choices of  their parishioners.  In terms of  identification with the 
ecclesiastical identity, both the Latin and Orthodox communities had a relatively low occurrence of  
self-identification as a Katholik or Rum.  Rather, there was a strong association with the Christian 
community more broadly and the Palestinian nation as a whole, which suggests that most 
respondents consider their “in-group” to be quite broadly defined and inclusive.   
 
Simultaneously, however, the challenges of  statelessness and the increasing public salience of  
religious identification have affected how Palestinian Christians experience political identity and also 
how they participate politically.  Through the examination of  Arabism, citizenship, and political 
support, this chapter has shown that the political pragmatism of  Palestinian Christians is grounded 
in a strong desire for equal rights.  This desire proved so strong in fact that numerous respondents 
were against quotas for Christian seats in the PLC and municipal councils.  This was explained both 
by their ideological commitment to egalitarian notions of  citizenship, and also by their desire to be 
considered full citizens without special distinction as minorities.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, equal 
rights are a top priority for a future state.   
 
However, for those who feel alienated by the growing role of  Islam in the public discourse, they may 
retreat to their communal identities – leading to a decline in overall national solidarity.  If  and when 
Palestinian Christians do retreat to their confessional communities, if  they do not receive sufficient 
guidance in terms of  how their faith can address ongoing social and political issues, then they have 
little incentive to remain in the country.  Social welfare initiatives, whilst providing essential and 
otherwise absent services to these communities, have only provided a short-term solution to the 
more salient existential crises of  demographic decline and identity politics.  Whilst these trends do 
not mean that Palestinian Christians are not committed nationalists or pious Christians, they do 
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suggest that this community feels increasingly alienated by the changing social and political 
landscape.  As the next two chapters discuss, these daily negotiations between communal and 
political identity have important implications for the ways in which Christians participate politically, 
as well as their future in the Holy Land.   
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Chapter Six -- Palestinian Christian Political Participation: Trends and Perspectives on Governance:   As the previous chapter discussed, the impact of  communal identity on political choice is significant.  
However, the relative influence of  church leadership on political choice is increasingly insignificant, 
particularly as evolving social realities (e.g. intermarriage and ongoing conflict) continue to be 
neglected.  Rather, the more salient impact of  communalism on political choice is how individuals 
reconcile their faith and identity as Christians with their political identity as Arab Palestinians. Within 
this context, statelessness, as discussed in Chapter Three, is also a factor because political choices 
have the added weight of  directly impacting the fundamental nature and structure of  a future state.  
This impacts upon social and political action/choice in the Palestinian Christian community in 
several ways.  Firstly, there is a tendency to vote defensively, e.g. voting for Fatah in order to prevent 
Hamas from taking power, despite disagreeing with Fatah's platform.  Secondly, because communal 
identity shapes the social role that individuals take, it also shapes interest and determines which 
choices are socially acceptable, given the social role.495 Finally, when making political choices, 
Palestinian Christians weigh the past performance of  political candidates against the political record 
of  current candidates to a much greater degree than the population in general.496   This suggests that 
Christian voters prioritise the performance and utility of  a party over ideological considerations.  
Political choice then resembles the following hierarchy: 
1. Choice is limited by communal identification – I am a Christian, I cannot vote for Hamas 2. Assessment of  the past performance of  a party – Has this party delivered on its promises? 3. Current material utility of  a party – How capable is this party of  economic and social development? 4. Ideological considerations – Does this party's platform match my own political ideology?  This hierarchy is further evidenced by the significant changes in voting trends over the course of  
2000-2012 election cycles and also by the fact that close to 50% of  Palestinian Christians surveyed 
do not support a political party, despite the fact that voter turnout is frequently close to 80% – 
suggesting that that there is little commitment to specific parties.  Rather, voters tend to change 
party affiliation based the above considerations in each new election cycle.497  This is also affected by 
generational trends as party support falls to close to 30% amongst respondents under the age of  20, 
suggesting that either the youth are less involved politically or that they are exploring modes of  
                                                 495. Sen, "The Fog of Identity.", 287 496. Sabella, "Comparing Palestinian Christians on Society and Politics: Context and Religion in Israel and Palestine." 497. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research", 2000-2010. 
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political participation outside of  the traditional political structures, whether this is online activism, 
street protests, or daily conversations with friends.498 
 
At present, national government in Palestine continues to operate, but is hindered by tax burdens, 
lack of  foreign investment, internal corruption, divided government, and numerous other issues.499  
Although it has not held a voting session since 2007, the Palestinian Legislative Council remains the 
nominal authority next to the President and Prime Minister.  However national elections have not 
taken place since the controversial 2006 legislative elections, in which Hamas won a majority of  
parliamentary seats -- eventually leading to the split between a Hamas-governed Gaza Strip and 
Fatah-governed West Bank.  With Hamas and Fatah now reunited, elections were expected to take 
place at some point during 2014, but have been suspended indefinitely due to non-cooperation 
between the national unity government and the 2014 Gaza War.500  In the period between the 
creation of  the PA in 1994 and present, there have been six elections held in the Palestinian 
Authority:  
• 1996 presidential and legislative council elections • 2004/05 municipal elections • 2005 presidential elections • 2006 legislative elections • 2012 municipal elections  However, the ability of  the PA to govern and provide basic services has declined sharply since the 
early 2000s. As a result, local government, non-governmental organisations, and church-related 
organisations have filled the gap; supplementing social welfare services like education and healthcare 
to Palestinians on a local level – and to a much greater degree in Christian areas.501  This contributes 
to the tendency for Palestinian Christians to be pragmatic voters, but has also led to a greater interest 
in local versus national politics as voters see their local government as more consequential to their 
daily lives.   
 
These factors contribute to the belief  that the central government does not, in fact, provide much in 
the way of  tangible benefit to citizens in Christian areas.  Rather, self-sufficiency and relationships 
                                                 
498 Sabella, "Comparing Palestinian Christians on Society and Politics: Context and Religion in Israel and Palestine." 
499 Ilan Halevi, "Self-Government, Democracy, and Mismanagement under the Palestinian Authority " Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no. 3 (1998). 500. Ahmed Melhem, "Palestinian Elections on Hold until Further Notice," al-Monitor, 28 October 2014. 501. Raheb, Palestinian Christians in the West Bank: Facts, Figures and Trends. 
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with foreign donors account for a sizeable amount of  benefit, not only for the Christian 
communities themselves, but also for the wider Palestinian society.  Therefore, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, numerous respondents were somewhat indifferent to the shape and nature of  the 
government itself  as long as it did not directly interfere with their safety, well being or material 
wealth.  In contrast to the previous chapter, which explored how communal and political identities 
shape choice, this chapter focuses on Christian political trends themselves.  Particular emphasis is 
given to local and student politics, which, as stated above, have a far greater impact on the daily lives 
of  Palestinian Christians.  In addition to exploring broad political trends, this chapter examines party 
support, electoral history, and factors contributing these political trends where discernible.  In the 
first section factors affecting political participation are explored, relying on qualitative data obtained 
during fieldwork.  In the second section electoral trends in legislative, local, and student elections are 
examined after a brief  historical background on the evolution of  electoral politics in Palestine. 
 Factors influencing Christian political participation: Correlating religiosity and political participation: 
Respondents were asked several questions regarding both their level of  religiosity and level of  
political participation, including how they would characterise both from a scale of  'very religious' to 
'not very religious' and 'very political' to 'not very political'.  In all instances they were also asked 
about their family history of  both religiosity and political participation (if  they were aware of  this 
history), what church they belonged to (if  any), and which political party they supported (if  any).  
Although this qualitative data was limited by its relatively low sample size of  20 semi-structured 
interviews, it was supported by ten years of  survey data from the PCPSR, whose findings were 
suggestive of  similar trends across the Palestinian Christian community.502 
 
As figure 1 (below) suggests, there was a negative correlation between reported levels of  religiosity 
and political activism.  Although politicisation was relatively low amongst respondents regardless of  
religiosity, it was considerably lower with respondents who self  identified as moderately or very 
religious. This trend was explained by one respondent as follows:  
 
                                                 
502 PCPSR Survey Data 2000-2010 
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I think many Christians will find that their faith is their ideology.  It's the resource with which to bring about society and change and so forth – it's their motivation.  Whereas if  you become involved with a political party then you've got a competing set of  ideologies often.503  --Latin Priest, mid-50s, Bethlehem  
  figure 1.0 
 
This suggests that religion and politics were seen by some respondents as being mutually exclusive 
forces. For those respondents who did identify as being simultaneously religious and political, the 
process of  negotiating exactly how to participate in political life as a Christian was difficult due to 
the perceived contradictions between Christian principles like non-violence and forgiveness, for 
example, and active resistance. As one Palestinian Catholic priest related: 
Palestinian Christians try to combine – not always successfully of  course – being Palestinian and being Christian.  I say not always successfully because there are Palestinian Christians who do believe in violence or who have participated in violent acts.  And they feel this is their duty as Palestinians, regardless of  their faith, which preaches non-violence.  And the question that's always important – and this is a kind of  tension between being a Palestinian and being a Christian -- is how can you be involved in public and political life 
                                                 503. Latin Priest 2, interview by Quinn Coffey2014. 
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here as a Palestinian AND a Christian.  That is, how can you participate in political and public life not as a 'secular' Palestinian, as many of  us have done, but rather fully as a Christian Palestinian.504  And indeed this notion that, in order for one to participate politically as a Palestinian Christian one 
must forgo the public expression of  their Christian faith is backed up, to some degree, by the data, 
which suggests a relatively low level of  pious nationalism amongst Christians.505  There are, of  
course, a few examples to the contrary, such as Mitri Raheb, Naim Ateek, Atallah Hanna, and former 
Patriarch Michel Sabaah – all highly political public figures who have integrated their religious belief  
into their political activism.  However, the overwhelming majority of  Christian Palestinian political 
figures of  note have eschewed religion in exchange for leftist politics.506  The reasons behind this 
have varied over time, but, generally speaking, have had to do with issues of  identity – whether this 
was a struggle to define pan-Arabism in secular terms or disillusionment with their confessional 
communities.  At the grassroots level, the limited guidance that the lay community receives from 
their religious leadership on how to integrate their faith into their political lives fosters an 
environment in which Christians are increasingly either political or religious, but rarely both 
simultaneously.507   
 
The church leadership has, at times, published joint statements elucidating a Palestinian Christian 
response to the Conflict.  The 2009 Kairos document was both a theological response and call to 
action for Palestinian Christians, which framed the current plight of  Palestinians within a Christian 
moral framework. In this sense, the Palestinian Kairos attempted to fill the gap missing at the parish 
level as it simultaneously condemned violent resistance and affirmed the right of  Palestinians to self-
defence:  
Resistance to the evil of  occupation is integrated, then, within this Christian love that refuses evil and corrects it. It resists evil in all its forms with methods that enter into the logic of  love and draw on all energies to make peace. We can resist through civil disobedience. We do not resist with death but rather through respect of  life. We respect and have a high esteem for all those who have given their life for our nation. And we affirm that every citizen must be ready to defend his or her life, freedom and land.508  
                                                 504. Latin Priest 1, "Personal Interview." 505. Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen. 506. George Habash, Isa al-Isa, Michel Aflaq, etc. 507. This view is also supported by Lybarger who describes this as 'apolitical piety'.  Lybarger, "For Church or Nation? : Islamism, Secular-Nationalism, and the Transformation of Christian Identities in Palestine." 508. Kairos Palestine, "Karios: A Moment of Truth, a Word of Faith, Hope and Love from the Heart of Palestinian Suffering," news release, 2009, http://www.kairospalestine.ps/content/kairos-document. 
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In general, the Kairos document was well received by respondents who saw its value not only as an 
important statement against injustice, but also as a guide for Christian participation in political 
activism. As one of  the authors of  the Kairos explained: 
I remember when we presented the Kairos document here in Beit Jala, there was a young man from the PFLP, who's in engaged in politics, spent a few years in prison, doesn't believe in violence but you know he is a Christian Palestinian who is engaged in Palestinian politics. And when we presented the Karios he said, “you know now I can see that I can be a Christian and a Palestinian at the same time; my engagement in politics, etc. -- my Christian faith gives me courage.”509  -- Latin Priest, mid-50s, Beit Jala  Therefore, it is clear that the religious leadership is conscious of  the often-difficult position 
occupied by Palestinian Christians in the political context.  However, the inconsistency and 
infrequency of  these messages, combined with the challenges that ecumenism presents for the 
church leadership, has dampened the effect that initiatives like Kairos have had on a Christian-based 
activism.  The overall effect of  religiosity on political participation is therefore a tendency towards 
what Lybarger termed, 'apolitical piety' or the tendency for religious individuals to remain somewhat 
detached from the political field.510  This does not mean that religious individuals did not engage 
rhetorically with Palestinian nationalism or support the right to self-determination, but rather that 
they often had difficulty reconciling their religious and political lives.  This was also affected, as the 
next section discusses, by generational trends.  
 
Generational factors: 
Data has indicated that Palestinian Christians under the age of  40 are less inclined to become 
politically active than their parents – particularly when it comes to support for specific political 
parties.511  Whilst younger respondents indicated that they were hesitant to get involved primarily 
because of  issues of  personal safety, older respondents viewed Palestinian youth as increasingly self-
interested and apathetic.  
The younger generation is apathetic about politics. Yes they do support their country but they don't see the value in getting involved in the parties. Most people that are younger than the Second Intifada age that are Christian are just trying to avoid anything that might harm their future and politics is seen as one of  the things that might do that – there's no value for it.512                                                  509. Latin Priest 1, "Personal Interview." 510. Lybarger, "For Church or Nation? : Islamism, Secular-Nationalism, and the Transformation of Christian Identities in Palestine." 511. This observation was made based upon qualitative and quantitative data from the fieldwork and PCPSR survey data. 512. Orthodox Community Member, "Personal Interview." 
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 -- Rum Orthodoks community member, mid 30s, Jerusalem  Although they had political feelings and often privately supported one party or another, respondents 
often suggested that to do so publicly may endanger what they worked so hard for in school and at 
their workplaces.   
You see that a majority -- the majority of  people that you deal with on the Christian side get involved, but they get involved if  it doesn't involve political affiliation – some people would disagree with me and say look at Beit Sahour, Beit Jala, and Bethlehem where you have people on the Left. Yes, my research showed that more young Christians are really to the left of  the political spectrum you know. Yes they are engaged and yes they get arrested and yes once in awhile you get someone who is killed by the Israeli authorities. But in general the tendency is to remain non-violent and work low-key for young people.513  -- Palestinian Christian MP, mid-60s, Jerusalem  And indeed the issue of  personal safety greatly affects the youths' desire to make their political 
opinions known.  And this is an important distinction, between having political opinions, which 
nearly all of  the respondents had, and expressing them publicly: 
 I-1: We watch political issues and the news but we're not into that much of  politics.  I-3: We don't care very much. Because if  you give your opinion maybe you will be in danger.  QC: From who or what?  I-3: From the parties and everybody else.  QC: So you don't support any party?  I-1: No.  QC: Would you say that it is common with your peers not to support a specific party?  I-2: No we have some friends who are very political and interested.  But not all of  us.  I-1: It's almost 50-50, so people who are – they go and participate with political issues.  And people who don't are not interested in political issues.514  -- Focus group with Bethlehem University students aged 19-22   
                                                 513. Palestinian Politician 2, "Personal Interview." 514. Focus Group Bethlehem University Students, "Personal Interview." 
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Safety is not the only issue.  Indeed many respondents felt that joining a political party limited their 
freedom in terms of  maintaining independent political and social opinions – i.e. if  they join a party 
then they are wedded to the ideology of  that party in the public sphere. Regardless of  age, 
respondents indicated that they felt most of  the major political parties had similar ideological 
perspectives and that political choices may also reflect tribal affiliation more than acceptance of  
party ideology; a fact which then affects one's ability to hold opinions counter to the party, clan or 
family.  
 QC: Do you support any political party?   I: No I don't. I like to be independent and I like to have the authority and the possibility to say what I like and so on.   QC: So are you saying that if  you're a member of  a party you don't have as much freedom to say things?   I: Yeah.   QC: Why do you think that is?   I: Because that's part of  the culture here if  you belong to a party, you have to stick to their ideology. Anyhow if  you look at all the political parties right now, there aren't really great ideological differences so it becomes very tribal and I have problems with all tribal issues.515  -- CRO leader, mid-50s, Bethlehem  
The tribal element516, both in the Christian and Muslim communities, was also expressed in 
interviews within the municipalities themselves, in which it was revealed that city council members 
                                                 515. Lutheran Priest, "Personal Interview." 
516 Tribalism remains a powerful, but subtle political force in Palestinian politics.  Robinson distinguishes between three types of clan-like groups in Palestine: tribes, clans, and notable families.  The tribal groups are descended from nomadic Bedouin tribes, whose importance has diminished with the increased urbanisation of the 19th and 20th centuries.  In the contemporary context, the influence of the traditional tribes on politics is far less significant than it is in neighbouring Jordan where there continue to be large numbers of nomadic or semi-nomadic groups.  Clans (hama’il), which consist of larger numbers of extended families with a shared ancestry, are a far more salient political force.  This is particularly true when several clans unite against a political group, like Hamas in Gaza, or when elections are organised according to district.  In the case of the latter, clans, who may demographically dominate a district, can shape the outcome of elections merely because of their number.  Finally, notable families who typically trace their lineages to important administrative or economic roles in the Ottoman bureaucracy, have typically aligned themselves with the ruling authority in a mutually beneficial relationship. A majority of the most permanent families including the ‘Husayni, Nashashibi, Dajani, Abd al-Hadi, Tuqan, Nabulsi, Khoury, Tamimi, Khatib, Ja’bari, Masri, Kan’an, Shaq’a, Barghouthi, Shawwa, Rayyes’ and other families, have aligned with Fatah in recent decades because they have an economic interest in a stable state.  However, the breakdown of the state in recent years has increased the relative importance of clans because, as Robinson notes, clans tend to be powerful ‘when the state is weak, while notables benefit the most from a stronger 
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were "elected" from amongst the most prominent clans, who would take turns nominating tribal 
leaders for council seats with very little room for outsiders.  Indeed, as noted by Signoles, 'The 
formation of  municipal staff  in Palestine traditionally responds to two major stakes: first, ensuring 
the representation of  families (hamay’il) in municipal bodies; and second the creation, preservation or 
strengthening of  patronage networks for the competing actors in a system where proximity to the 
political centre guarantees financial income, the attainment of  micro-agreements in the case of  
power struggles, and sometimes, a degree of  social prestige.'517  This is also reflected by Sabella who 
characterises the PLO policy of  co-opting family elites, as 'mutually reinforcing', in that the PA 
needs these elites to secure support at the local level, whilst simultaneously helping to preserve the 
status of  elites in society.518  In this sense, party affiliation becomes merged with clan and familial 
networks and comes to influence the way in which individuals make political choices.  Choosing not 
to support a political party can then be a rejection of  traditional power networks.  However, the 
relative influence of  the clan leadership has declined along with their economic and social role. As 
Robinson argues ‘the claims of the humula [clan] patriarchs to have the final say in the decision 
making process are now widely seen by Bayt Sahourians as anachronistic, and those people with 
nationalist credentials earned in the confrontation with Israel are seen as having a greater mandate 
for communal authority’519 This was reflected by younger respondents in particular, who were 
vaguely aware of their clan membership and structure, but dismissed any significant pressure to 
adhere to clan authority. 
 
An opposing perspective that does not explicitly cite the role of  tribalism, is the declining role of  
group influence on the individual: 
QC: You mentioned the rise of  individualism with younger people – is there more of  a focus on local versus national politics?   I: Yes I think the whole concept of  loyalty and identity is becoming smaller. So if  now you ask a young person 'who are you?' he will say 'I'm Quinn Coffey' – he used to say I'm a Palestinian or I'm a member of  
                                                                                                                                                             state’.  In the Christian context, clans and notables continue to play a political role, but as Kårtveit notes, ‘today hamula ties have little operational relevance in these communities, but each hamula consists of several extended families or sub-clans, and such families, referred to as ‘aeeilah’, still constitute one’s primary base of social support’, particularly in times of uncertainty or open conflict. See  Glenn E. Robinson, "Palestinian Tribes, Clans, and Notable Families " Strategic Insights 7, no. 4 (2009).; Kårtveit, Dilemmas of Attachment: Identity and Belonging among Palestinian Christians., 39; Glenn E. Robinson, Building a Palesitnian State: The Incomplete Revolution (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997). 517. Aude Signoles, "Local Government in Palestine," Focales: Agence Française de Développement 2 (2010)., 32 518. Bernard Sabella, "Palestine, Jordan, Israel: Building a Base for Common Scholarship and Understanding in the New Era of the Middle East " Passia  (1997). 
519 Robinson, Building a Palesitnian State: The Incomplete Revolution., 73 
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PFLP, or I'm a member of  Fatah or...so the identity is shrinking.  Or identifying with their denomination; who are you? 'I'm Christian or I'm Roman Catholic or I'm Lutheran.'  And this has a lot to do with the fact that the group influence on the individual is waning.'520  -- CRO leader, mid 50s, Beit Sahour  A possible outcome of  declining group influence and interest is a diminished willingness to engage 
in altruistic behaviour in the political sphere, e.g. not getting involved politically for fear of  it 
affecting personal well being.  Although this trend was observed to a limited extent, it appeared to 
be less influenced by an inherent self-interest of  the youth, and rather the psychology of  perpetual 
military occupation.    
When I worked for [local NGO], there were Orthodox and Catholics who were very passionate politically, but the idea that they would go off  and join a party like their parents is unheard of.  There is a frustration, there is anger about Gaza and other parts of  the country. But a) we've got problems of  our own and b) we're not going to fall into the traps that our parents did of  just blindly following parties without results.521  -- CRO worker, late 30s, Jerusalem  
In other words, decades of  hopeless and fruitless political struggle have created a certain level of  
apathy that makes Palestinian Christian youth less likely to endanger their futures without a plausible 
positive outcome.  Again this was particularly true of  party affiliation, which held little utility for a 
number of  respondents: 
I think the younger generation within the Muslim and Christian community are less political.  So even when you hear the demonstrations in Bethlehem, I remember if  this happened years ago a thousand kids would be at Rachel's Tomb doing this night thing that they do.  Now 50-100 show up.  So people are in a place of  yeah – it's the challenge of  identity and who is leading us and why do we do the things that we do and why should we sacrifice if  nothing is going to come out of  the sacrifice.522  -- CRO leader, mid-40s, Bethlehem  This again highlights the link between political activism and tangible benefit, as those who have 
grown up during the Intifada and Oslo eras have not necessarily seen how political activism can 
produce economic or social change.  As discussed in the next chapter, this is also related to the 
tendency for Palestinian Christians to be wealthier and more socially mobile than a majority of  their 
Muslim peers.  The focus then becomes far more internal, as they pursue higher education and 
white-collar jobs, which may be endangered by political participation. 
                                                 520. CRO Employee 2, "Personal Interview." 521. Orthodox Community Member, "Personal Interview." 522. CRO Employee 3, "Personal Interview." 
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For their part, young respondents primarily framed their hesitation towards political activism in 
terms of  safety and freedom of  movement. 
QC: You don't participate in politics because of  safety issues?  I-1: Yeah because it does affect us a lot.  For me I think first of  the permit because...  QC: The permit to travel to Jerusalem?  I-1: Jerusalem yes.  If  we are into any political party they would for example – or if  we participated into any political demonstrations...  I-3: Even with the Palestinian police it may be a danger for you.  If  you are not with them, it makes problems.523  Therefore, when making the decision whether or not to be politically active, youth weighed the 
relative costs of  such a choice with their current and future well being.  Again this reflects the 
pragmatism of  the Palestinian Christian community in regards to political participation.  As the next 
section explores, these factors, as well as those described in the previous chapter, have an important 
effect on political trends within the Palestinian Christian community.   
 
Political Trends: As discussed in the introduction, there is a relatively low level of  confidence in national politics 
within the Palestinian Christian communities.  This stems from the government’s inability to provide 
basic services (e.g. economic development, infrastructure, and healthcare) to its citizens, but it is also 
related to history of  national elections since the creation of  the PA in 1994.  These elections have 
seen the gradual splintering of  the national political field, leading, in 2007, to a split between the 
Hamas-led Gaza Strip and the Fatah-led West Bank.  As a consequence, the PLC, which was 
intended to be an institutional check on the power of  the executive branch, has been suspended 
indefinitely.524  The President of  the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, now claims legislative, judicial, and 
executive powers, with the Hamas-led Gaza government doing the same.  
 
As a result, local elections have tended to be a more influential political force in the daily lives of  
Palestinians Christians, as they have the ability to more immediately and effectively reflect 
                                                 523. Focus Group Bethlehem University Students, "Personal Interview." 
524 National Democratic Insititute, "Final Report on the Palestinian Legislative Council Elections," (https://www.ndi.org/files/2068_ps_elect_012506.pdf: NDI, 2006). 
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community-based needs.  Unlike national politics, which hinge largely upon ideological concerns, 
local elections ‘are more service oriented; they would respond to local community needs'.525  
Therefore electoral trends are shaped by pragmatic considerations like the past performance of  
political parties and their current ability to deliver economic development.  This section explores 
major political trends that have emerged over the past decade, with an emphasis on local and student 
politics within the Palestinian Christian communities.  Trends with the 2006 Legislative Elections are 
also briefly discussed for their relevance in gauging how Palestinian Christians have participated in 
national politics.  The remaining sections give a detailed look at the 2004/05 and 2012 municipal 
elections and the 1994 – 2014 student elections in Birzeit and Bethlehem Universities, exploring how 
and why electoral trends have changed over time, and the implications of  these trends on Palestinian 
Christian politics.  
 
2004/05 Elections: 
Background: 
From the beginning of  PA rule in 1994 until the first municipal elections in 2004-2005, city council 
members and mayors were directly appointed through the Ministry of  Local Government (MoLG), 
and only then after lengthy negotiations with the traditional elite in the electoral districts.526  In 
practice, this led to power struggles both at the local and national level between and within families 
as clan leaders protested or ousted those on the extreme left or right in preference for those more to 
the political and social centre.527 Consequently, this led to a stronger showing, prior to 2004, of  
centrist candidates who would, because of  their relationship with the PA and Fatah, not directly "stir 
the pot".  As such, a vast majority of  mayoral and city council appointments in this period were in 
some way affiliated with Fatah, either as party members or maintaining a neutral stance towards 
Fatah.  Naturally the public questioned the legitimacy of  these unelected candidates, particularly in 
light of  the declining popularity of  Fatah in the early 2000s.528  It is therefore unsurprising that the 
2004/05 elections produced significant changes to the political landscape that more accurately 
reflected popular political sentiment at the time.   
                                                 525. Carter Centre, "Palestine Electoral Study Mission Urges Political Reconciliation," news release, 2012, http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/occupied-palestinian-territory-102112.html. 526. Signoles, "Local Government in Palestine.", 30 527. Ibid., 30 528. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "The Palestinian General National Plan: Summary of the Cross-Sectoral Strategy for Palestinian Local Government and Administration Sector," (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2011)., 5 
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In the 2004/05 elections 2,519 candidates competed for 906 seats in 84 municipal and village 
councils. 141 electoral lists were represented.  Despite the decline in Fatah's popularity at the time, 
they managed to win 56% of  total council seats in coalition with the PPP.  Hamas, who had 
boycotted the 2005 presidential elections, won 33% of  total council seats with the PFLP and 
independent parties winning a majority of  the remainder.529   
 
2004/05 election results in Christian-Quota districts 
Whilst Fatah and Fatah-affiliated independents gained the vast majority of  municipal council seats in 
Christian quota districts, the PFLP performed reasonably well in Beit Sahour, Beit Jala, Bethlehem 
and Aboud.  However, apart from the Bethlehem municipality, they were unable to gain a sufficient 
enough majority to win the mayoral appointments in these areas.  Despite the relative popularity of  
the left in Christian quota districts, Fatah was able to gain a significant majority largely due to the 
fact that the three major left parties were unable to form coalition lists in opposition to Fatah.  This 
was a somewhat surprising result considering both the perceived dominance of  the left in Christian 
districts and the very low public opinion of  Fatah at the time -- close to 85% of  respondents to a 
2004 survey by the PCPSR considered the Fatah-led PA to be corrupt.530    
 
However the unique nature of  the electoral process in Christian quota districts allowed the left to 
hold leadership positions in municipalities where Hamas has won a majority.  This is because 
electoral law requires that Christian districts have a Christian mayor regardless of  which party wins 
the election.  Therefore the party with the largest majority in the municipal councils will almost 
always gain the position of  mayor, who is selected by the councils themselves.  In the 2004/05 
elections, Hamas gained a majority of  votes in the Bethlehem municipality, however, because of  the 
Christian quota, were forced to choose a Christian mayor.  Hamas opposed Fatah and therefore 
elected the PFLP-affiliated Victor Bartaseh as mayor, despite the fact that Fatah actually gained 
more votes than the PFLP.531  However, this had a disastrous effect on economic development in the 
Bethlehem region during this period because the PFLP and Hamas were both listed terrorist 
                                                 529. Palestinian Central Elections Commission, "2004/2005 Election Results,"  Elections.ps. 530. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research", 2000-2010. 531. HCEF, "Bethlehem Mayor Says He’ll Preserve City," news release, 2005, http://hcef.org/1425-bethlehem-mayor-says-hell-preserve-city/. 
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organisations by the US government at the time.532   As such, foreign aid to the city dwindled from 
2004-2012.  Respondents cited this and other similar examples as a major reason for their shift away 
from the left and towards Fatah in the 2012 elections – again reflecting the pragmatism of  Christian 
voters.   
 
2006 Legislative Elections: 
Background: 
The 2006 Legislative Elections marked a significant turning point in Palestinian politics, as they were 
the first national election in which Hamas and the political left participated.  These parties had 
boycotted previous elections largely because of fundamental disagreements with the Oslo Accords 
and the peace process, including the right of return for refugees and commitment to a two-state 
solution.533  However, the strong performance of Hamas and leftist candidates in the 2004/05 Local 
Elections proved to their party leaderships that they could present a serious challenge to the 
hegemony of Fatah in the West Bank and Gaza. 534  Ultimately seven major parties competed for 132 
seats on the PLC, with the following table detailing the results. 
 
Party Seats 
Hamas 74 
Fatah 45 
Abu Ali Mustafa (PFLP) 3 
The Alternative (DFLP, FIDA, PPP) 2 
Independent Palestine (Mustafa Barghouti) 2 
Third Way (Salam Fayyad) 2 
Independents 4 
535 
Following the Hamas victory and subsequent splintering of the West Bank and Gaza governments, 
the PLC was suspended indefinitely and no longer functions as a legislative body.  As the deputy 
chairman of  the PLC, Hassan Khreisheh described in an interview with al-Monitor: 
                                                 532. Kuttab, "Why Do U.S. Officials Boycott Bethlehem's Mayor?." 
533 Michael Broning, Political Parites in Palestine: Leadership and Thought (2013). 
534 Salih Bicakci, "The Palestinian Parliamentary Legislative Elections 25 January 2006," Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 9, no. 1 (2007). 
535 Manal A. Jamal, "Beyond Fateh Corruption and Mass Discontent: Hamas, the Palestinian Left and the 2006 Legislative Elections," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 40, no. 3 (2013)., 275 
  
  155
The legislative branch [in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank] endures only in name. The legitimacy of  the Legislative Council and its members has been battered since its marginalization in 2007, with President Abbas assuming the council’s powers. As a result, ours [the Legislative Council] now is more akin to a totalitarian regime ruled by one individual. The prevailing sentiment is that President Abbas does not want to convene the legislature, because its absence facilitates his job. He now has assumed the powers of  the Legislative Council, the presidency, the premiership and the head of  security. Consequently, the principle of  separation of  powers has been undermined in his favor.536  
This, consequently, has contributed to the lack of confidence most Palestinians have with the 
Palestinian Authority, and with President Abbas.537   
 
2006 Legislative Elections in Christian Quota Districts: 
Palestinian Christians are granted six seats on the Legislative Council, in accordance with the 2005 
Presidential Decree on the Allocation of PLC Seats to Electoral Districts.538  Christians elected Fatah 
candidates in all but one of their quota districts with the Gaza representative Husam Altaweel 
running as an independent. Although the Fatah-led PA was increasingly viewed as corrupt in PCPSR 
surveys leading up to the election, the dominance of Fatah shows that Christians continued to 
believe that they were the best available option in an election where Hamas was participating. 539 This 
is also reflected in the local election data, where Fatah remains the most popular party, largely 
because of its relationship with foreign donors and positions in the peace process.   
 
2012 Elections: 
Background: 
When the mandate of  the municipal governments elected in 2004/05 expired in 2008, the MoLG 
extended their mandates for a period initially intended to be one year.  This allowed the MoLG, 
'through ratification of  the cabinet to dissolve the elected councils whose mandates electoral periods 
have expired, and to appoint a transitional committee to run local council/communities...', which 
gave the ministry the authority to control both elections and the appointment of  municipal 
councils.540   Although the PA's initial aim in creating the MoLG was decentralisation, these measures 
had the opposite effect.  The political climate following the 2007 Hamas takeover of  the Gaza Strip, 
                                                 
536 Ahmed Melhem, "Palestine's Crippled Legislative Authority,"  Al-Monitor (2015). 
537 PCPSR Survey Data 2000-2010 
538 Raheb, Palestinian Christians in the West Bank: Facts, Figures and Trends., 40 
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followed by the removal of  dozens of  Hamas members from government posts in the West Bank 
created an environment in which municipal elections were low on the list of  priorities for the PA.  
Local elections scheduled in both 2010 and 2011 were announced and then cancelled resulting in 
four of  the electoral lists taking legal action against the MoLG's right to cancel elections.  The 
Palestinian High Court ultimately decided in favour of  the electoral lists stating that once elections 
had been announced, they could not be cancelled.541  However this did not prevent President Abbas 
from issuing a presidential decree in 2011 suspending elections until the situation on the ground 
(and presumably within his party) improved.542  West Bank municipal elections were announced 
finally in 2012.  
 
Hamas boycotted the 2012 elections citing the lack of  political reconciliation as a major factor.  
Similarly, a number of  Fatah members split from their official lists and ran either as independents or 
as part of  coalitions in a number of  cities – despite apparent threats from the Fatah Central 
Committee that 'any party cadres who participated in alternate lists would be fired', which, according 
to the Carter Centre, happened to at least 27 candidates.543  Additionally, the changes in electoral 
procedures to a closed-list system spawned dozens of  additional "independent" lists of  candidates 
from quasi-independent and coalition parties. 
 
This proliferation of  lists was explained by one anonymous member of  the PLC as follows, 'some 
political parties established affiliated "independent" lists in order to gain the most possible seats on 
the local councils.'544  In other words, because the closed-list system uses the Sainte-Laguë method, 
in which only the top names on each list are favoured and granted seats (if  multiple lists run), larger 
political parties would increase their odds of  gaining a majority in city councils if  they split into 
several smaller lists.  In a municipal council consisting of  13 seats, for example, the first five names 
on a given list will have a much higher chance of  gaining a council seat because the first name is 
guaranteed a seat with each subsequent seat having a smaller chance of  a seat.  If  three lists (A, B, C) 
are competing for 13 seats in this municipal council and list A gets 450 votes, B 350 and C 150, then 
list A gets six seats, B gets 5 seats and C gets 2 seats. If  list A and list C are from the same larger 
party but running as "independents", they will gain a majority on the council and can then control 
                                                 541. Centre, "Palestine Electoral Study Mission Urges Political Reconciliation." 542. Ibid. 543. Ibid. 544. Palestinian Politician 1, interview by Quinn Coffey2014. 
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many of  its policy making decisions – including the appointment of  mayor.  So in this sense the 
proliferation of  "independent" candidates in 2012 should be taken with a grain of  salt, as it often 
reflected political manoeuvring within the national party than any real independence in terms of  
ideology or platform.   
 
As a PLC council member explained, 'often the independent lists reflect the family affiliation where 
one family couldn't have any seats in the top of  their usual list, they therefore create their own list 
with their names at the top to increase their chances of  gaining a seat, which may happen in larger 
families.'545  He also suggested that the opposite might be the case, where a small family may split up 
its members into different lists in order to increase its relative strength within a village where its 
actual material or demographic strength might be weak.   
 
Results: 
As a result of  the change in electoral procedure and the Hamas boycott, 179 of  353 localities could 
only produce one electoral list, and 82 produced no list at all.546  In the case of  localities that only 
produced one list, candidates were elected by acclimation. Fatah was able to gain majorities in 149 of  
the 179 single list localities along with 35 examples of  Fatah-left coalition lists.547  In 93 localities 
multiple lists were given – including the largest urban areas – constituting around 53% of  the total 
registered voters in the West Bank.548  The results were similar in Christian areas.  Fatah, running 
under the name "Independence and Development" won a majority of  seats in nearly all of  the 
Christian quota localities, with the PFLP and independent parties taking the bulk of  the remaining 
seats.  However, the number of  independent lists increased from 11 in 2004/05 to 18 in 2012 – 
owing again to the shift in electoral procedure, but also because of  internal rifts within Fatah.   
 
One important result of  the 2012 elections was a shift back to Fatah mayors in a number of  the 
Christian districts.  Bethlehem city, whose city council had faced an economic downturn as a result 
of  the composition of  its council, elected Vera Baboun, from the Independence and Development 
(Fatah) party, who was not only the city's first female mayor, but also has crucially been able to 
resume foreign aid to the city. The left remained strong in a number of  Palestinian cities, but failed 
                                                 545. Ibid. 546. Centre, "Palestine Electoral Study Mission Urges Political Reconciliation." 547. Ibid. 548. Ibid. 
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to gain a majority in any of  the city councils.  The strong showing by Fatah in Christian quota cities, 
regardless of  the Hamas boycott and the changes to electoral procedures, has shown that public 
opinion of  Fatah was on the upswing, particularly since its lowest point in the early 2000s.549 This 
again reflects the opinion of  many that local elections are 'driven by pragmatic considerations' and 
are not typically framed within the national political dialogue.550  Therefore, whilst respondents 
continue to view Fatah critically, they saw on the local level how their political choices affected their 
material reality – to a much greater degree than they perhaps would at the national level. The next 
section explores respondents' views on major political parties, as well as the disconnect between 
perceived dominance of  certain parties and the electoral realities. 
 Major Parties: 
On average, close to 50% of  Palestinian Christians do not support a specific political party when 
polled over the period between 2000 and 2010.551  The reasons behind this varied, but the most 
prevalent were security concerns and not being satisfied with the options.  Of  those who did 
support a political party, Fatah gained the most support, (see figure 9 appendix), with the PFLP 
gaining the second most.  This is reflective of  the electoral data from the 2012 municipal elections, 
but marks a shift from a 2000 survey of  Palestinian Christians, in which 62% of  respondents 
supported political parties and support for the PFLP and Fatah were close to equal.552   
 
As noted above, there was a disconnect between the respondents' impression of  which parties held 
localised political power and the electoral reality – particularly concerning the relative power of  the 
left.  Whilst Fatah has maintained a majority in nearly every Christian quota district since the 
establishment of  the PA – including the seat of  mayor – the left is still viewed as a significant 
political force.  A number of  respondents, when asked who the dominant parties were in their towns 
and cities would cite the PFLP, PPP or DFLP as the main political actors despite the fact that it was 
often the case that the majority of  their city councils and indeed their mayors were Fatah.  It would 
therefore seem that the PFLP and other major parties on the left have strong grassroots support 
despite the fact that they do not perform well in the elections.  This is primarily because of  their 
                                                 549. Sabella, "Comparing Palestinian Christians on Society and Politics: Context and Religion in Israel and Palestine." 550. Centre, "Palestine Electoral Study Mission Urges Political Reconciliation." 551. “Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research", 2000-2010. 552. Sabella, "Comparing Palestinian Christians on Society and Politics: Context and Religion in Israel and Palestine." 
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work outside of  the established political system.  This was explained by one Bethlehem-area blogger 
as follows:  
Like Hamas, the PFLP have gained the respect of  the people on the ground by working at the grass roots levels to improve their situation. Institutions such as the Health Workers Committee's Clinic in Beit Sahour, for example, which is the largest clinic of  its kind in the West Bank; a well-equipped and effective community based institution, providing cheap services for the people independent of  the inadequate PA services, was established with PFLP support and commitment. Other such centers are common around the region.  The leftists have consequently built a social base in the Christian towns with a large professional community and student population.553  However, a staunch Fatah supporter suggested that Fatah's more centrist platform has attracted 
Christians over time: 
QC: You had mentioned that in the 1960s and 70s the left parties were very popular within the Christian communities; it seems that now there is more interest in Fatah?    I: Yes, there is more support for Fatah now definitely.      QC: Why do you think this has changed?  I: In the 60s and 70s the founding figures of  the PFLP and other left parties were very popular. But then Arafat knew how to win Christians to him. Arafat was brilliant in that.   QC: How so?   I: By giving them places, roles in the government. Then what happened also was that the Popular Front and the Democratic Front accepted violence sometimes – Fatah was less violent – more moderate – so Christians were drawn to Fatah. Slowly, slowly, it happened very slowly.'554  -- Latin Bishop, mid 60s, Jerusalem  
The violence of  the left was only partly to blame however, several respondents mentioned their lack 
of  faith in all political parties generally, but also the failure of  the left to transform its political 
platform along with the changing times – particularly during the Oslo period:   
 
QC: Are the left parties becoming less popular in Christian communities and if  so when did this start to change?  I: 30 or 40 years ago the communists were the most popular – they were the dominant party.  However, they did not have a programme to continue, whereas Fatah has a program and they knew where they were going.  So that's why they took charge since the 1990s.  They started negotiating with the Israelis and they became                                                  553. Max Salaam to Bethlehem Bloggers2005, http://bethlehemghetto.blogspot.no/2005/05/left-and-local-elections-in-bethlehem.html. 554. Latin Bishop, "Personal Interview." 
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the main negotiating partner of  Israel.  Also, unlike the communists who aren't religious, Fatah involves Muslims and Christians and is more open-minded.    In recent elections, Fatah has been more popular at the local level because the foreign donors approve of  them, whereas in the 2004/05 elections Hamas were in the Bethlehem Municipality and the mayor was PFLP, so the foreign donors did not approve.555  -- Municipal council member (Fatah), mid-50s, Beit Sahour  
Respondents also mentioned the fact that the Palestinian political spectrum was lacking a moderate 
alternative to Fatah and Hamas.  The strong support for Fatah, some mentioned, should not be 
taken as support for the ideology of  Fatah as much as it is a rejection of  the ideology and violence 
of  the left and fundamentalism of  Hamas.  Similarly, within the context of  fieldwork, during the 
2014 Israeli invasion of  Gaza, respondents were concerned that Fatah's failure to present itself  as a 
serious liberation party increased the popularity of  fundamentalist groups – even amongst the 
Christians: 
 
I: If  we continue living under occupation in this situation with Israel attacking Gaza and the West Bank, the fundamentalists will emerge and win in the end. And people will say to be moderate does not serve anyone. You know Fatah failed – it failed we need to be strong, etc.  QC: Is there a contemporary moderate voice that Christians support if  they feel that Fatah has failed them?  I: We have, you know, if  we ask people 'do you support Fatah or Hamas?' you will find 20-30% for Fatah. You know these days you will find 40 for Hamas and 30 for Fatah, you know it used to be the opposite.  And more than 50% would say they support neither of  the parties.  But the independent parties are not organised...You know we lost our faith, confidence, trust in political leaders in those two parties. So I hope that those people [independents] will have more voice, but they are not organised. And I saw it in 2006 in the last elections – those people were organised so many people said, I'm not going to vote Fatah, I'm going to vote against Fatah.556  -- Latin Priest, mid-50s, Beit Jala  Similar trends were noted throughout the Second Intifada, when the popularity of  Fatah decreases 
in exchange for the Hamas or parties on the left.   
 
                                                 555. Municipality Employee, "Personal Interview." 556. Latin Priest 1, "Personal Interview." 
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It became clear in the interviews that, apart from those die-hard Fatah supporters whom either held 
political office or were invested in some way (materially or socially) in a Fatah-controlled 
government, the vast majority of  respondents were acutely dissatisfied with Fatah and fearful of  
Hamas.  Despite the fact that the left does not tend to perform well in national or local elections – 
owing largely to their inability to form coalitions – they are increasingly popular with university-aged 
Christians -- many of  whom view Fatah as corrupt and old fashioned.  This is reflected in the 
student elections where the left has seen an increase in support in the past two or three years, whilst 
Fatah has been on the decline. Numerous young respondents indicated their dissatisfaction with the 
Abbas government during the 2014 Gaza War as they felt that Fatah has shied away from directly 
supporting the resistance in Gaza.  This, coupled with the fact that these young graduates will soon 
enter the stagnant job market will affect the outcome of  future elections. 
 Student Elections: Background: Student politics in Palestine developed along with the establishment of  Palestinian universities in the 
mid 1970s.  During this early period, Palestinian students and teachers were heavily involved in both 
the articulation and organisation of  the Palestinian nationalist movement, often acting as grassroots 
representatives of  the larger, but exiled PLO constituent parties abroad.  It is for this reason that 
student politics is held in high regard nationally.  Student elections are also seen as a barometer for 
official national, and to a lesser degree, local elections.  Apart from a two-year hiatus during the 
Second Intifada, student elections have taken place in Palestinian universities nearly every year since 
their establishment in the early 1980s.  Therefore, student election results can be more easily tracked 
over time – with far more data points than either local or national elections.  
 
However the relative autonomy of  Palestinian universities and the ability of  their student senates to 
freely express themselves was somewhat dampened, ironically, with the establishment of  the PA.  
Due to changes in the funding schemes of  most Palestinian universities, aid money was now to be 
funnelled through the PA and then towards the universities, who now became far more dependent 
on their relationship with the PA in order to secure funding.  As Bruhn notes, 'Palestinian 
universities found it increasingly difficult to operate in the shadows of  a politically driven PA that 
limited their capacity to serve Palestinian communities as national institutions'.557  Added to this, the 
                                                 557. Christa Bruhn, "Higher Education as Empowerment: The Case of Palestinian Universities," American Behavioral Scientist 8 (2006)., 1135 
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Israeli Occupation has had a detrimental effect on student politics at Palestinian universities because 
arbitrary and frequent road closures, and closures of  the universities themselves -- often as 
punishment for political activism -- has made certain universities more wary of  political activism on 
campus.558  
 
Results: 
Although respondents indicated that the leftist parties were more popular with the Palestinian 
Christian youth than with adults, the data indicates that Fatah continues to dominate student 
elections, despite the fact that, unlike municipal or national elections, the left are able to form strong 
coalitions. Fatah maintains a much stronger presence in Bethlehem than it does in the Ramallah area 
where the popularity of  Hamas and Fatah are quite close.  This is reflected both in the municipal 
and student elections.  
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561  
Although the left is slightly more popular in the Bethlehem area, where there is also a higher 
concentration of  Christian students, Fatah is significantly more popular in both Birzeit and 
Bethlehem Universities.  There may continue to be strong grassroots support for the left in Christian 
districts, however both the student and local election results have shown that Christians tend to vote 
pragmatically.  The strong showing of  Fatah in student elections is also evidence of  the fact that 
Christians may have begun to show stronger ideological support for Fatah as well, as the student 
elections have no tangible effect on the material well being of  voters.  However, the low voter 
turnout amongst Christians in student elections also signals the fact that the youth are increasingly 
less political.    
 
Conclusion: As this chapter has discussed, Palestinian Christians tend to be pragmatic voters whose political 
choices respond to the utility of  a party, rather than ideological concerns.  This has become 
particularly the case as the Palestinian political landscape has become increasingly fractured since the 
2007 split between the Gaza and West Bank governments.  Further, the inability of  the PA to be 
able to consistently provide basic services like healthcare, security, education, and infrastructure has 
meant that community-based politics and pragmatic concerns have become more directly relevant in 
                                                 
561 PCPSR Survey Data 2000-2010 
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people’s daily lives.  These concerns were reflected in the ways in which Christians made political 
choices, and the overall political trends within these communities. 
 
The introduction presented a hierarchical paradigm for political choice within the Palestinian 
Christian communities, in which communal identity and utility were major factors: 
 
1. Choice is limited by communal identification – I am a Christian, I cannot vote for Hamas  The salience of  communal identity and perceived threat to the group had a strong impact on 
political choices.  Although there was some low-level support for Hamas as a resistance group -- 
particularly during times of  conflict – Palestinian Christians generally rejected the Hamas platform 
as it contradicted their identity as Christians.  This led voters to often make political choices 
defensively, i.e. voting for Fatah in opposition to Hamas, despite their ideological commitment to 
parties on the left.   
 2. Assessment of  the past performance of  a party – Has this party delivered on its promises? 3. Current material utility of  a party – How capable is this party of  economic and social development?  If  a party does not contradict factor one (above), voters based their choices on the past performance 
of  the party, and their current ability to provide basic services.  This was seen in the 2012 municipal 
elections in Bethlehem, when the incumbent PFLP mayor lost the election to a Fatah candidate 
partly because of  a halt in much needed foreign aid during the PFLP’s tenure. However, factor one 
can also override factors two and three in situations in which Hamas has a strong chance of  winning 
an election.  This was seen in the 2006 Legislative Elections in which large numbers of  Christian 
voters voted for Fatah, despite the perceived corruption and ineffectiveness of  the PA/Fatah.   
 
4. Ideological considerations – Does this party's platform match my own political ideology?  The final consideration, which falls lowest in the hierarchy, is that of  the ideological stance of  a 
particular party.  As discussed in Chapters Three and Five, statelessness has made political choices 
potentially more consequential towards shaping the social reality for Palestinian Christians.  
Therefore, as long as a party’s platform did not endanger the position of  the Christian community, 
voters tended to prioritise their ability to deliver services.  This explains the disconnect between the 
perceived popularity of  political parties like the PFLP, DFLP, and the PPP at the community level, 
and their poor electoral performance.   
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The shifting sands of  political expression in Palestine and the increasing public role of  religion have 
been reflected in a growing concern within the Christian community as to how they fit into society.  
This has been exacerbated by the popularity of  Islamist parties regionally, the ongoing Israeli 
Occupation, and the existential threat faced by Christians in neighbouring states.  However, the 
Christian leadership continues to strongly assert that it has good relations with the Muslim 
community.562  And indeed, respondents also indicated that this was the case.  However, despite 
these assertions, the Palestinian Christian community continues to decrease in number.  Many Israeli 
and American commentators have cited the so-called “Islamification” of  Palestine as the primary 
cause.563  However, as the next chapter will show, issues of  social identity, economics, and the Israeli 
Occupation have proved far more influential in the demographic decline of  the Palestinian Christian 
communities. 
 
 
  
                                                 
562 Kårtveit, Dilemmas of Attachment: Identity and Belonging among Palestinian Christians. 
563 See, e.g. Nicholas Pelham, "Where Is It Really Better to Be a Christian - Israel or Palestine?,"  Haaretz (2014), http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.590027.  
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Chapter Seven -- Demography and Emigration in the Palestinian Christian Communities 
 
As the previous chapters have discussed, the Palestinian national identity has shifted away from its 
secular-nationalist origins and has become fractured between several competing notions of  the 
nation.  As a result, there is a growing disconnect between a secular-nationalist vision of  the 
Palestinian nation and one in which religion plays a much larger role.  Palestinian Christians, who 
have traditionally supported secular-nationalist parties, are therefore increasingly concerned with 
how they fit into society.  Those who are alienated by this changing social and political landscape 
may seek refuge in their communal identities, where they may find solace in their religion, 
community, and family.  However, as discussed in Chapter Five, there are a number of  potential 
issues within the communities themselves which may diminish the sense of  psychological and 
material utility gained from communal membership.  These issues include a lack of  ecumenical 
relations, issues over the identity and vocation of  the Patriarchates, and contextualisation of  the 
Conflict in the Christian faith.  Whilst the significant social welfare initiatives provided to the 
communities by the Church provide a short-term solution to some of  the daily difficult of  
Palestinian life, the more pressing issues of  identity and demographic decline remain largely 
unaddressed by the communal leadership.  Apart from affecting the ways in which Palestinian 
Christians participate politically, these issues have contributed to the ongoing issue of  demographic 
decline.  The purpose of  this chapter is to assess the current demographic realities of  the Palestinian 
Christians, in light of  the ongoing problem of  emigration.  It begins by addressing the problematic 
issue of  "minority status", followed by a new calculation of  the current demographic realities in the 
Palestinian Christian communities, and finally a qualitative and quantitative assessment of  current 
emigration trends.   
 Palestinian Christians and "minority status": 
There have only been three comprehensive demographic surveys of  the Palestinian Christian 
community conducted over the past several decades – all three of  which have been carried out by 
Palestinian church-related organisations (CROs).564  These studies based their findings on small to 
medium-scale surveys within Palestinian Christian communities and have relied heavily on the 1961 
                                                 564. Raheb, Palestinian Christians in the West Bank: Facts, Figures and Trends.; Rami Mourad, Ali Abuzaid, and Ali Bandi, "Survey of the Christian Community in the Gaza Strip," (Gaza Strip: YMCA, 2014).; Sabella, "Comparing Palestinian Christians on Society and Politics: Context and Religion in Israel and Palestine."; "Migration of Arab Christians (in Arabic)," in Conference on Christian Arabs (Amman2002). 
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Jordanian and 1967 Israeli censuses, which were used to create projections about the size and shape 
of  the current population.  Whilst these studies have been invaluable in terms of  their contribution 
to our understanding of  social dynamics within this community, their results have failed to take into 
account subsequent censuses and other demographic data collected by the Palestinian Authority in 
1997 and 2007. As a result, estimates of  the Palestinian Christian population in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip in published literature have overestimated the Palestinian Christian population by 
anywhere from 10-50%.  
 
The incontinences in the published CRO data are significant in and of  themselves, not only because 
these population statistics are frequently cited as authoritative in both academic literature and the 
media, but also because they highlight the sensitivity of  the Palestinian Christian community towards 
the issue of  demographic decline.  This is also reflective of  the community's struggle to choose the 
way in which they are defined by the state and society, as well as the desire to be regarded as fully 
Palestinian, rather than being singled out as a minority group.  It is therefore unsurprising that there 
is a great deal sensitivity to terms like "minority" – an issue common in identity narratives in 
Christian communities across the Middle East, where there is an ongoing struggle between sectarian 
notions of  citizenship, in which rights and duties may differ according to religion or race, and 
secular notions of  citizenship in which rights and duties are universal.565  
 
Middle Eastern Christians have a complex history with the term "minority".  During the late 
Ottoman period, non-Muslim ethno-religious communities were increasingly organized into broad 
confessional communities known as millets.566   Each millet was headed by its own 'highest 
ecclesiastical authority', which granted them some degree of  autonomy under the patronage of  the 
Sublime Porte.567  Whilst non-Muslims were largely barred from holding high political and social 
positions within the imperial bureaucracy because of  their faith, they were not considered 
"minorities" by either the government or themselves. 
 
                                                 565. Fiona McCallum, "Christian Political Participation in the Arab World," Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 23, no. 1 (2012). 566. Shatzmiller, Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies / Edited by Maya Shatzmiller., 3 567. Roussos, "Eastern Orthodox Christianity in the Middle East.", 107 
  
  169
Indeed, as White argues, the term "minority", as we understand it today, did not exist prior to the 
mid-19th century in either the European or Middle Eastern context.568   Rather, it only began to hold 
significance in the Middle East with the imposition of  the French and British Mandates, which, for 
the first time, introduced the 'philosophical and geographical preconditions associated with modern 
states', which included the western conceptions of  national identity, citizenship, etc.569 Whilst the 
Ottoman millet system differentiated rights and duties based upon a binary of  Muslim or non-
Muslim, this differentiation was not understood in terms of  majority/minority. The authority of  the 
Sultan came from God, not from the citizen; therefore religion and ethnicity were irrelevant to one's 
being a subject of  the Empire.570  In this context, non-Muslims were not regarded as "minorities" in 
the sense of  a demographic understanding of  the word, but were rather from a subordinate religious 
confession.571    
 
With the imposition of  a nation-state system in the inter-war period, newly created Middle Eastern 
states naturally began to define their national identities, and therefore what constituted a citizen.  
This transformed notions of  legitimacy and authority, as the declining power of  the "church" and 
reorganisation into a state system necessitated new ways for political actors to legitimize their 
authority in the eyes of  an empowered public.572  Groups that held power, either because of  
numerical superiority, their patronage by the colonial authorities or wealth, unsurprisingly had the 
strongest influence on the definition of  these national identities – thus becoming de facto 
"majorities", whilst groups that did not fit into these new categories became "minorities", often 
regardless of  their physical size.573  In the Middle Eastern context, this process of  "minoritisation" 
was aided, in large part, by the British and French Mandate authorities through religious demarcation 
in census taking, granting of  reserved seats to demographic minority groups, and divide and rule 
tactics.    
 
Early on, many Middle Eastern Christian communities embraced their categorisation as minorities 
by the British and French simply because it allowed them to share in power in places where their 
small number would have otherwise made this difficult.  However, as the momentum of  Arab 
                                                 568. White, "The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria." 569. Ibid., 66 570. Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey. (New York: Routledge, 1998)., 22 571. White, "The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria.", 66 572. Hurd, "Legitimacy." 573. White, "The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria.", 66 
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nationalism grew nearing the end of  the French and British Mandates, a majority of  Christians 
began to reject the term. Mitri suggests that this change of  heart was partly due to the fact that 
Christians were gaining increased access to education through the numerous mission schools that 
had been established in the Levant from the mid-19th century.574   It was largely through these 
schools that Christians were exposed to secular nationalism and liberal ideas of  governance and 
citizenship.  As a result, the Christian influence on the Arab and Palestinian nationalist movements 
has been characterised by its calls for 'modern nationalist and universal ideologies', as well as an 
emphasis on the 'common ethno-cultural identity with Muslims as the basis for independence and 
modern nation building', rather than minority status.575  In the case of  Palestine, the impact of  
Zionism in the region had a tremendous nationalizing and unifying effect on the Palestinian 
population.  In the aftermath of  the 1948 War with Israel, Christians and Muslims shared in their 
dispossession and suffering.576  Palestinian nationalism therefore reflected the collective struggle of  
both the Christians and Muslims of  Palestine, with traditionally strong support for a secular-oriented 
national identity.   
 
In the contemporary context, both the declining numbers of  Palestinian Christians and the 
increased popularity of  Hamas --and looming threat of  Daesh (ISIL) -- have had an effect on how 
Palestinian Christians frame their demographic realities because many fear that the traditionally 
secular-oriented Palestinian nationalism – one which is largely upheld by the PA577 -- could become 
increasingly defined in sectarian terms.  Regardless of  this growing tension, Palestinian Christians are 
extremely hesitant to publically frame their relationship with the Muslim community in a negative 
light.578  This is primarily because of  the feeling that it may diminish Palestinian solidarity, but also 
because Christian leaders are well aware of  the dangers of  unnecessarily inflaming sectarian 
divisions – divisions which, quite frankly, are not very apparent in Palestinian society.  However, 
there is a clear concern that defining oneself  as a minority or highlighting your community's 
demographic decline may exacerbate the feelings of  isolation and communalism – both from the 
perspective of  the Christian communities themselves and from the Muslim community.   
                                                 574. Tarek Mitri, "Christians in the Arab World: Minority Attitudes and Citizenship," The Ecumenical Review 64, no. 1 (2012). 575. Ibid., 46 
576 Bowman, "Constitutive Violence and Rhetorics of Identity." 577. The Palestinian Basic law defines citizenship as follows: 'Palestinians shall be equal before the law and the judiciary, without distinction based upon race, sex, colour, religion, political views or disability'.  As of March 2014, the PA has also removed religion from the Palestinian ID cards – a move largely supported by Palestinian Christians. 578. Kårtveit, Dilemmas of Attachment: Identity and Belonging among Palestinian Christians. 
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 And indeed many respondents indicated that when the term "minority" is applied to their 
community, even when it is used as a means to ensure equal treatment at the government level – 
such as reserved parliamentary seats – it actually singles out the community in a way that they feel 
has the opposite effect.  This has a tremendous impact on how the community views itself  and its 
place within the state and society.  
 
Assessing the demographic reality of  the Palestinian Christians can therefore be seen as potentially 
threatening from the perspective of  the Christian communities themselves, not only because it can 
potentially lead to what they view as unnecessary special treatment, but also because it can in some 
ways degrade the significant contribution that this community has made to Palestinian society.  As 
the leader of  the Bethlehem-based Diyar Consortium Mitri Raheb described it, 'Arab Christians are 
a minority, but only a quantitative, not a qualitative minority.'579  And indeed this highlights the 
struggle for Palestinian Christians to be regarded as possessing a uniquely Christian heritage and 
culture, while being fully committed to the Palestinian cause of  self-determination.  However, as the 
number of  Palestinian Christians declines, the community has understandably grown more sensitive 
to engaging with the issue of  emigration, and indeed the inconsistent data in self-assessments of  the 
Palestinian Christian population seems to reflect the realities of  this issue.  This is the point of  
departure for the next section, which seeks to reconcile available CRO data with the most current 
PA census and health data in order to more accurately assess the current demographic realities of  
the Palestinian Christians. 
 
Assessing the contemporary demographic realities: 
If  we were to approximate what the Palestinian Christian population of  the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip would have been under normal growth, i.e. excluding emigration, we would have expected the 
2007 population to be approximately 192,400 or approximately 400,000 in both Israel and 
Palestine.580   However, the numbers from the last available PA census in 2007 indicated that the 
Christian population of  the West Bank and Gaza Strip was around 42,565, which indicates that tens 
of  thousands have emigrated over the course of  the 20th century.581   Indeed, the Sabeel Survey 
                                                 579. Mitri Raheb, I Am a Palestinian Christian (Minneapolis: Fortress Pr, 1995). 580. This figure comes from the 2006 Sabeel Survey and is their estimate of the Palestinian Christian growth rate (2.0%) before emigration is taken into account; i.e. the natural growth rate.  Soudah and Sabella., 13. 581. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, "Census," (2007)., 114 
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estimates that roughly 240,000 Palestinian Christians or 60% of  the total global population of  
Palestinian Christians currently reside outside of  Israel and Palestine.582    
 
Estimates of  population growth and decline in the Palestinian Christian community are somewhat 
difficult to ascertain because the data over the past 60 years has been both unreliable and infrequent.  
Apart from the total population numbers by governorate, there is no data tracking the crude birth or 
death rates or net migration rates specific to the Christian community.  As such, it is not possible to 
use the standard method to calculate the crude growth rate.  For this study, several methods were 
considered to resolve this issue, however, because this is a population that has undergone several 
significant and asymmetrical changes over the years, all linear methods were excluded.  The 
exponential change method was deemed the most appropriate because 'it views change as occurring 
continuously rather than at discrete intervals'.583  Exponential change was calculated as follows:  
R= [ln (P1 / Pb)]/y 
 
'Where r is the average annual exponential rate of  change; ln represents the natural logarithm; Pl is 
the population in the launch year; Pb is the population in the base year; and y is the number of  years 
in the base period.'584 In order to estimate current growth trends, data from the last available 
censuses in 1997 and 2007 is used to calculate the following: 
 
R=[ln (42,565/40,055)]/10 
=0.00607*100 
=0.61% growth rate in the period between 1997 and 2007 
 
We can then use this figure of  exponential change to project a future population estimate as follows: 
Pt = P1erz 
'Where Pt is the population in the post-censal year, e is the base of  the system of  natural logarithms 
(approximately 2.71828), and z is the number of  years in the post-censal period.'585 
 
                                                 582. Soudah and Sabella, "The Sabeel Survey on Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and Israel .", 48 583. David A. Swanson and Jeff Tayman, eds., Subnational Population Estimates, vol. 31, The Springer Series on Demographic Methods and Population Analysis (Springer, 2012)., 118 584. Ibid., 119 585. Ibid., 119 
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P2014=[42,565 * (e0.00607*7)] 
P2014= a population of  approximately 44,415 in 2014586 
 
Applying this same method to the first and last major data points, the 1945/46 Anglo-American 
Survey and the 2007 PA census, we are able to estimate a 62 year growth rate of  -0.5%. Meaning 
that the total growth in population from 1945 (57,950) to 2007 (42,565) was slightly negative, but 
quite close to zero.  This indicates that a large number of  Palestinian Christians have emigrated in 
the period between 1945 and 2007 and also that rate of  natural increase of  the Palestinian Christians 
was insufficient to counter the outflow of  emigrants.  
 
In order to determine current growth and decline trends, data from the periods around the 1948 and 
1967 Wars was excluded because the large outflow of  emigrants in these periods is not 
representative of  the contemporary trends.  However, data from these periods is very much relevant 
to the bigger picture of  Palestinian Christian emigration in the 20th century and it is essential to note 
the significant decline in both periods: 1945-1961 (-1.18%) and 1961-1967 (-2.01%).587  For the 
purpose of  this study, the 1997 and 2007 PA censuses were used to estimate a current growth rate 
of  approximately 0.61%.588  For comparison, the growth rate of  the Palestinian nation as a whole in 
the same time period was around 2.9%.589  We can see this drastic difference between the growth of  
the Palestinian population as a whole in Figure 1 (total population)590 and the Palestinian Christian 
communities in Figure 2 (Christian population), which are broken down by governorate.591  Using 
the estimated 0.61% growth rate, we can extrapolate that the population in 2014 was approximately 
44,415, before taking into account emigration between 2007 and 2014.  
 
The Palestinian Authority completed its first survey on migration in 2010.   This survey offers one 
of  the most comprehensive pictures of  emigration for the Palestinian population within the past 
several decades.  However, migration figures cannot be estimated with 100% accuracy in Palestine, 
and most developing countries, as both immigration and emigration records are not normally 
reported.  Therefore, far from offering us a complete picture of  emigration within the Palestinian 
                                                 586. Before adjustment for emigration 587. Author's Calculations 588. 1997 and 2007 censuses 589. Calculated using the following: ((Log (Pt / P0))/t)*100 590 All figures and tables are located in the appendix beginning on page 201 591. Gaza is excluded from figures 1 and 2 because there are significant gaps in the data for Gaza over this 60 year period. 
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Christian community, this survey can give us a better idea of  the general trends across the 
population as a whole.  Of  the thousands who have emigrated between 2000-2010, the PA migration 
report suggests that only 5.3% were Christian.592  That being said, it is difficult to fully ascertain the 
Christian-specific migration trends merely using this 5.3% figure cited in the PA report.  A more 
scientific approach is possible using the survival rate method of  calculating net migration rates.  This 
method is particularly suitable where the vital statistics method is not possible – due either to poor 
reporting or, in this case, the fact that the PA does not track Christian-specific birth and death 
rates.593  The survival rate method uses survival rates calculated from census life tables in order to 
estimate the 'expected population' in each five-year age group at the end of  each five or ten year 
period.594  This information can then be applied to the five-year census age groups over the period 
between censuses to adjust migration estimates against expected mortality rates in these periods. 
 
Again because of  poor reporting, survival rates are not available for Palestinians Christians 
specifically.  However, age-specific death rates were available for the population as a whole.  Life 
tables were then created using the standard method for life table calculation.595  Due to the non-
cooperation of  the Fatah-led West Bank and Hamas-led Gaza Strip governments in this period, 
these calculations apply to the West Bank only (see tables 2 and 3).  Using these life tables and the 
age-specific population rates given for the Christian communities in the 1997 and 2007 censuses, we 
can then estimate both survival and emigration rates.  The survival rate method can be represented 
as follows: 
Net Migration = nPx+y,l -  (xSn) (nPx,b) 
'Where nPx,b is the population age x to x + n in year b, nPx + y,l is the population age x + y to x + n + y 
in some later year l, y is the number of  years between b and l, and xSn is the y-year survival rate for 
age group x to x + n.'596  Net migration rates are estimated for each age group in tables 4 and 5. With 
this information we can estimate that roughly 2,384 West Bank Christians emigrated in the period 
between 1997 and 2007.    
 
                                                 592. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), "Migration Survey in the Palestinian Territory," (2011)., 60 593. Swanson and Tayman, Subnational Population Estimates., 121-2 594. Ibid., 54 595. Stanley K. Smith, Jeff Tayman, and David A. Swanson, eds., A Practitioner's Guide to State and Local Population Projections, vol. 31, The Springer Series on Demographic Methods and Population Analysis (Springer, 2013). 596. Swanson and Tayman, Subnational Population Estimates., 122 
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As mentioned above, estimates in the 2006 Sabeel Survey indicated that approximately 4.5% of  the 
sample population were processing emigration papers.597  If  the emigration trends from the previous 
decade continue we should expect at least an additional 1,700 emigrants in the period between 2007 
and 2014.  Taking all of  these factors into consideration, it is estimated that the current Palestinian 
Christian population in the West Bank and Gaza strip is approximately 43,000 persons.598  The 
population is broken down by year and governorate in table 6. 
 
Apart from the differences in growth rates between Palestinian Christians and the population as a 
whole, there are also notable differences between the age make up of  the Christian population vis-à-
vis the Muslim population, which can be seen in figures 3, 4, 5, and 6.  Whilst the population pyramid 
for the Muslim community reflects a fairly standard shape for developing nations – with high birth 
and death rates -- the Christian population has a relatively longer life expectancy and much lower 
birth rates, with emigration also being a major factor.  This has also changed significantly from the 
1997 census to 2007.  The 2007 Christian population pyramid has a narrower base than the 1997 
pyramid, suggesting that birth rates have dropped in this 10-year period.  Additionally, the effects of  
emigration have been particularly profound over the past decade and have contributed to a 
substantial decline in population as seen in the concave portions of  the pyramids above.  
 
Whilst the Christian population pyramids are closer to that of  a developed nation, with lower birth 
and death rates and more chimney than cone shape, they represent a population in transition from 
developing to developed, which is suggestive of  several things.  Firstly, the Christian community is 
waiting longer to have children than their Muslim peers and having fewer children once they do.  
Secondly, emigration rates are substantial.  Finally, the relative wealth of  the Christian community 
has meant greater access to healthcare and healthier lifestyles, which means that Christians tend to 
live longer than their Muslim peers.  The Christian population pyramids also confirm periods of  
increased emigration – becoming concave in the 2007 pyramid around the ages of  50-60 (1967 War) 
25-35 (First Intifada) and 0-10 (Second Intifada).  These periods of  growth and decline are also 
reflected in the growth rate table and associated infographic in table 7 and figure 7 and are broken 
down by governorate.   
                                                  597. Soudah and Sabella, "The Sabeel Survey on Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and Israel .", 32 598. This is based on a 0.61% growth rate and the above emigration calculations. 
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When growth and decline are reflected as percentages of  the total population, we can gain 
perspective as to the size of  the Christian community relative to the total community over time.  
These changes in population percentage are reflected in table 8 and indicate that the Palestinian 
Christian population is now less than 1% of  the total Palestinian population and roughly 10% in its 
largest concentration in the Bethlehem governorate.  There are also significant communities in 
Ramallah (3.28%) and Jerusalem (2.92%), however due to emigration and low birth rates, the 
percentage of  Christians relative to the total population has consistently declined in every 
governorate since the 1948 War.   
 
Why do Christians emigrate?: 
Emigration has been an issue for the Palestinian Christian community going back at least until the 
late Ottoman period.  Whilst Christians had been a majority across the Levant until the arrival of  
Islam in the 7th and 8th centuries – and indeed at least a century after the Islamic invasions – the 
decline of  their political hegemony and population, and that of  their imperial patrons had made 
them more susceptible to political upheaval and instability.  But despite this instability and periods 
of  unrest, throughout the period of  Islamic rule, Middle Eastern Christians fared fairly well and 
prospered as a largely urban, merchant, middle class.  Throughout this period, Middle Eastern 
Christians developed or sustained trade relationships with the West and were particularly adept at the 
languages of  Mediterranean trade.  These relationships would continue to benefit the Middle 
Eastern Christians throughout the various Islamic Caliphates, both materially and socially, and were 
put to their most robust use during the Ottoman period when large numbers of  Greek Orthodox 
phanariots were placed in positions of  prominence as diplomats and envoys to the West.599    
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, as the Ottoman Empire's influence and interest turned increasingly 
westward in the 19th century, so too would Western interests turn East – first through trade and then 
through the church.  Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, numerous church-related 
educational institutions were founded across the Levant by Western missionaries and were attended 
en masse by Christians.600  Whilst Christians had already established themselves through trade, they 
now had greater access to education relative to their Muslim peers, which crucially gave them a leg-
                                                 599. Roussos, "How Greek, How Palestinian? The Patriarchate of Jerusalem in the Mid-War Years." 600. Mitri, "Christians in the Arab World: Minority Attitudes and Citizenship."; O'Mahony, The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land : Studies in History, Religion and Politics.; Tsimhoni, "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem During the Formative Years of the British Mandate in Palestine." 
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up towards attaining white-collar or skilled labour employment.  As Sabella notes, 'The advantages 
that the Palestinian Christians gained from earlier access to education enabled them to develop a 
middle-class socio-economic and occupational profile – and the preferences and limitations 
associated with it – well before other Palestinians.'601  
 
It is no coincidence that this period of  increased education and wealth corresponded to the first 
major waves of  Palestinian Christian emigration – particularly as the Ottoman Empire entered into 
numerous conflicts throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries.  Christians emigrated not only to 
seek their fortunes abroad, but also to escape conscription into the Ottoman military when the 
Tanzimat reforms allowed for non-Muslim participation in the military.602  It is also clear from the 
Palestinian and Arab nationalist literature of  the period – a great deal of  which was written by 
Christians603 – that they were increasingly inspired by liberal Western ideas and nationalisms and 
began to question the ideology and motives of  the Ottomans, as well as their place within the 
Ottoman political and social hierarchy.  This, coupled with the fact that Middle Eastern Christians 
tended to be educated, wealthy and skilled in Western languages, allowed thousands to emigrate with 
relative ease during this period.  Consequently, in the period prior to the First World War, population 
growth in the Palestinian Christian community dropped from approximately 2% to around 0.85%.604 
The history of  this early period of  emigration was explained by one respondent as follows:  
The emigration started at the end of  the 19th century and the beginning of  the 20th century. The reasons were mainly economic – but also coming from the fact of  being a minority. Our people were afraid to serve in the Ottoman army because they knew they would die in the Balkan Wars or elsewhere because the Ottoman Empire was always in situation of  war – against Russia, against Greece, other countries.  So our young people didn't want to go to the army, they preferred to leave – so they left.605  -- Bishop William Shomali, Auxillary Bishop to the Latin Patriarchate of  Jerusalem  
A majority of  the Palestinian emigrants who left in this period moved to the Americas, establishing 
themselves as successful merchants and craftspeople.  However, they never severed contact with 
their extended families in Palestine and often moved back to Palestine after gaining wealth abroad. 
                                                 601. Bernard Sabella, "Comparing Palestinian Christians on Society and Politics: Context and Religion in Israel and Palestine," al-Bushra  (2001)., 2 602. Ibid., 3 
603 Nationalist literature with the greatest reach was published in the newspapers al-Karmil (founded by Najib Nassar) and Filastin (founded by ‘Isa al-‘Isa).  For a more in depth look at nationalist literature of the period see Robson, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine.; Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness  604. Author's own calculations 605. Latin Bishop, "Personal Interview." 
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The relationship with Central and South America has become especially evident in recent years – as 
the Palestinians have found high-level political support amongst Latin American countries, which 
was particularly strong during and after the 2014 Gaza War.606  
 
The trend of  emigration continued and spiked during and after the First World War.  From the 
period between 1914 and 1922, population growth dropped to 0.11%, rebounding significantly 
during the Mandate period (1920-1948), with an average growth of  around 2.7%.607  Although 
Palestinian Christians fared well and significantly increased their numbers under the British Mandate, 
emigration would again experience a surge during and after the 1948 and 1967 Wars.   And indeed 
this is reflected in the growth rates for the periods between 1945 and 1961 (-1.18%) and 1961-1967 
(-2.01%).608  In fact, since the establishment of  the State of  Israel in 1948, the Palestinian Christian 
population would never again experience the levels of  growth seen prior to and during the Mandate 
period.   
 
Stories of  forced migration during the 1948 and 1967 Wars are also common to the narrative of  
emigration:  
70% of  the Christian population were kicked out in 1948 by the Israeli Occupation.  23,000 Christians were kicked out from West Jerusalem.  Many moved abroad to the US and South America, and some moved here as refugees.  The Christians in 1948 were 22% of  the population, now we are less than 1.5%.  -- NGO Leader, late 50s, Bethlehem  
Although a significant portion of  those Palestinian Christians currently living in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip are native to the historically Christian areas of  Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Jenin 
etc., a substantial number of  Christians living in cities that now fall within the boundaries of  Israel 
fled the violence of  the 1948 and 1967 Wars towards the West Bank, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, 
and indeed further abroad to North and South America.  Refugee stories are common within the 
Palestinian Christian narrative.  As one respondent relayed: 
You know when you ask Palestinians where they're from it's complicated actually.  With Christians and Muslims alike.  Maybe Christians in Bethlehem actually have more of  a "yes I am from Bethlehem" story than the Muslims.  But my family are part of  the population that came as refugees into Bethlehem.  The 
                                                 606. Charlie Hoyle, "Interview: Latin America's Dynamic Palestinian Communities,"  Ma'an News (2013), http://www.maannews.net/Eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=651844. 607. Author's own calculation based on data from: Soudah and Sabella., 41. 608. Author's calculations based on the 1945 Anglo American Survey and 1961 Census and the 1961 Jordanian census and 1967 Israeli Census.  Using the mean annualised growth rate: Pt = P0 * ert 
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original family is from Jaffa.  My grandfather moved to Jerusalem and in 1948 – the family became refugees and came to Bethlehem.  My grandfather was killed in the War.  So my grandmother and seven children moved to Bethlehem.  So we are refugees from my father's side.609   -- NGO Leader, mid 30s, Bethlehem  Similar surges in emigration are seen during all times of  conflict in the region.  The most recent 
surge has been associated with the rise of  Daesh (ISIL) and the 2014 Gaza War, but is in many ways 
a continuation of  the trends that began with the Second Intifada in the early 2000s in that it is a 
response to both the growing fears about the potential threat of  Islamisation in the region and the 
ongoing violence of  the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.     
 
However, interview and survey data conducted for this study indicated that the stagnant economy 
was the biggest factor contributing to emigration, with the Israeli Occupation as a close second – 
although the two are obviously intertwined.  (See figure 8)  The economic factor however is more 
complex than merely a lack of  jobs – something that both Muslims and Christians share in equally.  
Rather, many respondents indicated that, because their community tends to be middle class, they 
have grown accustomed to a certain lifestyle – one that is impossible to sustain under the 
Occupation economy.  As one respondent suggested: 
They [Christians] are wealthier, and they tend to have higher standards of  living.  The investment in certain aspects – like education for example is higher.  So when you look at the Christian population and they have slight economic challenges, it affects them much greater than the Muslim population that is able to adapt to these challenges.  While many Christians just because of  habit and culture and way of  life it's difficult for them...that's the reason why people emigrate out.610  -- Palestinian MP, late 60s, Jerusalem  This factor was also echoed by Sabella, who suggested that Christian's social standing as well-
educated, middle class citizens 'made them increasingly sensitive to the instability and uncertainty 
that accompanied Israeli military rule'.611 But this movement towards a middle class existence has 
also had trickle down effects on other aspects of  Christian demography.  Because of  the pressure 
for young men and women to get white-collar jobs, Christians will tend to place more emphasis on 
attaining university and professional degrees, often foregoing marriage until later in life than 
Muslims.  Indeed, the Palestinian Central Bureau of  Statistics indicated that the average marriage age 
                                                 609. CRO Employee 3, "Personal Interview." 610. Ibid. 611. Sabella, "Comparing Palestinian Christians on Society and Politics: Context and Religion in Israel and Palestine." 
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for Christian men is 28 years old, versus 19-23 years old for Muslims.612  As one respondent 
indicated, it is very difficult for him to get married because he has spent a long time getting a good 
education and job, rather than going straight into work after high school.  He is now unmarried at 25 
and will need several years to save up the roughly 70,000 NIS needed for a wedding and a house.613 
The relatively late marriage age also impacts the overall fertility rate of  Christian women; 2.59 
compared to an average of  5.5-6.3 for Muslim women because Christian women are waiting until 
later in life to have children.614  When taken together, these factors contribute to the small natural 
growth of  the community, but also add to the reasons why a Palestinian Christian might choose to 
emigrate in search of  greater economic opportunities and freedom.    
 
The second major reason for emigration is the Israeli Occupation and overall political instability in 
the region, which the majority of  respondents tied to social, economic, and a variety of  other 
problems.  In fact nearly all of  those who listed the Occupation as the main reason for emigration 
also listed the economy as the second biggest factor.  This relationship is illustrated quite clearly in 
the following statement from a respondent: 'The main reason [for emigration] is the Occupation.  
Because of  the occupation we have unemployment, lack of  jobs and the economic situation very 
bad – there are many social problems because of  it, etc.  The main problem is that.'615  This 
sentiment was echoed by a number of  respondents who indicated that the Occupation was 
responsible for social strife on a number of  levels: unemployment, communal violence, political 
violence, and domestic violence. – all factors leading to emigration.   
 
Several respondents indicated that their political and religious leadership had fallen silent on social 
issues, choosing rather to focus on political issues, which many felt created a gap in legitimacy that 
could lead to youth feeling less responsible towards maintaining their presence in the Palestine. As 
one respondent argued:   
I: Violence against children and women – things like that, these are not part of  our religious discourses.    QC: Simply because it's not seen as being as important as political issues?  
                                                 612. Soudah and Sabella, "The Sabeel Survey on Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and Israel .", 14 613. Orthodox Community Member, "Personal Interview." 614. Soudah and Sabella, "The Sabeel Survey on Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and Israel .", 14 615. CRO Employee 1, "Personal Interview." 
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I: It is less visible.  I mean the most visible things are – you see soldiers, tanks, but at the same time there is a lot of  violence against women and children and other social problems in Gaza and the West Bank.  And it's not visible; we are not challenging it.  This is a part of  the challenges we have to consider as local leaders.616  -- Academic, mid-40s, Bethlehem  This suggests that the common discourse from the leadership is most decidedly anti-Occupation, 
but lacking in the areas of  self-criticism or self-examination.  And whilst the anti-Occupation 
discourse is seen as necessary or even the cultural norm, many respondents indicated that emigration 
was partly caused by these ongoing social issues stemming from the pressures of  life under 
Occupation, which they felt were not adequately dealt with at the leadership level.  In other words, 
people are leaving because of  the difficulties of  their daily reality – whether it is caused by a soldier 
at a checkpoint or violence at home.  As one respondent said: 'That is why you have people 
emigrating to all of  the world. Just to find money and to be free and to live life as they should. Not 
with walls surrounding you and every day people coming inside Bethlehem shooting and taking 
people. This is what the people are mad about or tired of  -- this situation. So that is why people are 
emigrating to other countries.'617 
 A related third factor mentioned by respondents is the situation of  modern Christian identity in the 
holy land.  As the population diminishes, many feel that it is becoming increasingly difficult to live 
and identify as a Christian in the Middle East – both because of  the fear of  persecution and because 
many of  the youth are in some ways forgetting or not learning about their own history or identity.  
Many older respondents indicated that the youth were overly self-interested: in education, money, 
jobs, etc. and as a result they were more easily enticed to emigrate.  As one respondent suggested: 
People's identity is becoming smaller nowadays and this is so much influenced by the concept of  individualism and by globalisation – by globalised ideas and values that are being spread all over.  Many of  our people – young people -- now are starting to think individually about life and about everything. Sometimes they feel connected for a national or social cause or public issues, but sometimes they feel that they are only themselves, they are individuals they have this ego centric value or – and this makes many of  them as a result of  not finding the solution for their difficulties, finding their own way – sometimes religion is the inspiring issue for them so they go for only the church – also sometimes they get disconnected from the community.618   -- CRO Leader, mid 50s, Beit Sahour  
                                                 616. Palestinian Academic, "Personal Interview." 617. Rum Orthodox Priest, "Personal Interview." 618. CRO Employee 2, "Personal Interview." 
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Some respondents indicated that it was becoming difficult to identify as a Christian in the Middle 
East, but also noted the culpability of  their communities in not reaching out to the Muslim 
community in both an ecumenical and social sense.  They suggested that some in the community 
had chosen to emigrate rather than reach out.  
 My problem with that is that we as Palestinian Christians did nothing to help them [Muslims] to understand who we are. For example, three years ago in Bethlehem, we had a Christian conference and during my presentation there were three bishops – Catholic and Orthodox.  I told them, "you need now to go to Gaza and start talking with Hamas – with their leaders, they need to see you. They need to see that there are Christians who are worried about their brothers and sisters in Gaza. You need to show solidarity." But they need to know us. So go there – don't wait for them. They will never ask you to come there and to chat with you – we need to take the initiative. We did almost nothing.619  -- CRO leader, mid 40s, Beit Sahour  
However, regarding Christian and Muslim relations, very few respondents indicated that emigration 
was caused by tension between the two communities.  Rather they were concerned with the future 
of  Christians in the Middle East more generally.  This theme was also explored in the qualitative 
interviews and a majority of  respondents were quick to distinguish between moderate Muslims, 
including to a limited extent, Hamas, with whom they had good relations, and violent political 
Islamist groups like Daesh, whose ideology they feared was spreading to Palestine.  In fact, during 
fieldwork at the height of  the 2014 Gaza War, a number of  respondents indicated that they 
supported Hamas as a legitimate resistance group, whilst being highly critical of  what, in their view, 
was an ineffective and impotent response from Fatah.  This was particularly true of  younger 
respondents (under 30 years of  age), who had perhaps less of  a connection to the PLO as an active 
resistance group than those who had lived through the First Intifada and earlier.  However, 
respondents remained critical of  the overall social and political ideology of  Hamas.  But, in general, 
respondents felt that the small amount of  tension that does exist between Christian and Muslim 
Palestinians was simply a matter of  miscommunication between the two communities. 
Yes we [Palestinians] are well-educated people in general – but Muslims they don't know much about us [Christians]. They know just very, very few things about Christians and our history, our culture, our faith. So we need to engage in cultural awareness because there is lack of  awareness in Muslim communities – in some of  the Muslim communities – the more poor communities – towards Christians.620  
                                                 619. CRO Employee 1, "Personal Interview." 620. Ibid. 
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By most accounts it would seem that emigration trends have continued to increase over the past few 
years.  Whilst the number of  émigrés per year has not reached the levels of  either 1948 or 1967, the 
steady outflow of  Palestinian Christian emigrants, coupled with the relatively low birth rates, and late 
marriage age have contributed to a consistent decline in numbers since 1948.  Although it was not 
explicitly mentioned in the survey data, dissatisfaction with the shape and structure of  the PA itself  
is also seen as a contributing factor towards emigration.  These include notions of  citizenship, 
equality, levels of  political participation and party politics.  A majority of  respondents indicated that 
they did not feel that all Palestinians were equal under the law as it currently functions, however 
stopped short of  describing themselves as second-class citizens.  It is unsurprising then that close to 
50% of  respondents from 2000-2010 considered equal rights to be the most important issue for 
their community in a future Palestinian state.621   
 
This data is significant not only because it helps to explain why a Palestinian Christian might choose 
to emigrate, but also because it highlights one significant grey area in the wider discussion of  
Christians in the Middle East, namely the role of  the non-Muslim minority in Middle Eastern states.  
As post-revolution states across the Levant and North Africa struggle to reinvent or redefine the 
ways in which they govern and organise their societies, Middle Eastern Christians have also sought 
redefinition as small, but integral parts of  these states.  The Palestinian Authority, in contrast to the 
transition governments in many neighbouring states, has sought an inclusive path for its Christian 
minority -- from reserving seats in local governing councils and the Legislative Council, to the 
tradition of  the President of  the PA attending the Christmas Mass in Bethlehem.  However at the 
societal level there continue to be numerous challenges to the overall social make-up of  Palestinian 
society -- revolving particularly around issues of  identity.   
 
Institutional response to emigration: 
The church leadership are aware of  the detrimental effects of  demographic decline on the cultural 
make up on the Holy Land.  As such, they have attempted to address primarily the economic 
concerns of  their communities by providing social welfare initiatives, education, health care, and 
affordable housing for newly married couples. As Latin Bishop William Shomali suggested,  
What do we do to stem emigration?  The best medicine is to give antibiotic to the virus.  So if  the issue is a bad economy because of  insecurity and lack of  peace, peace would be the medicine – the solution.  If  there 
                                                 621. Ibid. 
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was peace here the situation would improve, the Christians would remain – willingly.  So lack of  peace is one of  the problems and peace would be the solution.  But also, even if  peace is not there we should help our people in giving them faith that their presence here is important – is crucial – it's our vocation from the lord – it's a blessing, it's a privilege.  So we need spiritual motivation because people can be rich and leave.  So we cannot say it's only an economic problem or political problem – difficulties are, but people can have a spiritual strength to say, ok it's difficult, but I remain.622  
However, the broader issues of  identity and integrating faith and activism remain elusive for church 
institutions.  In 2013 the National Coalition of  Christian Organisations in Palestine (NCCOP) issued 
a statement in which it reiterated the church's role in indoctrinating Palestinian youth, not just in 
their faith, but in their identity as Christian Palestinians, 'The Church sees her task as one of  
educating our young people to accept themselves as they are, giving them a balanced human, 
national and Christian education and an awareness of  their history, their rootedness in the land and a 
sense of  identity'.623  The concept of  "rootedness in the land" was reiterated continuously in field 
interviews, in which the Christian presence in the Holy Land was described variously as; "our 
Christian vocation"; "our cross to bear"; and "a unique privilege".  In this way, respondents 
connected their presence in the land – including their difficult daily realities – to Christian notions 
of  suffering and resilience.  However, as Chapter Five discussed, respondents continue to feel a 
disconnect between their faith and their difficult daily realities.  Consequently, the trend of  
emigration continues to present a challenge to religious leadership and institutions.   
 
Conclusion: 
As discussed throughout this study, the material and psychological utility gained from social 
identities are extremely consequential to individual’s willingness to participate in groups.  This 
chapter has shown how these issues of  social identity impact upon the demographic realities of  the 
Palestinian Christians, who now constituted less than one percent of  the total Palestinian population. 
However, the demographic decline of  the Palestinian Christian community is not a new 
phenomenon.  But it has, since the earliest periods of  emigration in the 19th century, revolved 
primarily along issues of  economic underdevelopment and identity.  This has also corresponded to 
the development of  this community into an increasingly well-educated, wealthy, and socially mobile 
population, resulting in relatively low birth rates and population aging as the median age of  
                                                 622. Latin Bishop, "Personal Interview." 623. National Coalition of Christian Organisations in Palestine, "Attempts to Mobilize Christians into the Israeli Military the Case of Christian Arab Citizens of Israel," news release, 2013, http://hcef.org/790793710-attempts-to-mobilize-christians-into-the-israeli-military-the-case-of-christian-arab-citizens-of-israel/. 
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Palestinian Christians continues to increase.  In the contemporary context, efforts by the church 
leadership to stem emigration through investment in social welfare programmes have had limited 
success, whilst the larger issues of  the ongoing Israeli Occupation, the economy, and identity 
continue to be insurmountable for many Palestinian Christians.   
 
Christian-Muslim relations are also a factor in emigration, but a considerably muted one in that it is 
not typically expressed in terms of  “persecution” or systematic discrimination.  Rather, it revolves 
around differing opinions about the structural nature of  the state itself.  As the hegemony secular-
nationalism becomes increasingly threatened by alternative political ideologies like Islamism, 
Palestinian Christians are understandably cautious about their position in society.  However, despite 
the ongoing issue of  demographic decline, many in the community continue to reject the term 
minority, as well as the special political concessions granted to their community as such.  As Chapter 
Five discussed, this reflects the community’s positions on citizenship and equal rights, but may also 
lead the community leadership to underestimate the seriousness of  the problem of  emigration.  
Consequently, CRO and NGO studies, as well as community leadership, have often presented an 
overly optimistic picture of  Palestinian Christian demography in which there is little room for self-
reflection about many of  the issues that the community faces.  Therefore, ongoing issues of  identity 
and the contextualisation of  faith remain significant barriers.   
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Chapter Eight – Concluding remarks:  How do we understand ourselves, what is the reality of ethnic differences that have survived up until today in some countries? A Christian belongs to his people, to his country and to his society, just as every human being in each one's country and society. We constitute a small number, but we are not minorities in the sense of being a foreign element in our countries. And we say: we are not numbers, neither are we proportions, we are human beings one hundred per cent. Each one is a creature of God, just like everyone else in the country, Muslim, Jew, Druze or Christian. We belong to our people, whatever the behaviour of our people might be, welcoming or persecuting as it happens to be now in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, as Christians, we are sent to our people: we are bearers of a mission, we have a message to our people, to adhere to its identity, and to contribute to the building up and defence of our society, in all circumstances, easy or difficult, as it is at present. Jesus told us: you are the salt, the light in your societies. That means we have to bring to our public life a taste of living, our Christian values and ways.624 
 
-- Patriarch Emeritus, H.B. Michel Sabbah  
This study has found that the complex dynamics of  communal and political identity have a 
profound effect on the ways in which Palestinian Christians participate politically.  It was argued that 
the situation of  statelessness has created several competing notions of  the nation, which are then 
defined, transmitted, and enforced by actors in competition with the state. The Palestinian Authority, 
as the nominal state, has attempted to foster a sense of  civic universalism, but its unpopularity and 
ineffectiveness have not allowed for this narrative of  the nation to dominate the cultural 
imagination.  As a result, the actors with the most popular support have been able to effectively 
transform societal norms and nationalism to suit their own ideological perspectives.  The ongoing 
issues of  emigration, increased sense of  communalism, and low levels of  political interest and 
participation can therefore be explained, in part, by the alienation that some Palestinian Christians 
feel from this evolving and fractured national identity.  Individuals are less willing to endure the 
difficult daily realities of  life under Occupation if  they do not derive some material or psychological 
utility from the social identity of  the nation or find refuge in their communities.  This has a number 
of  important implications for the ways in which Palestinian Christians participate politically and can 
shed light on broader issues of  political and social participation for minorities in the Middle East, as 
well as highlighting the need for on-the-ground qualitative research in these areas.   The following 
sections present a thematic summary of  the main findings of  this study, highlighting potential areas 
for future research and discuss the limitations of  "identity" as a theoretical framework.    
 
                                                 624. Michel Sabbah, "Emeritus Patriarch of  Jerusalem Considers Palestinian Christian Identity in Mideast," Zenit 2015. 
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1. The political influence of  the church: 
Although the church continues to play a vital role in the daily life and socialisation of  Palestinian 
Christians, the growing disconnect between church leadership and the social reality had led to an 
overall decline in the influence of  the church in the political field.  This is due to a number of  
factors.  The first factor is the church's views on ecumenical relations and intermarriage.  Numerous 
respondents indicated that the growing openness to ecumenical relations amongst the lay 
community was a result of  the increasingly common practice of  intermarriage between different 
Christian denominations in Palestine.  As discussed in Chapter Two, this has meant that the "in-
group" expands beyond the confessional community and extends to other Christian denominations.  
Therefore, if  the church leadership is unwilling to integrate these practices and values into their 
liturgical and pastoral practices, individuals are less likely to have a positive relationship with the 
confessional community, thereby decreasing the relative influence of  the church leadership. 
 
A second factor in the declining influence of  church leadership in the political field has been the 
ongoing issues of  the identity and vocation of  the churches themselves.  Within the Rum Orthodoks 
community in particular, the identity of  the Patriarchate of  Jerusalem continues to be a highly 
contentious issue.  As discussed in Chapter Four, although the history, ancient liturgy, and traditions 
of  the Orthodox Church were seen as central to the identity of  Rum Orthodoks respondents, the 
material and psychological utility of  the Orthodox identity was impaired by the ethnic Greek near-
monopoly of  the church hierarchy.  Therefore, although Arab parish priests were highly regarded 
amongst community members and influential in certain social contexts, the influence of  the higher 
clergy on social and political action was negligible.  The situation in the Latin community was slightly 
different, with the Patriarchate having greater influence on the social lives of  the lay community and 
providing considerable social welfare to the Palestinian people as a whole.  However, when 
discussing how respondents made political choices and approached activism there was not a drastic 
difference between the Latin and Orthodox communities.  This suggests that the lack of  
contextualisation of  the faith was a more influential factor in determining the political role of  the 
church leadership.    
 
Contextualisation was particularly relevant in terms of  determining whether or not respondents 
would turn to their church leadership for advice on social and political issues -- but was also a factor 
contributing to the psychological utility of  confessional identity; that is: Who can I turn to for advice 
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when facing the choice to participate politically? Choose a political party? Attend a rally or protest? Emigrate?  And 
also, how can I participate as both a Christian and a Palestinian? The rigidity of  Catholic and Orthodox 
liturgies may also explain the conversion of  a number of  Palestinian Christians to various forms of  
Protestantism over the past several decades.  Whilst these Protestant communities remain small in 
number, Palestinian Protestant priests and activists have been some of  the most outspoken Christian 
activists in Palestine in recent decades, which they attribute partly to the greater amount of  flexibility 
in the liturgy of  Protestantism.  They are therefore able to respond to the social and political context 
more fluidly than their Orthodox and Catholic peers.  This contrasts the relative lack of  
contextualisation of  social and political issues in the Orthodox and Latin liturgies, which contributed 
to feelings of  isolation, despair and hopelessness in the lay community, as individuals are increasingly 
uncertain of  how to respond to changing societal norms as both Palestinians and Christians.  These 
three factors contributed to the limited role that the church leadership plays in influencing or 
inducing political participation and activism in the lay community.  
 
2. Political Participation 
Within the context of  statelessness, as discussed in Chapter Six, a political choice is extremely 
consequential to the future nature and structure of  a state because political actors have competing 
ideas about what the future state should look like: secular-nationalism, Islamism, quasi-secularism, 
etc.  As Palestinian political parties have evolved over time, they have responded to the changing 
cultural context, in which Islamism had presented a major challenge to the secular-nationalist 
paradigm.  For the Palestinian Christian communities, political choices and political participation 
were largely pragmatic, responding to the needs of  the community rather than ideological concerns.  
Chapter Six proposed the following hierarchy for political choice, which responds both to the 
limitations placed on members of  particular social groups, and the tendency for Christians to be 
pragmatic and defensive voters: 
 
1. Choice is limited by communal identification – I am a Christian, I cannot vote for Hamas 
2. Assessment of  the past performance of  a party – Has this party delivered on its promises? 
3. Current material utility of  a party – How capable is this party of  economic and social development? 
4. Ideological considerations – Does this party's platform match my own political ideology? 
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This hierarchy explains the fact that there is very low long-term support for political parties (figure 9 
appendix), but rather that voters continuously assess the effectiveness of  a party based upon the 
context.  What it is unable to explain, however, is the grassroots support shown for parties on the 
left and, far less frequently, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.  As the hierarchy suggests, within the context 
of  the voting booth, pragmatic considerations take priority over ideology and other factors.  
Therefore, even if  an individual is a long-term member of  the PFLP, attends their rallies, and 
supports their political ideology, it would be unlikely that he/she would vote for them unless they 
were able to significantly improve upon their ability to delver economic development.  Additionally, 
the notion of  samud has a powerful effect on party support -- particularly in times of  crisis. As 
Chapter Two discussed, when threat primes become activated during times of  crisis, those groups 
who can show the most effective resistance against Israel gain popular support -- regardless of  the 
fact that their ideology may be incompatible with other aspects of  an individual's social identity.  
Whilst this does not translate into a significant amount of  votes, it does show that there are 
situations in which pragmatism is subdued in exchange for national solidarity.  However, in the 
absence of  perpetual conflict, this may have an effect on the ways in which nationalism is imagined 
and performed.   
 
Views on the proto-state and the perceived position of  Christians within society were largely shaped 
by how individuals regarded citizenship and equality.  Palestinian Christians were against the electoral 
quota system, in which Christians were guaranteed a number of  parliamentary and local council 
seats.  From their perspective, any efforts made by the state to single them out as minorities was 
detrimental to their overall situation in Palestine, regardless of  the fact that these measures provided 
them with political power in situations where it would have been unlikely to have occurred naturally.  
This translated into views on citizenship, in which it was frequently reiterated that they simply want 
the same citizenship rights and duties as all other Palestinians.  This is also reflective of  the 
overwhelming tendency to support a secular-nationalist view of  the state in which religion is not a 
factor in the electoral system.  This has important implications for other Middle Eastern minority 
groups who may feel that quotas in their countries continue to reflect the hegemony of  Islam rather 
than civic universalism.  It may also be an important consideration for future state building efforts in 
Syria and Iraq, where attempts at federalism and proportional representation have largely failed to 
instil a unified sense of  the nation amongst heterogeneous populations. 
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3. For church or nation? 
Borrowing the above question from Lybarger, this section discusses the question of  how Palestinian 
Christians reconcile their political and communal identities.  As Chapter Five discussed, Lybarger 
proposes several typologies of  identity in regards to this relationship: secular-nationalist, religion-
communal, and apolitical piety.  Whilst these typologies were most certainly identified in the 
fieldwork, this study has argued that the relationship between communal and political identity is far 
too complex and varied to synthesise into typologies.  Rather, as discussed throughout this study, the 
fluidity of  these notions necessitates a flexible approach.   
 
What can be identified are trends within the social context that have shaped the relationship between 
these two aspects of  social identity.  The shift away from secular nationalism, for example, has 
created a crisis of  identity for the Palestinian Christian community, who are increasingly concerned 
with how they fit into Palestinian society. For those who feel alienated by the growing role of  Islam 
in the public discourse, they may retreat to their communal identities – leading to a decline in overall 
national solidarity.  If  and when Palestinian Christians do retreat to their confessional communities, 
if  they do not receive sufficient guidance in terms of  how their faith can address ongoing social and 
political issues, then they have little incentive to remain in the country.  Social welfare initiatives, 
whilst providing essential and otherwise absent services to these communities, have only provided a 
short-term solution to the more salient existential crises of  demographic decline and identity 
politics.  Whilst these trends do not mean that Palestinian Christians are not committed nationalists 
or pious Christians, they do suggest that this community feels increasingly alienated by the changing 
social and political landscape.   
 
In terms of  the relevance of  communal identity to state attachment, it was found that there is a 
correlation between feeling alienated from the national identity and the level of  communalism 
individuals experienced.  In other words, those who had negative feelings about the proto-state and 
did not see themselves reflected in the national identity were more likely to place a stronger 
emphasis on their being a Christian over being a Palestinian (whether they identified as religious or 
not).  Simultaneously, it was found that the political role of  the religious leadership was not normally 
a factor in individual's political lives.  Rather, a majority of  respondents indicated that the religious 
leadership fell short of  their expectations when it came to contextualising social and political issues 
within a Christian worldview.  These factors were connected to the high levels of  emigration 
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amongst Palestinian Christians.  Those who were against emigration were either committed 
nationalists (and typically not religious) or very pious, whereas those who hoped to emigrate felt 
disassociated from one or both of  these levels of  identity.  These dynamics are crucial to 
understanding how non-Muslim minorities participate politically in the Middle East, and also how 
the erosion of  post-colonial nationalism in the Middle East may be reconstituted.  Gaining a clearer 
understanding of  the impact of  identity on politics is essential in moving beyond the overly 
simplistic assumptions made about religious minorities in international politics.   
 
Theoretical implications and scope for future research: 
As discussed above, these considerations may shed light on how non-Muslim minorities in the 
Middle East are integrated into their civil societies.  Previous state building efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have attempted to include ethnic and religious minorities in the political system through 
federalism, proportional representation, and devolved parliamentary powers.  Whilst this may 
provide a short-term fix in the wake of  national reconciliation, in the long-term it may have the 
opposite effect in terms of  inducing a unified sense of  nationalism.  This is because, rather than 
integrating minority groups, these methods emphasise that the differences between sub-national 
groups are irreconcilable.  They also clearly demarcate which groups are in the national majority and 
minority.  The end result is a rather fractured sense of  the nation, which has proven unsustainable in 
the long-term.  The pragmatism of  minority voters shows that they are perhaps less engaged and 
invested in a future state and therefore have little incentive to participate.  These conclusions are 
supported by Elkins and Sides who have argued that federalism and proportional electoral systems 
have, 'at best mixed results' in terms of  inducing attachment to the state.625   
 
However, these studies give a rather superficial overview of  minority participation, in that they can 
describe the fact that these state building initiatives have failed, but not why they have failed. It is 
hoped that this study will shed some light on the internal identity dynamics behind these failed 
initiatives, by making empirical contributions to the study of  minority identity and politics in the 
Middle East.  It is also hoped that this study contributes to a small, but growing body of  research on 
the construction of  national identity in stateless contexts, specifically by detailing how minority 
                                                 625. Zachary Elkins; John Sides, "Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States?," The American Political Science Review 101, no. 4 (2007). 
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communities are affected by populism and pious nationalism.  However, there continues to be scope 
for further research.  
 
One potentially insightful study into alternative state building models might be a case study involving 
political identity amongst the Iraqi and Syrian Christian communities -- both in the diaspora and in 
the homeland.  This study could assess the ways in which these communities are politically involved, 
as well as their assessment of  American efforts to rebuild Iraq, and prospects for the future (Iraq 
and Syria).  Such a study could shed light on what went wrong, as well as how non-Muslim 
minorities achieved some measure of  stability in the past.  Along similar lines, a large scale 
comparative study of  Christian communities in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon could shed some 
light into the modes of  political involvement in these countries, how political involvement has 
changed over time, views of  the nation, prospects for the future, etc.  Such a study could also assess 
the role of  the growing diaspora communities in the politics of  the homeland, which was addressed, 
in part, by a recent DIMECCE study,626 which found that these relationships are substantial -- often 
going as far as to fund, help direct and coordinate opposition groups in the homeland -- as was the 
case with certain Coptic groups during the short-lived Morsi government in Egypt.  In the case of  
all of  these communities, there is scope for further analysis of  their political trends and opinions.  
Such studies could be extremely relevant to future foreign policy to these states, as well as the 
integration of  new Middle Eastern Christian immigrant communities into the European and North 
American contexts. 
 
Limitations of  identity as a theoretical framework: 
As with any study of  significant length, there are limitations to the approaches used in this thesis: 
firstly, the nature of  qualitative research itself.  Although the researcher is able to gain a far deeper 
understanding of  the dynamics at work within a given context, the time consuming nature of  
qualitative work itself  limits the potential sample size.  As such broad trends can be revealed and 
assessed, but it is difficult to create predictive models about behaviour.  Similarly, using "identity" as 
a theoretical framework, you are confronted with the enormous complexity of  the ways in which we 
identify with the world and how this shapes our behaviour.  This study has attempted to clearly 
define identity and its uses, as well as illustrate its depth.  Whilst quantitative data is often overly 
descriptive and lacking analytical depth, qualitative data can be overwhelmingly complex.  Therefore, 
                                                 
626 https://arts.st-andrews.ac.uk/dimecce/ 
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the use of  analytical software in this study was very beneficial in this regard, in order to help sort, 
quantify, and analyse hours of  interview material.  It is hoped that, despite these limitations, this 
study has presented a coherent synthesis of  identity politics in Palestine. 
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
This study of  the role that identity has played in the political lives of  the Palestinian Christians has 
shown that the complex dynamics of  identity choice have a significant effect on the level of  
attachment individuals have towards their nation, state, and community.  Beyond shaping the 
political choices and participation of  individuals, this study has shown the potential implications of  
identity issues on the demographic realities of  this community.  Although the Israeli Occupation, 
growing public role of  Islam, and fractured political landscape continue to present significant 
challenges to Palestinians as whole, the identity of  a future state and the role of  minorities -- 
whether they are Christian, atheist or otherwise -- is a potentially contentious issue.  When applied to 
other non-Muslim minorities in the Middle East, it is clear that identity politics will continue to play 
an important role in the foreseeable future.  However, efforts within these communities and the 
international community must take into account the nuanced dynamics, history, and interests of  
these communities in order to instil a more long-term, stable, and inclusive narrative of  the nation.   
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Appendix:  List of  political factions: 
 
The political left: 
Popular Front for the Liberation of  Palestine (PFLP)  
Founded: 1967 
Ideological stance: Marxist-Leninist  
Do they support armed struggle: Yes 
One-state/two-state solution: rejects the Oslo Accords and a two-state solution 
The PFLP was founded by Palestinian Christian George Habash, a Palestinian Christian, in the wake 
of the 1967 War and subsequent Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Its political 
ideology was initially based in Marxist-Leninist Arab Nationalism, but the collapse of the Soviet 
Union affected its funding and called into question the efficacy of Marxism in the Palestinian 
Territories. The PFLP has rejected the two state solution and adopted armed struggle as part of its 
resistance.  Since joining the PLO in 1968, it has been its second largest political faction, but has 
faced internal ideological divisions regarding the role of diplomacy and armed struggle since the late 
1960s.  These divisions resulted into the formation of several splinter groups, most notably the 
DFLP.   
With the rise of Hamas in the late 1980s, the PFLP lost ground as an opposition party to Fatah.  
The PFLP boycotted the 1996 PA elections, which further diminished their influence and 
popularity.  As a result of their diminishing influence, the PFLP began to establish 'a network of 
party-affiliated civil society organisations in the West Bank and Gaza', which has contributed to their 
strong grassroots support.627  However, this has not necessarily influenced voting trends, as their 
inability to deliver economic development and uncompromising stance on peace negotiations has 
dampened their perceived efficacy as a political actor. 
At present, the PFLP has struggled to transform its ideological platform to suit the political and 
social context.  As Broning argues, 'The failure of the PFLP to mobilize larger parts of the electorate 
                                                 627. Broning, Political Parites in Palestine: Leadership and Thought.@101 
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has often been attributed to the PFLP's ambiguous stance among theoretical rejection, practical 
accommodation, and radical socialism, which alienated not only the political establishment within 
the PNA but also the voters who felt that the PFLP's rhetoric of class struggle failed to address and 
was not in tune with the pressing issues of their daily lives.'628  As a result, their traditionally strong 
support amongst Palestinian Christians has declined in recent years.  They continue to have strong 
grassroots support, but have not managed to present a real challenge to Fatah or Hamas in terms of 
electoral votes.   
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)  
Founded: 1969 
Ideological stance: Marxist-Leninist (until 1991), now broadly socialist 
Do they support armed struggle: initially yes, but not currently 
One-state/two-state solution: rejects the Oslo Accords, but is warming to the two-state solution 
The DFLP was initially founded as a splinter group from the PLFP in 1969.  Unlike the PFLP, the 
DFLP pursued a parallel diplomatic process in addition to armed struggle.  The DFLP initially 
received support from the Soviet Union and has a Marxist ideological perspective.  It has been the 
third largest faction in the PLO since it joined in 1968.  It has abandoned armed struggle and has 
become a more pragmatic institution, often entering into alliances with the PPP.  However, it 
rejected the Oslo Accords.629  Despite its relatively strong support in the 1970s and early 1980s 
amongst the Palestinian Christian communities, it has declined in popularity in recent years, largely 
because of its inability to inspire popular support like the PFLP or provide material benefit like 
Fatah. 
Palestinian People's Party (PPP)  
Founded: in its present form 1982 
Ideological stance: Socialist 
Do they support armed struggle: No 
One-state/two-state solution: supported the Oslo Accords, supports two-state solution 
                                                 628. Ibid., 102 629. Ibid. 
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The PPP is the successor to the much older Palestinian Communist Party (PCP), which was founded 
by left wing Jews and Palestinians in 1919 as an anti-Zionist party.  The two factions split in 1943 
and the Palestinian faction formed the National Liberation League (NLL), which was dissolved after 
the 1948 War.  It was the only Palestinian party to support the 1947 UN Partition Plan for Palestine.  
The NLL reestablished itself fully as the PCP in 1982, gaining independence from the Jordanian 
Communist Party.  The PCP joined the PLO in 1987 and was the only member not actively engaged 
in armed resistance at the time.  Similar to the aforementioned PFLP and DFLP, the PCP was 
greatly affected by the fall of the Soviet Union. 630 From 1991, it sought to rebrand itself as the 
Palestinian People's Party (PPP), distancing itself from Marxism and Leninism.  The PPP has 
marginal support amongst the Palestine Christian communities, but this support is primarily shown 
when the PPP runs in coalition with Fatah-associated lists.  
The Political Centre: 
Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah)  
Founded: in its present form 1959 
Ideological stance: Democratic Socialism 
Do they support armed struggle: formerly, but not currently 
One-state/two-state solution: supported the Oslo Accords, supports two-state solution 
Fatah is the largest faction of the PLO.  Founded in 1959, Fatah has represented the ideological 
centre of Palestinian politics.  Its popularity has decline somewhat since the death of Yassir Arafat 
and the failure of the Oslo Accords, but it remains a key player in Palestinian politics -- particularly 
in the West Bank631.  Fatah has largely abandoned armed resistance in exchange for diplomacy in 
recent decades, which has also contributed to its decline in popular support as opposed to Hamas.  
Fatah has the most electoral support amongst Palestinian Christians despite the fact that they are 
generally regarded as corrupt and have been largely ineffective in terms of providing services to 
these communities.  But, given their ability to integrate Christians into its leadership and work 
towards peace -- and most importantly, to gain aid money -- it is often the most pragmatic choice 
for Christian voters.  
                                                 630. Ibid. 631. Ibid. 
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The Political right: 
Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)  
Founded: in its present form 1987 
Ideological stance: Islamist -- Muslim Brotherhood affiliate 
Do they support armed struggle: Yes 
One-state/two-state solution: rejected Oslo Accords, rejects two-state solution 
Hamas was founded in 1987 as an ideological offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  
Hamas is the major opposition party to Fatah.  It has also rejected the Oslo Accords and continues 
to support armed struggle against Israel.  Hamas has largely been characterised as a terrorist 
organisation by a number of western states.632  However, since their formation in 1987, and election 
in 2006 (and subsequent rule of the Gaza Strip), Hamas has transformed itself into an actor capable 
of institution building and very limited diplomacy.  Hamas' ideological stance, however, continues to 
be largely characterised by its close relationship with Islamism.  Translated into policy, this means a 
stronger role of Islamic shari'a in governance and law, and a worldview in which religious pluralism 
is tolerated, but non-Muslim minorities are not given equal rights.  
Unsurprisingly, Hamas has very low support amongst Palestinian Christians.  However, as discussed 
in Chapter Six, there are certain conditions in which Palestinian Christians do support Hamas, for 
example, in times of conflict when Hamas is actively resisting Israel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 632. Ibid. 
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Tables, figures, and graphs: 
 
Figure 1: West Bank Population Graph: 1961-2014 
 
 
Figure 1633 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
633 Based on data from the 1961, 1967, 1997 and 2007 censuses 
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Figure 2: West Bank Christian Population: 1945-2014 
 
 
Figure 2634 
 
Table 1: Palestinian Migration Figures: 2005-2009 
 
 Returnees Emigrants 
2005 7077 5841 
2006 6054 5205 
2007 5000 7290 
2008 5854 7390 
2009 6426 7122 
Table 1635 
 
 
 
                                                 
634 Based on data from the 1945 Anglo-American Survey, and the 1961, 1967, 1997 and 2007 censuses 
635 (PCBS), Migration Survey in the Palestinian Territory., 60. 
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Table 2: West Bank Male Life Table:  
 nMx nQx lx nDx nLx Ex 
Actual Deaths Actual Population 
0-4 0.00292 0.01450 100,000 1,450 496,374 63.77 474 162,223 
5-9 0.00016 0.00080 98,550 79 492,548 59.67 25 155,781 
10-14 0.00028 0.00138 98,469 136 492,003 54.72 42 152,460 
15-19 0.00046 0.00232 98,332 228 491,079 49.79 62 133,464 
20-24 0.00070 0.00351 98,100 345 489,621 44.90 72 102,320 
25-29 0.00065 0.00325 97,749 318 487,931 40.05 56 86,041 
30-34 0.00079 0.00393 97,424 383 486,136 35.18 59 74,931 
35-39 0.00096 0.00477 97,031 462 483,962 30.31 62 64,902 
40-44 0.00134 0.00669 96,554 646 481,099 25.45 75 55,870 
45-49 0.00227 0.01131 95,885 1,084 476,599 20.61 98 43,083 
50-54 0.00509 0.02514 94,754 2,382 467,488 15.83 147 28,874 
55-59 0.00866 0.04238 92,241 3,909 450,609 11.19 187 21,595 
60-64 0.01549 0.07455 88,003 6,561 421,377 6.61 246 15,884 
65-69 0.02245 0.10627 80,548 8,560 376,171 1.99 239 10,647 
70-74 0.03626 0.16624 69,920 11,623 308,043 -3.09 329 9,073 
75-79 0.05144 0.22789 53,297 12,146 209,511 -9.83 327 6,357 
80-84 0.08739 0.35859 30,508 10,940 62,890 -24.05 318 3,639 
85-89 0.11895 0.45844 -5,352 -2,453 -141,368 148.84 214 1,799 
90-94 0.14884 0.54239 -51,196 -27,768 -391,576 12.80 103 692 
95+ 0.23929 0.74862 -105,435 -78,931 -263,587 2.50 95 397 Table 2636 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
636 Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Health (MoH), Health Annual Report (Ramallah, 2007).; ; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Census 1997. 
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Table 3: West Bank Female Life Table:  
 nMx nQx lx nDx nLx Ex Actual Deaths Actual Population 
0-4 0.00236 0.01171 100,000 1,171 497,073 72.54 366 155,407 
5-9 0.00025 0.00124 98,829 122 493,838 68.37 37 149,620 
10-14 0.00018 0.00090 98,706 88 493,305 63.45 26 145,100 
15-19 0.00013 0.00067 98,616 66 492,915 58.51 17 127,614 
20-24 0.00022 0.00108 98,550 107 492,478 53.54 21 97,083 
25-29 0.00035 0.00175 98,442 172 491,771 48.60 29 82,922 
30-34 0.00030 0.00150 98,267 148 490,958 43.68 22 73,128 
35-39 0.00060 0.00297 98,117 292 489,839 38.75 37 62,108 
40-44 0.00107 0.00533 97,819 522 487,762 33.86 56 52,374 
45-49 0.00170 0.00847 97,286 824 484,312 29.03 51 29,983 
50-54 0.00263 0.01306 96,439 1,260 478,930 24.26 76 28,906 
55-59 0.00517 0.02550 95,133 2,426 469,290 19.56 105 20,327 
60-64 0.00957 0.04674 92,583 4,328 451,230 15.03 178 18,595 
65-69 0.01717 0.08233 87,909 7,238 418,961 10.70 242 14,092 
70-74 0.02809 0.13123 79,676 10,455 365,573 6.54 332 11,820 
75-79 0.03866 0.17626 66,553 11,731 288,700 2.34 337 8,717 
80-84 0.06288 0.27170 48,927 13,294 176,709 -2.72 318 5,057 
85-89 0.09008 0.36761 21,757 7,998 16,881 -14.23 207 2,298 
90-94 0.10894 0.42809 -15,004 -6,423 -182,043 21.77 89 817 
95+ 0.18282 0.62736 -57,813 -36,270 -144,533 2.50 83 454 Table 3637 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
637 (MoH).; (PCBS), Census ; (PCBS), Census 1997. 
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Table 4: West Bank Male Survival Rates and Migration Estimates: 1997-2007 
Age Group Survival Rate Migration (0-4)-(10-14) 0.991 -150 (10-14)-(20-24) 0.997 -146 (20-24)-(30-34) 0.995 -135 (30-34)-(40-44) 0.994 -254 (40-44)-(50-54) 0.993 -239 (50-54)-(60-64) 0.992 -229 (60-64)-(70-74) 0.990 -175 (70-74)-(80-84) 0.985 -69 (80-84)-(90-94) 0.972 -50 Total  -1488 
Table 4638 
Table 5: West Bank Female Survival Rates and Migration Estimates: 1997-2007 
Age Group Survival Rate Migration (0-4)-(10-14) 0.992 -110 (10-14)-(20-24) 0.998 -72 (20-24)-(30-34) 0.998 -74 (30-34)-(40-44) 0.998 -194 (40-44)-(50-54) 0.997 -175 (50-54)-(60-64) 0.996 -142 (60-64)-(70-74) 0.993 -80 (70-74)-(80-84) 0.989 -94 (80-84)-(90-94) 0.982 5 Total  -936 
Table 5639 
              
                                                 
638 Author’s calculations based on the data from: (PCBS), Census ; (PCBS), Census 2007; (MoH). 
639 Author’s calculations based on the data from: (PCBS), Census ; (PCBS), Census 2007; (MoH). 
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Table 6: Palestinian Christian Population: 1945-2014  1945640 1961641 1967642 1997643 2007644 2014645 
Palestine 57,950 47,949 42,494 40,055 42,565 43,000 
West Bank 56,650 42,000 40,016 38,367 41,188 41,687 Gaza Strip 1,300 2,100 2,478 1,688 1,377 1,313 Bethlehem 14,800 15,234 14,406 22,318 21,560 21,045 Hebron 170 168 200 26 66 127 Jericho  1,212 539 371 291 246 Jerusalem 31,330 10,795 10,813 1,525 5,271 12,558 Ramallah  8,410 15,371 10,597 11,140 10,817 10,596 Nablus 1,560 3,069 688 777 665 665 Salfit  No data 1,628 No data  6 No data Qalqilya  No data No data 9 7 6 Tubas  No data No data 54 54 54 Tulkarim 380 No data 100 27 28 29 Jenin  No data 1,045 2,120 2,423 2,661 
Table 6 
Figure 3: Palestinian Christian Population Pyramid: 1997 
 
Figure 3646 
                                                 
640 Various, A Survey of Palestine : Prepared in December, 1945 and January, 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (Volume 1 of 3), ed. J. V. W. Shaw (Inst for Palestine Studies, 1991). 
641 1961 Jordanian Census cited in: Raheb, Palestinian Christians in the West Bank: Facts, Figures and Trends.; Soudah and Sabella. 
642 1967 Israeli Census cited in: Raheb, Palestinian Christians in the West Bank: Facts, Figures and Trends.; Soudah and Sabella. 
643 (PCBS), Census  http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/pcbs_2012/Publications.aspx ‘Population Report, Bethlehem Governorate - First Part (Final Results)’ 
644 (PCBS), Census , 2007. 
645 Author’s calculations; Mourad et al. 
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 Figure 4: Palestinian Muslim Population Pyramid: 1997 
 Figure 4647 
Figure 5: Palestinian Christian Population Pyramid: 2007 
 
Figure 5648 
      
                                                                                                                                                             
646 (PCBS), Census , 1997. 
647 Ibid. 
648 (PCBS), Census , 2007. 
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Figure 6: Palestinian Muslim Population Pyramid: 2007 
 
Figure 6649 
 Table 7: Palestinian Christian Population Growth Rates: 1945-2007  1945-1961 1961-1967 1967-1997 1997-2007 1967-2007 Palestine -1.184 -2.013 -0.197 0.608 0.004 West Bank -1.870 -0.807 -0.140 0.709 0.072 Gaza Strip 2.997 2.759 -1.280 -2.036 -1.469 Bethlehem 0.181 -0.931 1.459 -0.346 1.008 Hebron -0.074 2.906 -6.801 9.316 -2.772 Jericho n/a -13.505 -1.245 -2.429 -1.541 Jerusalem -6.659 0.028 -6.529 12.402 -1.796 Ramallah 3.769 -6.199 0.167 -0.294 0.051 Nablus 4.229 -24.922 0.406 n/a -0.085 Salfit n/a n/a n/a n/a -14.008 Qalqilya n/a n/a n/a -2.513 n/a Tubas n/a n/a n/a 0.000 n/a Tulkarim n/a n/a -4.364 0.364 -3.182 Jenin n/a n/a 2.358 1.336 2.102 
Table 7650 
  
 
 
                                                  
649 Ibid. 
650 These calculations are made using the data from table 6 and the exponential change method. 
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Figure 7: Palestinian Christian Population Growth and Decline: 1945-2007 
 
 
Figure 7651 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
651 This infographic was created by the author and is based on the data from tables 6 and 8. 
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Table 8: Percentage of Total Population: 
 1961 1967 1997 2007 2014 Palestine 4.08% 3.15% 1.44% 1.14% 0.98% West Bank 5.21% 4.45% 2.15% 1.75% 1.55% Gaza Strip 0.57% 0.55% 0.17% 0.10% 0.07% 
Bethlehem 27.81% 29.09% 17.12% 12.73% 10.14% Hebron 0.14% 0.17% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% Jericho 1.89% 5.94% 1.19% 0.72% 0.50% 
Jerusalem 34.49% 36.16% 0.48% 1.51% 2.92% 
Ramallah 13.50% 11.92% 5.49% 4.12% 3.28% Nablus 1.80% 0.45% 0.31% 0.21% 0.17% Salfit n/a n/a n/a 0.01% n/a Qalqilya n/a n/a 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% Tubas n/a n/a 0.16% 0.11% 0.09% Tulkarim n/a 0.14% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% Jenin n/a 1.33% 1.10% 0.96% 0.86% 
Table 8652 
  Figure 8: Why Do Christians Emigrate? 
 
Figure 8653 
                                                 
652 Based on data from Table 6 
653 Data obtained through 2014 fieldwork and a 2014/15 survey conducted for this research 
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Figure 9: Major Party Support Amongst Palestinian Christians (survey) 2000-2010  
  Figure 10: Is there corruption in the PA (2001-2010)?  
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Table 9: 2006 Legislative election results:654  Electoral District Candidate Party Remarks     
Jerusalem IBRAHEIM ABU-SALEM Change and Reform (Hamas) 
 MOHAMMAD TOTAH Change and Reform (Hamas)  WAIL AL-HUSSEINI Change and Reform (Hamas)  AHMAD ATTOUN Change and Reform (Hamas)  EMIL JARJOUI Fateh Christian Quota  IVIVIAN SABELLA Fateh Christian Quota         
Ramallah and al-Bireh HASAN DAR KHALEIL Change and Reform (Hamas) 
 FADEL FADEL HAMDAN Change and Reform (Hamas)  AHMAD MOBARAK Change and Reform (Hamas)  MAHMOUD MUSLEH Change and Reform (Hamas)  MUHEEB SALAMEH  Fatah Christian Quota         Bethlehem KALID DWEIB Change and Reform (Hamas) 
 MAHMOUD ALKHATEEB Change and Reform (Hamas)  FUAD KOKALY Fatah Christian Quota  FAYEZ SAQQA  Fatah Christian Quota     Gaza SAID SEYAM Change and Reform (Hamas)  AHMED BAHAR Change and Reform (Hamas)  KHALIL ELHYYA Change and Reform (Hamas) 
 MOHAMMED FARAJ ELGHOUL Change and Reform (Hamas)  JAMAL SALEH Change and Reform (Hamas) 
 6 JAMAL ELKHOUDARY Independent   ZIAD ABU-AMR Independent   HUSAM ALTAWEEL  Independent Christian Quota            Table 9: 2004-2005 Local election results655:                                                  
654 National Democratic Insititute, "Final Report on the Palestinian Legislative Council Elections." 
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District Locale  Party Affiliation No. of council seats Ramallah Aboud Ibna' al-Balad PFLP 3 
  Reform and Change Hamas 2 
  
Palestinian Liberation Democracy Tomorrow 
Fatah 3 
  Alliance of Palestine Tomorrow Fatah and PPP 3      
 Jifna Jifna al-Watan (Jifna the Nation) Independent 4 
  Jifna Awalan (Jifna the first) Independent 7      
 Ramallah Change and Reform Hamas 5 
  Ramallah Together (everyone) Independent 5   Nation Independent 5      
 Bir Zeit Change and Reform Hamas 2 
  Fulfillment of the Covenant? independent 2   Bir Zeit National independent 9      
 Taybeh Martyr Yasser Arafat Fatah 9      
 Ain 'Arik No Data for 2004/05        
Jenin Zababdeh No Data for 2004/05        
Bethlehem Bethlehem Bethlehem Fraternity and Development 
Independent (But PFLP) 3 
  United Bethlehem Bloc (Baladna) 
Coalition (Fatah, PPP, and Independents) 4 
  Change and Reform Hamas 5   Devotion  1   Hope and Labour Fatah splinter 1   Independent  1      
                                                                                                                                                             
655 elections.ps 
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 Beit Jala United Beit Jala Bloc 
Coalition (Fatah, PPP, and Independents) 6 
  Sons of the Country PFLP 5   independent  1 
  Independent Assembly of Beit Jala  1      
 Beit Sahour United Beit Sahour Bloc 
Coalition (Fatah, PPP, and Independents) 8 
  Sons of Beit Sahour PFLP 5                                  
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Table 10: 2012 Local election results:656 District  Authority Party Affiliation No. of Seats 
Ramallah Aboud Independence and Development Fatah 11      
 Jifna Jifna National and Independent Bloc Coalition 11           
 Ramallah Ramallah Independent Bloc Independent 2 
  Ramallah Al-Mustaqbal Mustaqbal 5   Ibna' al-Balad PFLP 8      
 Bir Zeit Bir Zeit Independent and Professional Bloc Independent 3   Bir Zeit for All PFLP 4 
  Independence and Development Fatah 6      
 Taybeh Independence and Development Fatah 9      
Bethlehem Bethlehem Independence and Development Fatah 7   Baladna Independent 4   Ibna Bethlehem Idependent 2 
  Bethlehem al Jamiyea Independent 2      
 Beit Sahour Independence and Development Fatah 2   Right of Return Independent 2   The Future DFLP 2   Beit Sahour for all Independent 2 
  Development Block Independent 1   Nation PPP 1   Youth and Change Left Alliance 1   Better future Independent 1 
  Independence and Construction Independent 1      
 Beit Jala Democratic Gathering Independent 5 
  Independence and Development Fatah 3 
  Independent Beit Jala Independent 3   Unity Bloc Independent 2                                                  
656 elections.ps 
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     Jenin Zababdeh United Zababdeh Independent 2 
  Construction and Development Independent 4   National Zababdeh Independent 3                                         
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Figures 11-16: Political Party Support by Age group (2000-2010):  
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